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OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy Under
Carter: Continuity and Change
VED P. NANDA*
President Carter has taken a bold initiative to make human
rights a fundamental precept of U.S. foreign policy. Many examples might be cited to illustrate the heightened importance which
human rights is playing in our foreign policy particularly as compared with the previous administration. Moreover, it must be
reckoned that even with the best intentions, any government will
find that the international promotion of human rights is a very
difficult task. At the same time, however, within and without the
Federal bureaucracy, there are competing interests which at
times have muted our voice and vitiated our effectiveness in our
efforts to promote human rights.'

This statement by Donald M. Fraser, former Congressman
and Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations, is
an accurate reflection of the change in emphasis on human
rights instituted by the Carter administration. President
Carter is to be commended for enhancing the priority of human
rights considerations in U.S. foreign policy decisionmaking as
compared with the past. Equally significant, however, is the
role of the Congress in providing the necessary leadership in
taking legislative measures designed for the promotion and the
advancement of human rights abroad. In fact, the pertinent
congressional initiatives and actions predate the Carter administration.2
* Professor of Law and Director, International Legal Studies Program, University
of Denver.

1. Human Rights and United States Foreign Policy: A Review of the Administration's Record, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on InternationalOrganizations of the
Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited

as 1977 Human Rights Hearing].
2. For a comprehensive and incisive commentary on these initiatives, see 14 VA.
J. INT'L L. 591 (1974).

518

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL.

8:517

To illustrate the progress made toward making human
rights an integral component of U.S. foreign policy, U.S. military and economic assistance is now allocated based in part on
the human rights practices of the recipient country. As President Carter remarked at a ceremony at the White House on
December 6, 1978, commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of
the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
"In distributing the scarce resources of our foreign assistance
program, we will demonstrate that our deepest affinities are
with nations which commit themselves to a democratic path to
development. Toward regimes which persist in wholesale violation of human rights, we will not hesitate to convey our outrage
nor will we pretend that our relations are unaffected." 3 Also,
U.S. representatives on multilateral financial institutions have
attempted to place high priority on human rights issues in two
ways: one, by making recommendations on applications for
loans only after an analysis of human rights conditions in the
country seeking the loan;* and two, by making known to other
donor countries the U.S. position and concern with regard to
those countries where serious violations are reportedly occurring. 5
The Administration has demonstrated its commitment to
ratification of the Genocide Convention,' the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 7 the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,8 the Convention on Racial Discrimination,' and the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights. 0 The President has already signed
the important human rights Treaties and is seeking Senate
ratification of these instruments." In Assistant Secretary Patri3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

78 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 1 (Jan. 1979).
1977 Human Rights Hearing, supra note 1, at 10.
Id.
U.N. Doc. A/760, Dec. 3, 1948 at 9.
G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52-58, U.N. Doc. A/6316

(1966).

8. G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49-52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966).
9. Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for
signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force, Jan. 4, 1969).
10. American Convention on Human Rights, signed Nov. 22, 1979, O.A.S. Official
Records, OEA/Ser.K/XVI/1.1, Doc. 65 Rev.1, Corr.1 (Jan. 7, 1970), reprintedin 9 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 99 (1970).

11. See note 3 supra; 78 DRFIT STATE BuLL. 24, 29 (Mar. 1979).
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cia M. Derian's words, Senate ratification is "crucial to the
international credibility of this country's human rights policy.
It is ludicrous for us to base an enormous part of our foreign
policy on the fundamentals of human rights and fail to ratify
the implementing instruments that are in the international
2
world."1
A major departure from the past administrations is the
Carter administration's style in handling human rights issues.
As Assistant Secretary Derian recently suggested: "Our approach has not been limited to quiet diplomacy. We have practiced vigorous diplomacy in which all available instruments are
used. They include symbolic affirmations of our concern ...
We will continue to assert human rights concerns as vigorously
as we have during the past 2 years in our dealings with all
governments.""3
In answering critics of U.S. policy in regard to the recent
emphasis on human rights abroad, especially pertaining to its
timing or the tactics used, President Carter recently remarked:
"[Flew can dispute an important fact of this experience: our
concern for human rights has met with great resonance in the
world at large. The very term has entered the language and
become imbued with an everyday familiarity that was simply
unknown little more than two years ago."' 4 In addition to the
heightened global awareness of human rights issues, the Administration spokesmen have repeatedly asserted the practical
tangible results of the fresh approach, indications of concrete
progress in many parts of the world. Examples would be the
release of political prisoners, less oppression of political opposition, the holding of elections in many countries, and the return
of some countries to multiparty and civilian democratic systems. 5
Nevertheless, in spite of the current emphasis of the Carter
administration on human rights, critics have questioned the
genuineness of President Carter's commitment, particularly in
the face of competing claims, such as, national security, and
12. Supra note 3, at 7.
13. Id. at 6.
14. President Carter's State of the Union Message to the Congress, reprinted in
78 id. 24, 29 (Mar. 1979).
15. See supra note 3,at 5, 7;and 1977 Human Rights Hearing,supra note 1, at 6.
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the lack of effective actions by the Administration regarding
human rights violations in countries closely aligned with the
U.S., such as South Korea, the Philippines, and Iran under the
Shah. Even in Congress there is speculation as to how long the
human rights fervor will last. While a number of human rights
policy decisions have been incorporated into legislation, there
has been a high attrition rate of human rights activists in Congress in recent elections. In short, while the Carter administration has taken a number of important steps toward making the
United States an international leader in promoting human
rights, there still remain a number of questions as to the efficacy and sincerity of President Carter's program, as well as
speculation on how long the enthusiasm can be kept alive in
the face of myriad setbacks and conflicting interests.
These are valid concerns, some of which were aired at a
conference on human rights held in Denver-Boulder in May
1978, cosponsored by the Graduate School of International
Studies and the International Legal Studies Program at the
University of Denver, and the Department of Political Science
at the University of Colorado, Boulder. The conference invited
several close observers of the changes regarding human rights
issues instituted by the Carter administration. What follows is
primarily an adapted version of some of the papers delivered
and presentations made at the conference.
A recurring theme in these papers is the acknowledgement
of the significant changes introduced under the Carter administration. John Salzberg" and Stephen Collins 7 provide two
different perspectives-that of the U.S. Congress and the
A.I.D. respectively-in appraising the accomplishments under
President Carter. While both Salzberg and Collins note the
positive aspects of Carter's policy and the structural changes
within the Administration designed to implement the human
rights priority in U.S. foreign policy, Salzberg cites several instances, such as the Philippines, South Korea, Indonesia, and
the Western Sahara, where the Administration's commitment
to human rights has been compromised by its reticence to re16. Salzberg, The CarterAdministration:An Appraisal, A CongressionalPerspective, infra.
17. Collins, The Carter Administration:An Appraisal, A Perspective from the
Agency for InternationalDevelopment, infra.

1979

HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY UNDER CARTER

late military assistance to human rights. His study leads him
to the sobering conclusion that "the international protection of
human rights is an extremely difficult task with no ready formulas or easily achieved results. '"'
James Walczak' pursues the theme of "human rights and
economic development" introduced earlier by Collins. The
focus of Walczak's inquiry is the U.S. Food Aid Program which
he studies in an historical context. In his words, "this nation's
commitment to the conquest of hunger and malnutrition is a
critical indicator of our overall sincerity towards human
rights." 20 After studying the various congressional and executive actions, he notes that the evolution of the Food Aid Program "continues in the direction of greater emphasis upon the
humanitarian and developmental aspects."'" However, he finds
the overall level of such aid discouraging.
Cedric Tarr2 assesses the impact of human rights considerations on U.S. military assistance since 1973. He describes
the intricate arms transfer decisionmaking process in Washington and concludes that human rights considerations have become an "important new element" in this process since 1977,
a change which "came about because of congressional pressure,
organizational changes in the Department of State and, most
2' 3
importantly, Presidential interest.
Lars Schoultz21 compares the Ford and Carter administrations' policies toward human rights in Latin America. He restricts his inquiry to the twenty-three aid-receiving nations in
Latin America and uses the rather innovative technique of expert evaluation to measure the comparative level of human
rights violations. His objective is to investigate "how and to
what extent the U.S. Government is involved in encouraging
or discouraging the violation of human rights in Latin America." 25 He examines U.S. bilateral and multilateral aid to the
18. Salzberg, infra, at 536.
19. Walczak, New Directions in United States Food Aid: Human Rights and
Economic Development, infra.
20. Id. at 544.
21. Id. at 571.
22. Tarr, Human Rights and Arms Transfer Policy, infra.
23. Id. at 588.
24. Schoultz, US. Policy Toward Human Rights in Latin America: A Comparative Analysis of Two Administrations, infra.
25. Id. at 598.
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selected countries under the two Administrations and concludes that "the performance of the Carter administration in
dissociating the U.S. bilateral aid programs from unusually
repressive Latin American governments is impressive." 2 However, he notes that in the area "of commercial transactions by
U.S.-based corporations, the Carter administration has failed
to use its full influence to promote human rights." He warns
that
it would be a grave error to underestimate the number of U.S.
foreign policy officials who are waiting quietly for the human
rights issue to disappear. The plea of these people, whether it
concerns IFI loans or Food for Peace allocations, is that they must
be allowed to 'de-politicize' the U.S. aid program ....

Their

aim is not to 'de-politicize' aid but to 'de-fuse' human rights
considerations. It would be lamentable if human rights activists,
looking at encouraging data from the U.S. bilateral aid program
to Latin America, were lulled into a complacency which permitted these officials to succeed in their efforts.2

James Nafziger 29 offers a rather intriguing idea: that of
devising an immigration policy which would help bring people
to the resources. He asserts that the United States immigration
law will remain an unsatisfactory means of regulating the inward flow of undocumented aliens as long as it responds to
misplaced fears and fails to take into account the facts and
world order interests. Current Mexican migration is a case in
point. He urges the Federal Government to develop a comprehensive policy framework in which the United States would be
viewed as an important agent in the rational process of human
migration. He recommends the reform of immigration law and
policy to allow a shift from the current emphasis on distributing resources abroad in favor of bringing people to the resources. He considers such a shift to be in the national interest,
furthering the advancement of human rights, and helping this
country fulfill its global responsibilities.
Laurie Wiseberg and Harry Scoble" provide a comprehen26. Id.at 602.
27. Id.at 604.
28. Id. at 605.

29. Nafziger, An Immigration Policy of Helping Bring People to the Resources,
infra.
30. Wiseberg & Scoble, Recent Trends in the Expanding Universe of Nongovernmental OrganizationsDedicated to the Protectionof Human Rights, infra.
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sive survey of the expanding role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) dedicated to the protection of human rights. Noting a shift away from the promotion of human rights to that of
protection, the authors describe the types of organizations involved, types of groups receiving concern, cooperation and coordination of activities among the various NGOs, and strategies and tactics of implementation used by NGOs in selecting
"relevant targets of their activities." In evaluating the effectiveness of NGOs, the authors note encouraging trends. However, they urge continued vigilance by NGOs, since:
the motivation to retain power and privilege is enhanced at the
same time that the technology for repression has become more
sophisticated and regional cooperation among dictatorial regimes
has been demonstrated. For the human rights movement, therefore, the challenges remain at least as demanding as ever and
there are no immediate prospects for sudden or dramatic victo3
ries. '

The conclusion seems inescapable that although the
Carter administration has taken the necessary first steps toward achieving a place of legitimacy and respectability for
human rights in U.S. foreign policy, the continued viability of
this changed posture which will assure the maintenance of a
high priority to human rights considerations both in the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy is by no
means certain. A comment on the recent Vienna meeting is
indicative of the fragile nature of the progress made thus far:
"Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's sudden cancellation of a
private meeting here on June 21 to report Vienna summit progress on human rights in the Soviet Union laid bare this tragic
fact: human rights, the shining emblem of Jimmy Carter's foreign policy, vanished almost without a trace in Vienna."3
Unfortunately, the human rights constituency in this
country is woefully weak: witness the plight of the Genocide
Convention in the U.S. Senate. It seems imperative that
human rights advocates build and nurture such a constituency,
whose voice is strong and clear and will be heard and heeded
in Washington. If the U.S. is to provide a forceful leadership
in the global human rights movement, is there an alternative?
31. Id. at 658.
32. Evans & Novak, US. Human Rights Effort Fading, Den. Post, June 27, 1979,
at 24, col. 1.

THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION: AN APPRAISAL

A Congressional Perspective*
JOHN SALZBERG**
I.

INTRODUCTION

This is an appropriate time to discuss the human rights
policy of the Carter administration, and some of the issues both
of principle and strategy which need further clarification. However, before considering some of the problems faced by the
Carter administration in its formulation and implementation
of a human rights policy, it would be useful to emphasize the
fundamental change which has taken place since this Administration took office in January 1977. Under the Nixon and Ford
administrations, human rights was hardly considered a relevant factor in U.S. foreign policy decisionmaking. Now it is a
legitimate factor in the decisionmaking process, and often does
influence the outcome of decisions.
As a further prefatory comment, the complexity of the
human rights issue in foreign policy should be underscored,
especially the difficulties in achieving progress in this field. It
is important to recognize the limitations of the United States'
influence to affect human rights change in any given country.
Governments believe that repression is essential for the maintenance of control. No matter how much they might value the
friendship of the United States, if they have to choose between
their own survival as a regime and their relationship with the
* Adapted from a presentation made at a conference on human rights, hosted by
the International Legal Studies Program, College of Law, and the Graduate School of
International Studies, University of Denver, and the Department of Political Science,
University of Colorado (Boulder), and held in Denver-Boulder in Spring 1978.
** Special Consultant on Human Rights to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives. Ph. D., 1973, New York University.
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United States, it is obvious which option they are likely to
choose.
Consequently, our efforts may have only a limited impact
on the status of human rights in the country concerned. In
many cases, the most that we may be able to achieve is to
dissociate our government from the repression in that country
by removing the supporting relationship which we have with
that government, particularly in terms of military and economic assistance programs.
The Administration's human rights policy will be briefly
analyzed here by reference to bilateral assistance programs, the
Administration's role in the multilateral arena, and the Administration's initiatives designed to promote human rights.

II.

HuMAN RIGHTS AND MELrrARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

It was in the field of military assistance that Congress
placed the initial emphasis in relating human rights and U.S.
assistance programs, for military assistance provides the most
direct, symbolic, as well as practical, relationship between our
government and the repressive practices of foreign governments. Most repressive governments are military governments,
and the armed forces are frequently involved in day to day
law enforcement, and regrettably, in serious violations of
human rights. Perhaps one of the most blatant examples of the
military's role in repression is in Argentina, where the military
forces are involved in kidnappings, murder, and torture, without identifying themselves as military personnel. Our own military equipment may be involved in these actions, and the personnel involved may have received U.S. military training.
Consequently, military aid should be the first form of aid
sanction in the case of repressive governments. In 1974 Congress adopted in its initial form section 502(B) of the Foreign
Assistance Act,' regarding military sales to repressive regimes,
which was revised and strengthened in 1976.2 Under this law,
all forms of military assistance and sales are to be denied to
governments engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations
of internationally recognized human rights, unless extraordinary circumstances necessitate such assistance. Under this
1. Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559, 88 Stat. 1795 § 502(B).
2. Foreign Assistance Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-330, 90 Stat. 771.
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provision the Department of State is required to submit annually to the Congress a report on the status of human rights
in each country which is to receive either military or development assistance.
Regretfully, except in a few instances, there is very little
tangible evidence that this legislation has been implemented
by the Carter administration. For example, while the Administration made a serious effort at relating military assistance
with human rights in the relatively small country of Nicaragua,
even in that instance, the Administration's record has been
somewhat ambiguous. The Administration signed foreign military sales agreements for fiscal 1977 and 1978 for Nicaragua,
but said it would not implement these agreements unless there
was improvement in human rights. However, it has decided not
to go forward with new bilateral economic programs for Nicaragua. Subsequently, however, it cancelled all military sales to
Nicaragua, including those in the pipeline.
Ironically, the most significant relationship of military assistance and human rights has been taken at the initiative of
several recipient Latin American governments. In response to
the State Department's Human Rights Country Reports issued
in 1977,1 the countries of Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Argentina, and Uruguay decided, on their own initiative, that
they would not accept U.S. military assistance. They did this
on the grounds that they felt that such treatment was insulting
to their national dignity. Subsequently, the government of
Guatemala reversed its position and requested military training assistance. Human rights violations continue in Guatemala
with serious allegations of government complicity in acts of
assassination and violence. More recently, the Governments of
the United States and the Philippines have reached an agreement on the military bases which will entail interested U.S.
support for the martial law regime in the Philippines.
This reticence to relate military assistance to human
rights may be a result, at least in part, of (1) a tendency to
exaggerate the importance of our security assistance programs
to some countries which have been exempted from the human
3. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES IN COUNTRIES RECEIVING U.S.
SECURITY ASSISTANCE, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS. (Comm. Print 1977).
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rights considerations on grounds which do seem justified, and
(2) the inadequate focus which the Administration places on
human rights and military assistance programs. A few examples follow for illustrative purposes.
With respect to the Philippines, for instance, the importance of our military bases has led this Administration to believe we are without any options with respect to military assistance. It has been the Congress, rather than the Administration, that has invoked military aid sanctions with respect to the
Philippines.
The situation in South Korea is notably complex. Moreover, our policy of troop withdrawal, now somewhat amended,
has complicated the situation and diminishes possibilities for
military aid as leverage for human rights in that country. Nevertheless, the linking of military aid with human rights is possible but has been foreclosed by this Administration.
In Indonesia our concern for maintaining friendly relations
has preempted use of military aid as a human rights sanction.
While, on the one hand, it is encouraging that approximately
20,000 of the long term political prisoners have been released,
about 10,000 remain detained without charges and trial. Moreover, the recent crackdown on the press and student protest
indicates that aside from the long term detainee problem,
human rights restrictions in Indonesia remain very real and
pervasive. An additional and significant negative factor in the
Indonesia human rights picture is the forcible annexation by
that government of the Portuguese territory of East Timor-a
clear case of naked aggression by Indonesia in violation of the
United Nations Charter. Moreover, the United States Government concurs in the judgment of the U.N. General Assembly
that the Timorese people have not yet exercised the right of
self-determination. Nevertheless, we continue to provide military assistance to Indonesia, and such aid was substantial in
facilitating the occupation of East Timor and continues to be
used today to suppress liberation fighters.
Another instance where the importance of friendly relations has compromised the Administration's commitment to
human rights is the case of Western Sahara.4 This is another
4. See Franck, The Stealing of the Sahara, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 694 (1976).
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non-self-governing territory which has been annexed, in this
case by Morocco and Mauritania, in contravention of United
Nations resolutions and the U.N. Charter principle regarding
the right of self-determination.' The Moroccan Government
has used U.S. military equipment in its efforts to control the
territory of Western Sahara. Although we have, through quiet
diplomatic representations, urged the Moroccan Government
not to use our arms in the Sahara, violations have occurred,
and we have not contemplated using military aid as a sanction
with respect to Morocco.
Perhaps the Administration has exaggerated the national
security considerations with respect to these countries. Clearly
these countries are important to our national interest, but that
does not foreclose the possibility of using our military aid, at
least in a limited form, as a sanction with respect to human
rights. Moreover, one can seriously question whether our national security rests on solid ground if it is dependent upon
alliances with repressive regimes.
With respect to the inadequate bureaucratic focus, while
the Administration has established the Inter-Agency Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance to deal with economic issues, both bilaterally and through the multilateral financial institutions, there is no comparable committee which
focuses on human rights implications of military aid. The
Inter-Agency Committee, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of
State, Warren Christopher, has representatives from the Departments of Treasury, Commerce, State, Agriculture, the
White House, and other relevant agencies concerned with economic assistance programs and their human rights implications. This task force focuses solely on the human rights implications of particular economic aid programs. As a consequence
of this emphasis, the Administration has used economic aid as
a sanction in many instances. The United States delegates to
the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, and
other international financial institutions have frequently either
voted against or abstained on loans or notified countries applying for them that the loans should be withheld temporarily
5. See inter alia Nayar, Self-DeterminationBeyond the Colonial Context: Biafra
in Retrospect, 10 TEx. INT'L L. J. 321 (1975); and Dinstein, Collective Human Rights
of Peoples and Minorities, 25 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 102 (1976).
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until an improvement in the human rights situation takes
place.
It is ironic that the Administration does not have a comparable committee to deal with human rights implications of military aid, especially in view of the fact that such implications
are considerably more far-reaching than are the human rights
implications of economic aid. To meet some of these inadequacies in the Administration's policy with respect to security assistance, Congressman Fraser introduced during the mark-up
session of the military aid bill for fiscal year 1979 several
amendments' which served to tighten the restrictions on the
use of military equipment and military training with respect to
repressive countries. Although the Administration opposed
these amendments, eleven of them were adopted.
The first of three amendments clarifies the language in the
provisions of section 502(B). It deletes the word "policy" from
the language in the section that "it is the policy of the United
States that gross violators shall not receive military aid assistance." By virtue of that language, the Administration had
interpreted section 502(B) as not providing a mandatory requirement prohibiting military aid to gross violators except
under extraordinary circumstances, thereby permitting it to
provide military aid to gross violators even when there were not
extraordinary circumstances justifying such assistance. Consequently, the provision on military aid and human rights had a
less stringent standard than the human rights provision to economic assistance, which does not contain the "policy" language.
The second amendment offered by Congressman Fraser
concerned the sale of equipment which goes to police forces and
other forces engaged in law enforcement activity. Such equipment may be sold in several ways: (1) as military equipment
through the foreign military sales program; (2) as a commercial
item under the U.S. munitions list; or (3) as a commerical item
subject to the Department of Commerce's Export Administration Regulations. The Fraser amendment, which applies to all
6. For the text of these amendments, see COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS &
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, LEGISLATION ON FOREIGN RELATIONS THROUGH 1978,
VOLUME I, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 65-67 (Joint Comm. Print 1979).
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the above kinds of sales of police equipment, prohibits such
sales to governments engaged in a consistent pattern of gross
violations of human rights, unless the President certifies in
writing that extraordinary circumstances warrant such assistance.
Under prior Department of Commerce Export Administration Regulations, except for South Africa and Communist
countries, police equipment could be sold to any country without a validated license. This had meant, in effect, that police
equipment sales could have taken place without review of the
human rights implications of providing such equipment to repressive governments. Under the Carter administration, there
has been an effort to review some of these sales by virtue of a
voluntary agreement between the Department of Commerce
and the Department of State. However, since the exporters are
not required to have a validated license, the U.S. Government
was not fully aware of who was exporting what items and to
what countries. The category of crime control and detection
instruments under the Export Administration Regulations includes such items as leg irons, shackles, shotguns, shock batons, straight jackets, psychological stress analysis equipment,
dart guns, and even thumb screws. It is incredible that regulations with respect to the sale of such equipment had been so
lax. The Fraser amendment on police equipment will rectify
that situation.
The third Fraser amendment provides that no country, the
government of which is engaged in a consistent pattern of gross
violations of human rights, shall receive military training, unless the President certifies in writing that such assistance is
warranted by extraordinary circumstances. Of all forms of security assistance and sales, military training provides the most
profound relationship between the United States and another
government. When that government is engaged in gross violations of human rights such aid presents a special difficulty. It
needs no documentation that the military services are often the
ones engaged in repressive activities. It is true that under the
existing regulations, military officers who receive training are
required not to go directly into activities of a law enforcement
nature, thus limiting their involvement to matters concerning
the external defense of their country. However, this require-
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ment obviously could not apply permanently to the personnel
concerned, and after about a year from the completion of their
training, they could be assigned to law enforcement duties. It
is interesting to note that while the Carter administration had
held up on the foreign military sales credits for Nicaragua,
until recently it had continued to allow military training to be
provided to the National Guard of Nicaragua, although the
National Guard has been the principal violator of human rights
in Nicaragua.
III.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

It is desirable that high priority be given to pursuing every
avenue of promoting human rights through multilateral as opposed to bilateral institutions. On this score, the Carter administration has a good record. One could cite, among others, such
initiatives as (1) the efforts to encourage governments to permit
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to visit their
countries; (2) the efforts to encourage other donor governments
within the international financial institutions to take human
rights into account in their policies; and (3) the efforts to encourage the U.N. Commission on Human Rights to take constructive steps to respond to violations of human rights. On the
other hand, this Administration's decision to withdraw from
the U.N. agency which is doing the most effective work in
human rights, the International Labor Organization, was a
great disappointment.
The Administration's decision to sign and support ratification of the various human rights conventions-the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,7 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,8 the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,' and the American Convention on Human Rights10-is
7. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966,
G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52-58, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
8. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec.
16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49-52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966).
9. The Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signatureMar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force, Jan. 4, 1969).
10. American Convention on Human Rights, signed Nov. 22, 1969 O.A.S. Official
Records, OEA/Ser.KXVI/1.1, Doc. 65 Rev. 1, Corr. 1 (Jan. 7, 1970), reprinted in 9
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 99 (1970).
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commendable. While the Administration has sent these conventions to the Senate for ratification, unfortunately, it has
attached to these treaties a series of reservations, understandings, and declarations which could seriously undermine the
impact of U.S. ratification. The critics could accuse the Administration of purportedly signaling to the Senate that ratification of these treaties should not have any effect on our laws
and practices even when they are clearly deficient.
Ratification of these treaties with the Administrationrecommended reservations, understandings, and declarations
would expose us to charges that our commitment to the rule of
international law in human rights is halfhearted at best. Moreover, such action could set an unhealthy precedent for other
governments and thus might lead to a weakening of the international standards. It will be desirable for the Administration
to reconsider its position on this issue.
Thus, while there are some misgivings with respect to the
Carter administration's human rights policy, it should, however, be emphasized that many aspects of this Administration's commitment to human rights are well deserving of
praise. For example, the effort which the U.S. has placed on
increasing the effectiveness of multilateral institutions in the
field of human rights, such as the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights and the United Nations, especially its Commission on Human Rights, marks a striking departure from
past U.S. practices.
IV. POSmVE PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
A brief comment on two congressional initiatives which
sought to improve human rights through positive measures is
in order. At the initiative of Congressmen Fraser and Fascell,
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs adopted in May 1978
a bill to establish an Institute for International Human
Rights." The bill provides that the Institute would be an independent agency of the United States Government, providing
assistance for programs to promote universal respect for and
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Assistance would be provided primarily to nongovernmental and
ii. H.R. 12598, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124
1978).

CONG.

REc. H3948 (daily ed. May 5,
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international orgainizations in that field. Assistance could be
for such programs as conferences and seminars, publication of
works that have been suppressed, research, fellowships, assistance to victims of persecution, and assistance for the legal
defense of political dissidents. The bill provides the Institute
with a broad mandate-its assistance can be for organizations
both within the United States and abroad.
The Institute would be governed by a Board of Directors
of seven members, appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate, from among individuals who have
demonstrated a concern for human rights and fundamental
freedoms. No officer or employee of the federal government
may be appointed as the Director, thus insuring its independence. The Board would select an Executive Director who would
be the chief executive officer of the Institute. The bill authorized $1 million for fiscal year 1979.
The subcommittees held three hearings on this bill. Considerable attention was given to the importance of the independence of the Institute from the Department of State. For
these reasons, a section of the original bill which attempted to
formalize that relationship was deleted from the bill. It is interesting to note that the Department itself preferred this arrangement, thus relieving it of any responsibilities for the Institute's
actions.
Another concern of the witnesses was that the Institute not
compromise the independence and autonomy of nongovernmental organizations. This concern obviously relates to ensuring the independence of the Institute, which would be essential
to guarantee that the independence of the nongovernmental
organizations is not compromised. This concern is particularly
felt in terms of gaining receptivity by nongovernmental organizations in foreign countries to receiving funding from the Institute. Obviously, there are many groups that would not wish to
receive Institute funds, and this is a position which one can
highly respect.
Another concern expressed by witnesses was for the Institute to be politically objective and to demonstrate its concerns
through its assistance programs regarding violations of human
rights by both leftist and rightist governments. The independence of the Institute should help to ensure this quality as well,
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and it was hoped that the Administration would appoint members to the Board who have this concern in mind.
The Institute could have provided us with an additional
approach to pursue the advancement of human rights: an Institute not tied to any particular Administration, and an Institute
which could by its actions receive acceptance both by the nongovernmental community here as well as abroad. Unfortunately, an amendment was offered on the floor of the House to
defeat the Institute which was adopted." Few members, of
course, had detailed knowledge about the Institute. It appeared
that most members voted against the Institute because of a
general opposition to establishing new governmental agencies.
Perhaps the Congress and the Administration will reconsider
this proposal. An argument which is quite persuasive in favor
of the Institute is that it would continue beyond a particular
administration and, hopefully, would not be affected by
changes in the human rights policy from one administration to
the next. The Institute would thus provide a permanent and
continuing commitment to human rights by the United States
Government and not be subject to transitory political designs.
Meanwhile, through another initiative by Congressman
Fraser, the Agency for International Development (AID) is providing funding for programs and activities which promote civil
and political rights. Section 116(e) of the Foreign Assistance
Act 3 encourages AID to spend up to $1.5 million in fiscal year
1979 for such programs. The projects thus far approved serve a
variety of purposes: some are educational in nature, some serve
to increase communication between various national groups
struggling to defend human rights in different countries, and
some provide assistance to such groups. It may be hoped that
the success of the AID program will testify as to the usefulness
of creating an Institute along the lines of the Fascell-Fraser bill.
V.

CONCLUSION

On balance, the Carter administration's human rights policy, compared with its predecessors', is a desirable step forward. In a relatively short time frame this Administration has
12. 124 CONG. REc. H4706 (daily ed. May 31, 1978).
13. International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95424, 92 Stat. 947 § 109.
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made significant progress in elevating the priority given to
human rights in U.S. foreign policy, and has had a noticeable
impact on human rights conditions abroad. 4 However, the international promotion of human rights is an extremely difficult
task with no ready formulas or easily achieved results. It is
hoped that the Administration will continue its efforts toward
the utilization of the available bilateral and multilateral channels for such promotional activities.
14. ThirtiethAnniversary of the UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights, 79 DEP'T
STATE BuLL. 1 (Jan. 1979).

The Perspective from the Agency for
International Development*
STEPHEN J. COLLINS**

During the past two years, human rights has emerged as a
major force in American foreign policy. The implementation of
this policy has had a significant impact on U.S. foreign assistance programs.
Early in the Carter administration, a comprehensive reassessment was made of the direction and policy priorities of
existing U.S. foreign assistance programs. It was then determined that two complementary elements-the fulfillment of
the basic human needs of the poor, and the promotion of
human rights-would be key elements of future foreign assistance policy.
THE EMERGENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN U.S. POLICY

With the establishment of the Charter of the United Nations in 1945, the United States committed itself to promote,
respect, and observe human rights and fundamental freedoms
throughout the world. It also strongly supported the 1948 proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which established international definitions of human rights.'
President Carter has reaffirmed this commitment to the
promotion of human rights and made it a central part of his
* Adapted from a paper prepared for a conference on human rights, hosted by the
International Legal Studies Program, College of Law, and the Graduate School of
International Studies, University of Denver, and the Department of Political Science,
University of Colorado (Boulder), and held in Denver-Boulder in Spring 1978.
** Program Analyst, Planning Office, Agency for International Development.
1. G.A. Res. 217 A (II), 3 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).

538

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL.

8:537

foreign policy. As he noted in his address to the United Nations:
All the signatories of the United Nations Charter have
pledged themselves to observe and to respect basic human rights.
Thus, no member of the United Nations can claim that mistreatment of its citizens is solely its own business. Equally, no member
can avoid its responsibilities to review and to speak when torture
or unwarranted deprivation occurs in any part of the world.'

Three categories of rights are recognized by the U.N.
Charter and the Universal Declaration:
First, the right to be free from governmental violations of
the integrity of the person: torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment; arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, and invasion of the home; and the right to a free trial.
Second, economic and social rights: the right to be free
from government action or inaction which either obstructs the
individual's efforts to fulfill his vital needs for food, shelter,
health care, and education, or fails to adequately support the
individual in meeting basic human needs.
Third, civil and political liberties: the right to enjoy freedom of thought, of religion, of assembly, of speech, of the press;
freedom to take part in government; freedom of movement
within and outside one's own country.
Beginning in 1973, as concern intensified about repressive,
dictatorial governments throughout the world, a movement
began in the U.S. to translate the American people's belief in
the inherent rights and dignity of the individual into a major
focus of our foreign policy. Congress that year initiated a reevaluation of the position of human rights in U.S. foreign policy
and the possible effect on U.S. policies and programs in supporting repressive governments. From these deliberations
emerged a series of statutory provisions which formalized in
law our commitment to the goals of the Universal Declaration
on Human Rights. 3 Subsequently, additional legislation placed
2. Reprinted in 76 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 329, 332 (1977).
3. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2151n (1976) (international development assistance tied
to lack of human rights violations); 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) (1976) (security assistance
tied to lack of human rights violations); and 22 U.S.C. § 2384(f) (1976 & Supp. 11977)
(creation of an Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs).
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limitations on U.S. bilateral and multilateral economic aid to
countries which engaged in "a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights." 4
U.S. BILATERAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
The United States' program of bilateral economic assistance, administered by the Agency for International Development (AID), promotes human rights by helping the world's
poor majority to meet their basic human needs and improve
their opportunities for economic, political, and cultural development.
As a practical matter, this human rights policy, as supported by and applied to U.S. bilateral economic aid, has both
negative and positive components. On the one hand, section
116 of the Foreign Assistance Act directs that no assistance
may be provided to the government of any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, "unless such assistance will directly benefit the needy people in such country."5
The Administration has withheld, increased, modified, or
terminated some bilateral economic assistance when it appeared that this action would encourage a government to improve its efforts to respect human rights, or when the continuation of an aid program would have indicated U.S. support for
repressive practices or identified the United States with a repressive regime.
At the same time, with active encouragement from the
Congress, AID has begun a series of positive programs to help
the poor achieve effective access to the rights and protections
accorded by international law and/or the law of their countries.
It is also exploring new ways to identify and carry out programs
which would encourage increased adherence to civil and political rights.
The P.L. 480 Title I Food for Peace program' directs the
sale of American agricultural commodities to developing countries with generous repayment terms. Because of the concessionary nature of the program, it is seen as a symbol of Ameri4. 22 U.S.C. § 262d (a)(1) (Supp. 1 1977).
5. Id. § 2151n (a) (1976).
6. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1711 (1976 & Supp. I §§ 1701-1715, 1977).
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can support for the governments which receive it. As a result,
legislation was enacted last year to provide that no Title I
program be concluded with a country which engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights, unless the food itself or the proceeds from the
sale of the food "directly benefit the needy people in such country."7 The United States, therefore, last year negotiated special
provisions in agreements with a number of governments about
which there are serious human rights concerns to ensure that
all assistance provided under these agreements will reach the
8
needy people in those countries.
The Administration is committed to the proposal that in
developing assistance projects, consideration will be given both
to the impact of the program on the observance of human rights
in that country, and to whether a program could be seen as
supporting a government's human rights policy. When AID
makes its budget proposals, it ensures that the allocations of
these funds reflect, among other factors, U.S. human rights
policy. The countries which most qualify for American economic support are those whose governments are committed to
policies which encourage economic development and equitable
sharing of that progress.
MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE

Among the policy instruments available to the Administration for pursuing human rights objectives are the United
States' votes and influence as a member of the Boards of the
World Bank and other international development lending institutions. The Congress in 1977 directed that the United
States Government use its "voice and vote" in these institutions to promote human rights and seek to channel assistance
to those countries which do not violate human rights? The
legislation further provides that assistance to governments
which are "gross and consistent violators" of human rights be
opposed unless it is directed specifically to programs which
serve the "basic human needs" of the citizens of that country. 0
7. Id. § 1712(a) (Supp. 1 1977).
8. See, e.g., Agreement on Agricultural Commodities, May 17, 1977, IndonesiaU.S., 28 U.S.T. 6172, 6184, T.I.A.S. No. 8677.
9. 22 U.S.C. § 262d (a)(1) (Supp. I 1977).
10. Id. § 262d (f)(Supp. 1 1977).
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The law and Administration policy have resulted in U.S. opposition in the past year to specific loans to problem countries in
all the international financial institutions of which the U.S. is
a member.
While some criticisms have been levelled against the
United States for introducing what are considered nongermane
political issues into these institutions, the Administration believes that the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) are
an appropriate forum for advancing human rights. U.S. policy
does not hold that such actions "politicize" the MDBs, but
rather that economic development is inextricably linked with
questions of equity, welfare, and social justice.
An understanding of U.S. position by other member governments in the MDBs, and cooperation from those who share
our concerns, are needed if our policy of encouraging improved
human rights practices in these fora is to be effective. While a
"no" vote or an abstention on a particular loan by the U.S.
sends a significant message to an offending government, it does
not necessarily alter the flow of resources from the MDBs to
that country. To pursue the possibilities of increased cooperation, the Administration recently sent a joint State-Treasury
team to several MDB member countries to explain U.S. human
rights objectives in the MDBs and solicit the support of these
governments. These consultations will be expanded in the near
future. Their purpose is to increase and normalize consultations with like-minded governments concerning human rights
and to explore areas of potential cooperation.
COORDINATION

In April 1977, an Interagency Group of Human Rights and
Economic Assistance was established at the direction of the
NSC to coordinate implementation of the Administration's
human rights policy as it involved U.S. economic assistance.
It was directed that the Group should be chaired by a representative of the Secretary of State and that it should include
senior representation from the Department of Treasury, the
Department of Defense, the National Security Council, and the
Agency for International Development and other involved
agencies. The Group meets at regular intervals to discuss the
formulation of human rights strategies toward individual governments, to receive reports of changing conditions in specific
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countries, and to make recommendations regarding U.S. decisions on pending bilateral and multilateral assistance projects.
This Group has recommended the deferral of a number of AID
projects and U.S. opposition to MDB loans to some governments whose human rights practices were judged to be highly
abusive.
The application of human rights policy in U.S. foreign
assistance programs has in some cases required shifts in the
design, planning, and implementation of programs. These
changes have caused considerable questioning and controversy
in the U.S., in the less developed countries, and in some international fora. As a result, the Administation set as an important goal this year, expanding the scope and quality of the
dialogue on these policies, with the expectation that greater
understanding of their purpose and goals would foster broader
international acceptance.
Whatever may be the disagreements on the relative emphasis given the human rights in development policy decisions,
the goals of all donors and of the developing countries themselves are clear-self-sustaining growth, the provision of basic
human needs, and strengthened economies which can support
and sustain the basic needs of their people.
As President Carter noted in his address to the Indian
Parliament last January: "human needs are inseparable from
human rights; . . .while civil and political liberties are good
in themselves, they are much more useful and much more
meaningful in the lives of people to whom physical survival is
not a matter of daily anxiety."'"
11. Reprinted in 78 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 7 (Feb. 1978).

New Directions in United States Food Aid:
Human Rights and Economic Development*
JAMES

R.

WALCZAK**

I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of human rights encompasses not only political rights, but also economic and social rights.' Certainly the
most basic among these rights is the freedom from hunger and
malnutrition. 2 The United States, as the world's largest produ* Adapted from a presentation made at a conference on human rights, hosted by
the International Legal Studies Program, College of Law and the Graduate School of
International Studies, University of Denver, and the Department of Political Science,
University of Colorado (Boulder), and held at Denver-Boulder in spring 1978.
** B.S.F.S., Georgetown University; M.A., J.D., University of Denver; M.L.T.
candidate, Georgetown University. Staff Attorney, Foreign Agriculture and Commodity Stabilization Division, Office of General Counsel, U.S. Department of Agriculture.
The opinions and views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do
not represent the official position of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
1. See generally the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, Annex, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16 49-52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966).
For the most recent statement of the United States policy advocating this concept

of human rights, see

SENATE COMM. ON AGRIC LTURE, NUTRITION, & FORESTRY, 95T

A REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
480 42-45 (Comm. Print 1978)
[hereinafter cited as SPECIAL TASK FORCE REPORT]. See also Foreign Food Assistance
of the United States, Report of Secretary of Agriculture Bergland to John J. Gilligan,
Chairman, Development Coordination Comm. (Sept. 29, 1977).
2. Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, supra note 1, at 50-51, states:
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of
everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family,
including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous
improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect
the essential importance of international co-operation based on free consent.
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger, shall take, individually
and through international co-operation, the measures, including specific
programmes, which are needed:
(a) To improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food by making full use of technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition and
by developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to
achieve the most efficient development and utilization of natural
resources;
CONG., 2D SESS., NEW DIRECTIONS FOR
TASK

FORCE
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OPERATION
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U.S.

FOOD ASSISTANCE,
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cer and exporter of agricultural commodities, bears an especially important responsibility in meeting these needs. 3 In this
respect, this nation's commitment to the conquest of hunger
and malnutrition is a critical indicator of our overall sincerity
towards human rights.
Food aid, as well as all other forms of assistance, however,
does not exist in a vacuum. It is affected by a great variety of
domestic and international pressures which are both political
and economic in nature. This situation is unavoidable in a
world marked by fierce ideological differences and increasingly
scarce natural resources. Nevertheless, it is the moral obligation of the United States to anticipate these factors as best we
can, rather than haphazardly to react to every political and
economic pressure, and to do our utmost for the cause of
human rights within these constraints.
Another aspect of the general problem, often overlooked,
is the complex task of administering food aid programs. In both
donor and recipient countries, disputes over food aid development strategies and approaches, resource allocations, and
"bureaucratic turf," sometimes renders the "war on hunger" a
painstakingly slow process which often appears self-defeating. 4
This paper will discuss, in the political, economic, and
bureaucratic context, recent and proposed legislative changes
in the U.S. food aid program. These changes embrace food aid
as a development mechanism, food security, and human rights.
Before discussing these points in detail, however, it will be use(b) Taking into account the problems of both food-importing and
food-exporting countries, to ensure an equitable distribution of
world food supplies in relation to need.
3. Sol M. Linowitz, Chairman, Presidential Commission on World Hunger, recently stated:
The war against hunger must be a universal campaign, waged on
many fronts simultaneously by many diverse actors. Americans have a
leading role to play. The U.S.A. is the largest producer of food in the
world today. It has vast scientific, technical and managerial resources to
contribute. In fact, the challenge of eliminating hunger calls upon the
characteristic U.S. traits of ingenuity, optimism and humanitarian concern.

Wash. Post, Mar. 11, 1979, at C6, col. 6.
The Presidential Commission on World Hunger was created by Exec. Order No.
12,078, 43 Fed. Reg. 39,741 (1978).
4. Anderson, The Human Right Not To Be Hungry, Wash. Post, Apr. 2, 1978, at
C7, col. 5.
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ful to outline the historical and legislative background of U.S.
food aid efforts. 5
II. U.S. FOOD AID PROGRAM-A BRIEF OVERVIEW
A. History
The U.S. food aid program is structured around the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954,1 better known as Public Law 480 or the Food for Peace Program.
P.L. 480 was an outgrowth of: (1) the need to dispose of
huge grain surpluses built up in this country after World War
I; (2) the desire to develop export markets for agricultural
commodities; and (3) the desire to combat communist propaganda and criticism of U.S. wealth in a poor and hungry postwar world.7 Humanitarian motives were also an important factor, but it was these first three elements from which P.L. 480
drew its primary support.
Significant amendments to P.L. 480 were made in 1959
and 1964.' These amendments were primarily concerned with
the administration of P.L. 480. Of greater importance, however, was the Food for Peace Act of 1966.10 This Act was the
turning point in the U.S. food aid program: for the first time,
Congress made it clear that along with encouraging agricultural and economic development, building commercial markets for U.S. exports, and supporting U.S. foreign policies," the
humanitarian purposes of P.L. 480 were to receive primary
consideration. The disposal of surplus agricultural products
was no longer the raison d'Stre of P.L. 480.12
5. For greater detail on this subject see U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, P.L. 480
(Foreign Agric. Econ. Rep. No. 142 Dec. 1977) [hereinafter cited
as P.L. 480 CONCESSIONAL SALES]; SENATE SUBCOMM. ON FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL Poucv,
FOOD FOR PEACE, 1954-1978-MAJOR CHANGES IN LEGISLATION, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS.
(Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter cited as FOOD FOR PEACE].
6. Pub. L. No. 480, 68 Stat. 454 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1691, 1691a, 1701-36
(1976)).
7. FOOD FOR PEACE, supra note 5, at 1-3; P.L. 480 CONCESSIONAL SALES, supra note
5, at 1-3.
8. Act of Sept. 21, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-341, 73 Stat. 606.
9. Act of Oct. 8, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-638, 78 Stat. 1035.
10. Pub. L. No. 89-808, 80 Stat. 1526 (1966).
For a general explanation of the major changes made by the Food for Peace Act
of 1966 see FOOD FOR PEACE, supra note 5, at 8-11.
11. P.L. 480 CONCESSIONAL SALES, supra note 5, at 4. See SPCIAL TASK FORCE
REPolr, supra note 1, at 6-8.
12. The Food for Peace Act of 1966 also made one other very important mechaniCONCESSIONAL SAT,
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Subsequent amendments to the Act continued to place
increased emphasis on the humanitarian and developmental
aspects of food aid. 3 Reacting to what was perceived as grave
abuses in the program, Congress restricted the amount of food
aid made available to countries not among the poorest of the
poor." Presently, the law requires that seventy-five percent of
the food aid commodities provided each fiscal year under Title
I of P.L. 480 be delivered to countries that: (1) meet the poverty
criterion established for International Development Association financing; and (2) are affected by an inability to secure
sufficient food for their immediate requirements through their
own production or commercial purchases from abroad. 5
In addition to these minimum programming requirements,
Congress has recently focused upon the use of food aid as a
development mechanism. The International Development and
Food Assistance Acts of 1975's and 19771 created new statutory
authority and criteria for the application of food aid to chronic
development problems. The latter act also injected the issue of
cal change in P.L. 480: Under the original legislation, P.L. 480 concessional sales were
made for local, mostly unconvertible, currencies. By 1959, it became clear that the U.S.
was rapidly building up huge reserves of foreign currencies with which very little could
be done. Therefore, the 1959 amendments authorized sales for U.S. dollars and the
1966 Act provided for the total phasing out of local currency sales by 1971. Since 1971,
sales have been made solely for U.S. dollars or convertible foreign currencies. Foot FOR
PEACE, supra note 5, at 5-8; P.L. 480 CONCESSIONAL SALES, supra note 5, at 3-4. However, in some countries large amounts of local currencies still remain under U.S.
control. P.L. 480 CONCESSIONAL SALES, supra note 5, at 29-31; HOUSE COMM. ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, USE OF U.S. FOOD RESOURCES FOR DIPLOMATIC PURPOSES-AN ExAMiNATION OF THE ISSUES, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS. (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as
FOOD RESOURCES FOR DIPLOMATIC PURPOSES].

13. See the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559, 88 Stat. 1795;
International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-161, 89
Stat. 849; and International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1977, Pub. L.
No. 95-88, 91 Stat. 533. For a general explanation of the changes made by these and
other amendments see FOOD FOR PEACE, supra note 5, at 12-19.
14. The abuses referred to centered upon the use of food aid for political and
military purposes. In particular, during the early 1970s, large percentages of the P.L.
480 program were being used to support and finance the war in Southeast Asia. FOOD
RESOURCES FOR DIPLOMATIC PURPOSES, supra note 12, at 26-29. The diversion of P.L. 480
commodities to political/military purposes was further aggravated by the 1973-1974
grain shortage that followed the Russian wheat deal of 1972. This shortage of commodities ties drastically reduced the overall level of P.L. 480 programming during this
period. SPECIAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 7.
15. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1711 (Supp. 1979).
16. Pub. L. No. 94-161, 89 Stat. 849 (1975).
17. Pub. L. No. 95-88, 91 Stat. 533 (1977).
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human rights and food aid into the statute itself. The content
and administration of these amendments is discussed more
fully below.
In summary, the legislative history of P.L. 480 indicates
that Congress intends that U.S. food aid policies be governed
primarily by humanitarian and developmental considerations.
The political and economic factors affecting this program, however, are still important, both in terms of domestic political
support for the P.L. 480 program and its impact upon international affairs. Nevertheless, the legislation rightfully views
these various factors as being mutually compatible. To the
extent that they are not compatible in any given situation, it
is incumbent upon the administrators of the program to exercise prudent judgment in weighing the various factors involved.
B.

s
Mechanics of P.L. 480"

1. Statutory Framework
At the present time, there are three basic programs run
under P.L. 480. First, Title I of the Act provides that sales of
agricultural commodities may be made on a concessional basis
to "friendly" countries for U.S. dollars or convertible foreign
currency." Once a Title I agreement has been approved, the
importing country purchases the commodity in the United
States commercial market on a competitive bid basis. Through
a prearranged system with the Commodity Credit Corporation,20 the commodity supplier receives payment in U.S. dollars. The Corporation then is repaid by the importing country
over a period of twenty to forty years." The grant element in
this type of financing transaction is estimated at sixty percent."
18. For a detailed explanation of mechanics and policy aspects of a P.L. 480
transaction see P.L. 480 CONCESSIONAL SALES, supra note 5, at 13-29; and SPECIAL TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 64-94.
19. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1703(b) (Supp. 1979).
20. The Commodity Credit Corporation is a Federally owned corporation operated
under the direction of the Secretary of Agriculture. 15 U.S.C. §§ 714-714m (1976).
21. Sales for dollars are made pursuant to a maximum repayment period of 20
years with a two-year grace period on the first principal installment. Credit for repayments to be made in convertible foreign currency may be extended over a maximum
of 40 years with a grace period on principal payments of up to 10 years. P.L. 480
CONCESSIONAL SALES, supra note 5, at 15-18.
22. P.L. 480 CONCESSIONAL SALES, supra note 5, at 12.
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Ideally, this system will acclimate food aid recipients to
United States' trade practices, and as these countries become
more developed, they will gradually become commercial customers of United States commodities. This is one of the stated
objectives of the Act.2
Another important aspect of Title I transactions is that, in
most cases, Title I commodities are sold in the recipient countries, thereby generating local currencies. The Act requires that
the P.L. 480 agreement specify the manner in which such proceeds will be utilized. That is, such uses must be "self-help"
measures designed to enhance agricultural development, rural
2
development, nutrition, or population planning.
Second, Title I permits the donation of food commodities
to needy countries. Commodities generally are donated either
to the poorest of countries or to countries which have suffered
a major disaster. More than three-fourths of the commodities
donated under this program are channeled through the U.N.
World Food Program and nonprofit voluntary agencies such as
CARE and the Catholic Relief Services.2 1 It is felt that these
agencies provide the best means for assuring that the commodities in question will be distributed directly to the poor.
Finally, Title I of the Act, which embodies the food for
development provisions, was added by the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1977.26 The concept of food
for development contained in Title III, as well as the policy
issues involved, is discussed in detail below.
2. Administrative Framework
Most of the administrative functions required under the
Act are granted to the President. By Executive Order No.
10,900," dated January 5, 1961, the functions of the President
have been delegated to various cabinet officers, most notably
the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and by subdelegation, the Administrator
23. 7 U.S.C. § 1691 (1976).
24. 7 U.S.C. § 1709 (1976); 7 U.S.C.A. § 1706(b)(2) (Supp. 1979).
25. P.L. 480, § 201(b), sets specific statutory quantities that must be channelled
through these organizations. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1721(b) (Supp. 1979).
26. Pub. L. No. 95-88, 91 Stat. 533 (1977) (codified at 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 1727-1727f
(Supp. 1979)).
27. 3 C.F.R. 429 (1959-1963 Compilation).
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of the Agency for International Development. This Executive
order has never been significantly revised despite the numerous
amendments to P.L. 480 and their decided impact upon the
28
basic legislative intent.
Technically, primary responsibility for the administration
of P.L. 480 rests with the Secretary of Agriculture. However,
most major P.L. 480 policy decisions are made by consensus of
the Food Aid Subcommittee of the Development Coordination
Committee. The primary actors in this process are the Department of Agriculture,. the Agency for International Development, the Department of State, the Office of Management and
Budget, and to a lesser extent, the Department of the Treasury
and the Department of Commerce. On a day-to-day basis, policy and administrative responsibilities are shared by the Department of Agriculture and the Agency for International Development.
In practice, the decisionmaking process in P.L. 480 is very
complex and time-consuming. This result is only natural considering the number and diversity of interests affected by food
aid programming. Nevertheless, bureaucratic bottlenecks
hindering the ultimate objectives of the P.L. 480 program must
be minimized. To this end, the Special Task Force on the Operation of P.L. 480, established by the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1977, has recommended a
simplification of the P.L. 480 administrative structure. 2
III. FOOD Am AND HuMAN RIGHTS
President Carter, more than any other American president, has taken up the cause of human rights. Congress also
has responded to the present emphasis on human rights with
enactment of the International Development and Food Assis28. An updated and more streamlined delegation of authority under P.L. 480
would clearly be desirable. As a practical matter, however, it may be impossible to
achieve this goal without first resolving the difficult bureaucratic problem of how U.S.
foreign aid should be administered. Prior to his death, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey
proposed a reorganization for the administration of U.S. foreign assistance. This proposal will be brought again before the Congress during the 96th Congress, 2d Session.
Therefore, it is possible that significant changes will be made in the administration of
food aid assistance in the near future. In reference to possible changes see SPECIAL TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at xii-xvii.
29. SPECLL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 96-115.
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tance Act of 1977. This Act added the following section to P.L.
480:
SEC. 112. (a) No agreement may be entered into under this
title to finance the sale of agricultural commodities to the government of any country which engages in a consistent pattern of
gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment, prolonged detention without charges, or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, and the security of person,
unless such agreement will directly benefit the needy people in
such country. An agreement will not directly benefit the needy
people in the country for purposes of the preceding sentence unless either the commodities themselves or the proceeds from their
sale will be used for specific projects or programs which the President determines would directly benefit the needy people of that
country. The agreement shall specify how the projects or programs will be used to benefit the needy people and shall require
a report to the President on such use within 6 months after the
commodities are delivered to the recipient country.
(b) To assist in determining whether the requirements of
subsection (a) are being met, the Committee on Agriculture,
Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate or the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives may require
the President to submit in writing information demonstrating
that an agreement will directly benefit the needy people in a
country.
(c) In determining whether or not a government falls within the
provisions of subsection (a), consideration shall be given to the
extent of cooperation of such government in permitting an unimpeded investigation of alleged violations of internationally recognized human rights by appropriate international organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross,
or groups or persons acting under the authority of the United
Nations or of the Organization of American States.
(d) The President shall transmit to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, the President of the Senate, and the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate, in the
annual presentation materials on planned programming of assistance under this Act, a full and complete report regarding the
30
steps he has taken to carry out the provisions of this section.

This provision of law raises a number of questions: how
does one determine which countries are gross violators of
human rights? Is this a realistic approach to the human rights
30. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1712 (Supp. 1979).
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problem? Is such an approach compatible with military and
foreign policy needs and objectives?
In practice, no P.L. 480 recipients have been formally labeled as gross violators of human rights. However, if the recipient is considered a "problem" country, then language meeting
the requirements of section 112 is inserted into the P.L. 480
agreement. This determination is made by an interagency
human rights review committee headed by the Deputy Secretary of State, which reviews all proposed P.L. 480 agreements.
Of course, in the words of the Special Task Force Report,
"[tihese provisions in the agreement make no mention of
human rights per se, . . . and a nation in signing such an
agreement is in no way admitting to any wrongdoing in the
human rights area." ' 31 It is through this mechanism, however,
that the Administration has sought to strike a proper balance
between the requirements of the law and the realities of international affairs. Nevertheless, an informed observer might conclude that the insertion of such language into an agreement
effectively categorizes that country as a violator of human
rights. Some observers, therefore, question the efficacy and
propriety of using food aid agreements as a means of publicly
branding countries as violators of human rights.
Food aid is intended not only to feed hungry people, but
also to generate internal development so that a country may
eventually move away from concessional status. Accomplishment of this objective, however, requires the cooperation of the
importing government. In this respect, the salutary and beneficial effects in terms of human rights must be weighed against
the negative political and diplomatic consequences that might
result from naming a country a violator of human rights. It
would appear that a case-by-case approach might be more appropriate in these situations. However, the statute is manda32
tory and does not permit such an approach.
31. SPECIAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 43.

32. The ramifications and pitfalls of linking human rights and economic concessions may be seen in the net effect of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act
of 1974, codified at 19 U.S.C. 2432 (1976). Briefly, this amendment tied the granting
of economic concessions, such as most-favored-nation status to "nonmarket economy
countries," i.e., the U.S.S.R., to freedom of emigration.
The U.S.S.R., however, pursuant to the Jackson-Vanik Amendment renounced
the 1972 U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade agreement as interfering with their domestic affairs.
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A recent report of the Congressional Research Service33
confirms these observations with respect to the linkage of
human rights and foreign aid. The report concluded that
"though public pressures and direct leverage can be effective
instruments of human rights policy, quiet diplomatic efforts
and indirect hints of linkage between human rights conditions
and U.S. support are often likely to be more successful.""4 The
report further states that:
[T]he record on direct and explicit use of foreign assistance as
leverage to bring about specific improvements in human rights
conditions is hardly encouraging. In only five or six instances did
we find evidence that actual or explicitly threatened reductions
in aid played a significant role in bringing about changes in
human rights conditions. Direct pressures seem often to provoke
counterproductive reactions. Chile, Argentina, Ethiopa and the
Philippines represent cases in which such pressures clearly contributed to significant deterioration of bilateral relations.5

Food aid, by its very nature, is a unique method of foreign
assistance. As is pointed out elsewhere in this paper, the thrust
of the U.S. food aid program has moved decidedly in the direction of developmental and humanitarian objectives. Given this
emphasis, it would seem that all U.S. food aid should be made
available in a manner that satisfies the criteria of section 112.
In this respect, U.S. food aid would in every instance further
the general human rights objective of reducing hunger and
malnutrition. Therefore, linking food aid with the political aspects of human rights should not be necessary since the impact
of food aid on the economic aspects of human rights, i.e., freedom from hunger and malnutrition, ought to be sufficient in
and of itself to support food aid programming.
Therefore, in respect to freedom of emigration, the amendment had a severely negative
effect. For example, from 1972 to 1975 emigration from the Soviet Union increased to
about 30,000 persons per year. After the passage of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and
the Soviet renunciation of the Trade Agreement, this figure dropped to less than 10,000
per year. See generally Note, An Interim Analysis of the Effect of the Jackson-Vanih
Amendment on Trade and Human Rights: The Romanian Example, 8 LAw & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 193 (1976).

33. Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Assistance, Experiences and Issues in Policy
Implementation, Report of the Foreign Aff. and Nat'l Def. Division, Cong. Research
Serv., for the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations (Feb. 27, 1979).
34. Id. at vii.
35. Id. at x. See also FOOD RESOURCES FOR DLoM&Tic Puaposps, supra note 12, at
28-29.
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FOOD AID AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The International Development and Food Assistance Act
of 19773 established an innovative mechanism for generating
economic development through the use of food aid. This Act
restructured Title III of P.L. 480 to provide for the complete
forgiveness of P.L. 480 repayment obligations if the recipient
country undertakes agreed upon "additional" development efforts. The administration of this title over the past two years
has brought to the surface a number of serious legal and policy
issues that will affect not only Title III agreements but also the
general direction of the entire P.L. 480 program.
A. Statutory Framework of Title III
Title III is not a separate food aid program; rather, Title
III provides an alternative method by which Title I debt obligations may be satisfied. 7 The quid pro quo for the extinguishment of the debt obligation is the additional development efforts of the recipient country.
In basic form, the concept of Title III is quite straightforward. Section 302 provides that the President may designate a
developing country as eligible for Title III if such country:
(1) needs external resources to improve its food production, marketing, distribution, and storage systems;
(2) meets the criterion used to determine basic eligibility
for development loans from the International Development
Association of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development;
(3) demonstrates the ability to utilize effectively the resources made available under the Title III agreement; and
(4) indicates the willingness to take steps to improve its
food production, marketing, distribution, and storage systems.3
A country designated as eligible and wishing to participate
in a Title III food for development program formulates, "with
the assistance (if requested) of the United States Govern36. Pub. L. No. 95-88, 91 Stat. 533 (1977).
37. Therefore, Title l is subject to all of the requirements of Title I, as well as
those requirements contained in Title I itself. See 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 1727, 1727b(b)
(Supp. 1979).
38. Id. § 1727a(b).
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ment," a multiyear development proposal." The proposal must
include: (1) an annual value or amount of proposed agricultural
commodities to be financed under Title I of P.L. 480; and (2)
an annual plan for the intended uses of the commodities or for
the funds generated from the sale of such commodities for each
year such funds are to be disbursed. The proposal also should
specify the nature and magnitude of problems to be affected by
the effort, and should present targets in quantified terms, insofar as possible."
The statute further requires the proposal to demonstrate
how the Title III development program will be integrated into
and complement the country's overall development plans and
other forms of bilateral and multilateral development assistance." The Title III development plan must not replace any
other development activity. 2 This requirement is generally
described as the "additionality requirement."
Upon review and approval of the development proposal by
the United States, the U.S. and the recipient country enter into
a Title III agreement. A Title III agreement consists of two
annexes attached to a standard Title I agreement. Annex A
contains the standard language found in all Title Ill agreements: it sets forth the obligations of the U.S. and the importing country, as well as establishing mechanisms for reviewing
and implementing the "development proposal." 3 Annex B contains the detailed development proposal that the parties agreed
upon. This Annex varies with each agreement. It stipulates the
projects for which funds generated from the sale of the commodities furnished under the basic Title I agreement may be
disbursed. Normally, funds generated from the sale of the commodities in the recipient country are placed in a special account. The funds then are disbursed from the special account
as needed to carry out the agreed upon development projects.
These disbursements are treated as payments against the underlying Title I debt obligations."
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 1727b(a).
§
§
§
§

1727b(b).
1727b(c).
1727b.
1727d.
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Genesis of Title III
Title III is the culmination of congressional efforts dating
back to the Food for Peace Act of 1966 to make P.L. 480 truly
responsive to the problems of nutrition and development. 5 Efforts to make Title I more effective are continuing both within
the Administration and the Congress."
On the other hand, Title III is also a response to what is
generally perceived as a failure of Title I agreements to effectively address the problems of hunger and malnutrition, either
through the manner in which P.L. 480 commodities were distributed within the recipient country or through "self-help"
measures carried out through the use of the local currency generated by the sale of the P.L. 480 commodities in the recipient
country. All too often, Title I commodities were sold commercially within the recipient country, and the proceeds therefrom
have been utilized for general budget support rather than specific development activities.47 Section 201 of the International
Development and Food Assistance Act of 1978 voices not only
the concerns of Congress but also the concerns of many other
observers:
B.

SEC. 201. The Congress finds that food assistance provided
by the United States to developing countries under Title I of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954
45. The Food for Peace Act of 1966 required for the first time the inclusion of "selfhelp" measures in P.L. 480 agreements. 7 U.S.C. § 1709 (1976). See FOOD FOR PEACE,
supra note 4, at 8-11.
The International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975 contained a
precursor of Title I. Section 205 of the Act permitted "grant backs" to recipient
countries which would use the local currency proceeds of P.L. 480 commodities for
agreed upon development purposes. No agreement was ever signed under this authority, and with the passage of Title Ill in 1977 this provision of P.L. 480 was repealed.
Pub. L. No. 94-161, 89 Stat. 849, 850-51 (1975) (current version at 7 U.S.C.A. §
1706(b)(2) (Supp. 1979)).
46. See, e.g., §§ 202-203 of the International Development and Food Assistance
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-424, 92 Stat. 955 (codified at 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 1727c-1727d
(Supp. 1979)), which made Title III more attractive for relatively least developed
countries, as defined by UNCTAD, by allowing the United States to pay transportation costs and permitting excess Title III disbursements in any given year to be applied
against preexisting P.L. 480 debt obligations. It is expected that Title III will again be
amended in 1979 to make the program more responsive to the needs of developing
countries.
47. The use of local currencies generated from the sale of P.L. 480 commodities
for general budget support is not per se objectionable. Such support can be very
beneficial in countries undertaking significant development activities.
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often is distributed within those countries in ways which do not
significantly alleviate hunger and malnutrition in those countries. In order to determine how United States food assistance can
be more effectively used to meet the food needs of the poor in
developing countries, the President shall submit to the Congress
not later than February 1, 1979, a report (1) explaining why food
assistance provided to developing countries under Title I of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 is
not more successful in meeting the food needs of those suffering
from hunger and malnutrition, and (2) recommending steps
which could be taken (including increasing the proportion of food
assistance which is furnished under Titles II and III of that Act)
to increase the effectiveness of food assistance under that Act in
meeting those needs. 8

It is against this background that Title III came into being.

C.

Implementation of Title III
To date, four countries have entered into Title III agreements: Bolivia, Bangladesh, Honduras, and Egypt. In addition, Title III agreements with a number of other countries
have been proposed. The consideration of these proposals
48. Pub. L. No. 95-424, 92 Stat. 937, 954 (1978) (codified at 7 U.S.C.A. § 1711
(Supp. 1979)).
The President's report to Congress, submitted February 23, 1979, pursuant to the
above section, demonstrates a critical problem in the administration of P.L. 480, i.e.,
the report fails to directly address the question raised by section 201. The report is
merely a vague narrative of what has been accomplished under Title I agreements and
how progress is being made toward making Title I more developmental. It does not
address, in any fashion, the use of Title I for general budget support or, in a historical
context, the abuses of the program in Southeast Asia and in other countries.
In this respect, it is clear that the authors of the report simply do not agree with
the conclusions of section 201, or that they disagree with the underlying philosophy of
section 201, i.e., that U.S. food aid programs must be strictly scrutinized in order to
assure that P.L. 480 commodities are contributing directly to the alleviation of hunger
and malnutrition. This basic philosophical conflict between administrators of P.L. 480
and the legislative branch is probably based on a number of factors: (1) the need to
accommodate political and diplomatic considerations, which may render strict scrutiny of P.L. 480 programs difficult or impossible; (2) the perception among administrators that tight control over the use of P.L. 480 commodities, or the proceeds generated
therefrom, is not practicable or desirable; and (3) a tendency for development professionals to emphasize intangible "policy changes," while the thrust of the legislation is
clearly to encourage the undertaking of concrete development projects.
As a result of this tension between the administration of the program and the
legislative intent, Congress has increasingly placed specific restraints upon P.L. 480,
thereby attempting to channel the program into areas which more clearly reflect the
legislative intent. This process has produced a program which is incredibly complex
and difficult to operate. From the recipient's point of view, the constraints of the
programs are so great as to measurably reduce the attractiveness of participating.
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has brought to the fore a number of issues that touch upon extremely important questions not specifically contemplated by
the statute. Thus, as is the case with almost every legislative
enactment, the administrative interpretation and implementation of Title III will determine whether Title III will achieve its
ultimate purpose of enhancing economic development.
1. Generation of Title III Proposals
The statute clearly contemplates that Title III proposals
will be developed primarily by the recipient country." Specifically, the statute states that a "country designated as eligible
and wishing to participate in a Food for Development Program
shall formulate, with the assistance (if requested) of the United
States Government, a multiyear proposal which shall be submitted to the President. ' 50 (Emphasis added.) In addition, the
statute states that one of the criteria for eligibility to participate in a Title III program is that the recipient country
"indicate the willingness to take steps to improve its food pro'5
duction, marketing, distribution, and storage systems." '
However, most Title II proposals are being developed, not
by the recipient countries, but by the Agency for International
Development (AID), in its missions in the field and in
Washington. This situation is the result of: (1) the relative
unattractiveness of Title I in comparison with Title I; and (2)
the endorsement of "interventionism" by some food aid programmers.
First, Title III appears relatively unattractive in comparison with Title I. Title I offers concessional credit of up to fortyyear terms with a ten-year grace period on payments of principal. The grant element of a Title I agreement is approximately
sixty percent, and as it has developed over the years, there are
relatively few, if any, effective restrictions on the use of local
currency proceeds.
Title III, in contrast, requires a strict accounting of local
currency proceeds, as well as the continued monitoring of progress made under the Title III agreement. In this context, the
49. Inherent in this concept is the assumption that Title ml is sufficiently attractive to induce developing countries to participate. As will be discussed later in the text,
this assumption may well be incorrect.
50. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1727b(a) (Supp. 1979).
51. Id. § 1727a(b).
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prospect of achieving complete debt forgiveness holds little attraction in comparison with a Title I repayment schedule of
forty years, especially when it is taken into consideration that
most governments have a time horizon of only a few years at
most.
Second, food aid programmers have often followed what
may be described as an "interventionist" policy. That is, in
many cases programmers have insisted upon including policy
changes by the recipient country as the centerpiece of Title IIn
agreements, often over the objections of the potential recipient.
For obvious reasons then, such agreements are not attractive
to officials of the recipient country, who rightfully view U.S.
insistence on important policy changes as encroaching upon
their own authority as well as the sovereignty of their country.
It is questionable whether the emphasis on policy
changes is in harmony with the intent of Title III. First, Title
III clearly contemplates that recipient countries will enter into
Title III agreements willingly. Emphasis on policy changes as
the central feature of Title III agreements seems to run contrary to this objective in many instances. Second, the entire
tenor of Title Ill focuses upon specificity both in the Title III
agreement itself and in its implementation. In many cases,
however, policy changes do not lend themselves to specificity.
In this respect, the emphasis on policy changes resembles, to a
certain degree, the "self-help" measures of Title I. As explained above, Title III was enacted in large part as a reaction
against the manner in which Title I had been administered.
Third, in many instances, policy changes do not actually require added resources either in the form of the commodity itself
or in the form of local currency proceeds from the sale of the
commodity. Title III, however, clearly contemplates that additional, tangible development will be generated through the use
of additional resources provided by the Title III commodity.
Policy changes not directly connected to or supported by the
provision of the Title III commodity would therefore appear to
be outside the scope of the statute.
This is not to say that policy changes cannot or should not
play an important role in Title III programs. However, Title III
is clearly project oriented, both in its language and basic purpose. The administrative emphasis on policy changes as op-
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posed to projects, while not precluded by the statute, appears
somewhat inconsistent with the basic orientation of Title III.
2. Additionality Requirement: Policy Changes vs.
Development Projects
The issue of policy changes and development projects is
again met in dealing with the requirement of "additionality."
Briefly, the statute requires that a Title III program complement, but not replace, assistance authorized by the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, or any other program of bilateral or
multilateral assistance, or under the development program of
the country desiring to initiate a Food for Development Program [sic]. ' 5 2 The issue presented, therefore, is whether policy
changes, in and of themselves, may satisfy the additionality
requirement.
For example, a number of proposals, in their original form,
contemplated the use of Title HI commodities in grain stabilization operations known as open market sales (OMS) systems.
Simply put, the recipient government would agree to policy
changes in which the government would undertake to stabilize
the price of grain by purchasing it at a minimum procurement
price during times of plenty, thereby helping local farmers, and
by selling stocks built up in this manner during lean times. The
commodities from Title III would be added to government
stocks.
In their original form, these proposals allowed a complete
forgiveness of the Title I-Title III repayment obligation upon
receipt of the Title III commodity by the recipient government.
The policy change to implement the OMS system, under such
a proposal, would satisfy the requirement of additionality.
Since the statute does permit the use of the commodities for
the development program, the appropriate point at which debt
forgiveness is triggered would be when the transfer of title to
the commodity occurs.
Such a proposal, on its face, appears to fulfill the requirements of Title III. In substance, however, this proposal does not
differ from a Title I "self-help" measure, especially when it is
considered that local currency proceeds will be generated by
OMS sales. Although the legislative history and the statute are
not clear as to how the commodities themselves may be used
52. Id. § 1727b(c).
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to trigger debt forgiveness, it would seem apparent from the
structure and purpose of Title III that the use of the commodity
satisfies Title III requirements only where it generates development directly without first generating local currency proceeds
(e.g., food-for-work and direct maternal feeding). OMS systems do not fall into this category.
Second, and more important, the use of local currency
proceeds for additional development projects is not inconsistent with the implementation of policy changes, whether or not
those policy changes are themselves additional. Indeed, it is
more logical to assume that specific development projects
should be included so as to build the physical infrastructure
upon which the policy changes are based.5 3 In an OMS system,
such projects may include additional and better quality storage
capacity, improved internal distribution systems, increased
fertilizer production, and so forth.
Furthermore, it appears illogical to argue, as some food aid
programmers have done, that the undertaking of policy
changes and additional development projects is too much to
ask of the recipient country. First, proposed policy changes are
generally presented as both very significant, and difficult for
the government of the recipient country to implement. If this
is the case, it is illogical to assume that the use of the local
currency proceeds to carry out additional development projects, such as the construction of additional storage, is beyond
the capabilities of the recipient government. In fact, the only
logical basis for such an argument is that the recipient government will have insufficient inducement to carry out the proposed policy changes if it is unable to use the local currency
proceeds for general budget support. However, this problem is
precisely one of the abuses at which Title III is aimed.
Second, policy changes do not exist in a vacuum. They
must be based on a sound internal infrastructure. To this extent, development projects should precede or coincide with policy changes, rather than the reverse. Also, it seems more appropriate for the United States to provide developing countries
with the physical resources necessary to carry out development
53. To the extent that the additional policy changes themselves require local
currency expenditures, the use of local currency proceeds from the sale of the Title In
commodity qualifies for debt forgiveness.
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projects, rather than attempting to dictate internal development policies to such countries.
Thus far, this issue has been resolved by requiring that
local currency proceeds be applied to development projects."
However, in the absence of further legislative guidance, this
issue promises to remain in the forefront of Title III programming.
3. Additionality Requirement: Augmentation of the
Special Account
In a number of countries, food commodities from P.L. 480,
as well as other sources, are sold at a subsidized rate. In such
situations, generations of local currency proceeds are insufficient to offset the Title I-Title III repayment obligation. To
remedy this "problem," some food aid programmers propose
that recipient governments be permitted to augment the
''special account" in order to provide enough local currency to
achieve total debt forgiveness. However, neither the statute nor
the legislative history addresses the question of subsidized
sales. Therefore, a question exists as to whether the statute
permits augmentation of the special account. 5
On the one hand, funds used to augment the special account are not "[f]unds generated from the sale of [Title II]
agricultural commodities .... "51 On the other hand, there is
nothing to prevent a country from creating a government corporation, analogous to the Commodity Credit Corporation,
that would first "purchase" the commodity at its full fair market value.
Of more importance, however, is whether the augmentation of the special account really reflects the input of additional
resources, which the commodities are meant to represent. The
consumption of subsidized commodities cannot be considered
an additional resource which is available to development programs. The augmentation funds must come from the general
budget of the recipient. It is questionable, in view of the fungi54. Whether these projects need be "additional" is still in dispute.
55. It is clearly permissible under the statute not to have augmentation of the
special account. In such an instance, debt forgiveness would equal, assuming proper
disbursements for eligible uses, the amount of local currency generated. The remaining
debt would be repaid in accordance with ordinary Title I procedures.
56. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1727d(a) (Supp. 1979).
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bility of money, whether this action does not, in fact reduce a
country's ability to undertake its own development program. If
such a reduction did occur, the additionality requirement
would not be met.
In practice, where augmentation is permitted, 5 language
inserted in the Title III agreement states that the augmentation funds will not be taken from or in any way reduce the
recipient country's development budget. Nevertheless, there is
58
probably no effective way to verify this requirement.
4. Prefinancing of the Special Account
Some recipient countries have expressed a desire to "prefinance" the special account by placing local currencies into the
account prior to the sale of a Title III commodity. The arguments in favor of prefinancing are persuasive; tying financial
arrangements to commodity shipments and sales may not lend
themselves to efficient synchronization with a development
program. Conversely, prefinancing allows the recipient country
to have the financing mechanism for its food for development
program fully operational at a specified time. Prefinancing also
permits the recipient country to embark upon its development
program earlier than would otherwise be possible.
Prefinancing, however, is not specifically provided for in
the statute. Funds used to prefinance the special account technically are not "funds generated from the sale of the commodities." More importantly, it is difficult to see how the use of such
funds for development projects prior to the arrival of the commodity in the recipient country can meet the requirements of
additionality. That is, how can an "additional" development
project be undertaken in the absence of the additional resources which are represented by the commodities?
This leads to a second question pertaining to the source of
funds used for prefinancing the special account. As is the case
with augmentation, it will probably be impossible to verify that
57. In fact, it would appear that augmentation is becoming an administrative
requirement, although the statute does not dictate such a result.
58. One might also question the ultimate purpose of augmentation. Its proponents
generally argue that its purpose is to guarantee that the U.S. will receive the most
development "bang" for its P.L. 480 Title I-Title III commodities. On the other hand,
those who question the wisdom of augmentation generally characterize it as a method
of assuring the recipient country complete debt forgiveness, despite the obvious danger
of violating the additionality requirement.
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prefinancing funds have not reduced the recipient country's
development budget or, conversely, that the local currency proceeds generated from the eventual sale of the commodities will
replace funds taken from the government's development
budget to prefinance the special account.
As a practical matter, prefinancing is permitted only to a
very limited degree. For example, prefinancing has been allowed but at a time no earlier than when title to the commodities passes to the recipient country." The value of the prefinancing also may not exceed the value of the commodities
actually shipped. That is, disbursements from the special account will not be eligible to offset debt obligations until the
commodity actually arrives in the recipient country.
These restrictions, however, are not final authority and it
is conceivable that they will be liberalized to a significant degree. The benefits and flexibility of prefinancing are substantial and ought not to be foregone if reasonable assurances can
be obtained that the additionality requirement will be met.
However, the potential pitfalls of prefinancing should be approached very cautiously. Also, further legislative guidance in
this area should be sought. 0
59. Generally, property title passes at the U.S. port of shipment.
60. In fact, it does appear that further legislative guidance will be forthcoming.
The report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on the
International Development and Cooperation Act of 1979 contains the following statement:
Prefinancing
Additionally, in connection with interpretation of the section 305 legislative requirement that the proceeds from the sale of Title III commodities
be applied against the participating country's repayment obligations, the
Committee does not intend this requirement to preclude the possibility
of prefinancing. In order to be able to undertake its Title III development
activities without having to wait until purchase authorizations are issued
and the recipient country legally takes title to the commodities, the participating country may, on a year by year basis, deposit local currencies
into the special account and make disbursements in an amount equivalent to the value of the Title III commodities for each year of the Title
III agreement. However, in cases where prefinancing of this type is utilized, the participating country must assume the risk that, if the purchase authorizations are not negotiated for any reason, the participating
country will not be eligible for the repayment benefit specified in section
305 [codified at 7 U.S.C.A. § 1727d (Supp. 1979)].
H.R. REP. No. 79, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 31-32 (1979).
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Criticism of Title III

Criticism of Title III generally comes from two divergent
points of view. On the one hand, critics of P.L. 480 attack Title
III as a wholesale giveaway. These critics take an extremely
pessimistic view of the ability or the willingness of the U.S.
food aid bureaucracy to administer Title III in a manner consistent with the legislative intent. They correctly point out that
Title III objectives could be accomplished through strict implementation of Title I "self-help" measures. In the absence of
better performance under Title I, these critics see little reason
to believe that the marginally greater attractiveness of Title III
will induce behavioral changes either in the recipient countries
or in the U.S. food aid bureaucracy."
In contrast, food aid programmers and development theorists criticized the entire structure of Title III, and P.L. 480 in
general, as totally unrealistic in meeting economic development needs of the Third World. These critics view the extreme
complexity of P.L. 480 and Title Ill in particular as preventing
the effective use of food aid to generate economic development.
They point out that managerial skills are very scarce in Third
World countries and conclude that such skills should not be
squandered in futile attempts to satisfy the endless requirements of P.L. 480. Moreover, they see little or no utility in
compelling recipient countries to conform to these requirements.
In all fairness, then, it must be stated that some food aid
programmers and development theorists view the statutory
requirements of P.L. 480 as stumbling blocks to be avoided to
the greatest extent possible, rather than as policy statements
of the Congress to serve as guideposts in administering the
statute. The extreme complexity of the P.L. 480 program lends
credence to these views.
It is not, however, the purpose of this paper to pass judgment on these contending points of view. It is enough to point
61. This view was only confirmed when a Title III proposal came from a country
that repeatedly failed to implement agreed upon self-help measures under Title I
agreements. The Title III proposal contained a number of policy changes and other
measures that had been self-help measures in previous Title I agreements never before
implemented.
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out that they exist and represent a significant source of tension
within the administration of the program.
V. FOOD SECURITY
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss in detail the
wide variety of proposals for food security schemes which have
been put forth. 2 Rather, this portion of the paper will focus
upon presently existing food aid commitments, as well as legislative proposals to develop food reserves.
A. The Problem of Hunger and Malnutrition
The question of food aid security is of pressing importance.
Statistics clearly indicate that while food production is advancing well ahead of population growth in developed countries,
food production in developing countries is barely keeping pace
with their population growth. 3 Compounding the problem is
already existing widespread hunger and malnutrition. It is estimated that nearly two billion people in the developing countries are undernourished."
It is evident from these facts that the developing countries
will become increasingly reliant upon food transfers from the
developed countries. These transfers may take the form of commercial imports and food aid.
It is equally clear that most developing countries do not
have the financial assets to meet their food deficits adequately
through commercial imports alone. 5 The remainder must be
met through food aid in one form or another. In the past year,
food aid commitments equaled about nine million tons, or
about twenty percent of the estimated imports by developing
countries. As food deficits expand, food aid programming
should expand accordingly.
62. SPECIAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 17-25.
63. From 1968 to 1977, food production in industrialized democracies increased
an average of 2.7% per year while population increased 1% per year. In contrast,
developing countries, excluding Communist Asia, achieved a food production increase
of 2.95% per annum as compared to a population increase of 2.6% per annum. World
Population Silent Explosion, 78 DEP'T STATE BuLL. (Oct., Nov., Dec. 1978). See FOREIGN FOOD AssISTANCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at I-I to -5.
64. World Population Silent Explosion, supra note 63, at 1 (Nov. 1978; Foreign Food Assistance of the United States, supra note 1, at I-1 to -5.
65. World Population Silent Explosion, supra note 63, at 1 (Nov. 1978).
66. SPECIAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 10.
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B.

Food Aid Commitments
1. International Efforts
In 1974, when food shortages in many parts of the world
reached crisis levels, the U.N. World Food Conference called
upon the developed nations of the world to establish a goal of
ten million metric tons of food aid per year.67 The United States
supports this goal. 8 Nevertheless, little has been done since
that time to translate this goal into a workable system of food
aid commitments and reserves to guarantee a steady flow of
food aid in adverse, as well as favorable, conditions. To a
certain extent, relatively good harvests around the world since
1974 may have lulled donors and recipients alike into complacency."6

For example, the present Food Aid Convention of the International Wheat Agreement obligates donor members to
make available a total of only 4,226,000 metric tons of food aid
each year. The individual amounts are as follows:
Argentina
Australia
Canada
European Economic Community
Finland
Japan
Sweden
Switzerland
United States of America

Metric Tons
23,000
225,000
495,000
1,287,000
14,000
225,000
35,000
32,000
1,890,00070

At the same time, little progress has been made toward establishing an international system of reserves to stabilize grain
prices and guarantee access to supplies even in times of short
supply. Recent negotiations on a new International Wheat
Agreement, which would establish such reserves, have collapsed, and there is little prospect that they will be revived."
Id.
68. 7 U.S.C. § 1691a (1976).
69. See statement of Rep. McHugh in H.R. REP. No. 348, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
350, 352-53, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1704, 1918.
70. Of the 1.9 million tons delivered by the United States between July 1976 and
67.

June 1977, 49% was programmed under Title II. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, FOOD FOR
PEACE: 1977 ANNUAL REPORT ON PUBLIC LAW 480, at 45 (1978).
71. See Wash. Post, Apr. 11, 1979, at A26. col. 1.
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2. US. Food Aid Commitment
The problem with respect to U.S. food aid commitments
is summed up very succinctly by the "availability" criteria of
section 401(a) of P.L. 480:
No commodity shall be available for disposition under this Act
if such disposition would reduce the domestic supply of such
commodity below that needed to meet domestic requirements,
adequate carryover, and anticipated exports for dollars as determined by the Secretary of Agriculture at the time of exportation
of such commodity, unless the Secretary of Agriculture determines that some part of the supply thereof should be used to
carry out urgent humanitarian purposes of this Act."

In effect, this provision designates food aid as the lowest level
priority use for U.S. food commodities. Outside of the very
limited exception for urgent humanitarian purposes, commodities may not be programmed under P.L. 480 unless stocks are
adequate to meet domestic needs and export demands. This
provision of law, which protects consumer and producer interests, substantially reduces the value of U.S. food aid commitments to recipient countries since they cannot depend upon a
steady flow of U.S. food aid. The problem is demonstrated by
the impact of world grain shortages in 1972 and following
73
years.
During the 1960s, P.L. 480 annual shipments averaged
about 14.5 million metric tons. Since that time, the level of
P.L. 480 programming in terms of quantity of commodities74
has declined precipitously to the point where during the past
six years grain shipments averaged less than five million tons
per year, with a low of three million tons in 1974. Despite the
intentions of the Carter administration to increase food aid
programming substantially, programming levels appear to
have leveled off at around 6.0-6.3 million tons per year.75
72. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1731(a) (Supp. 1979).
73. For a more detailed analysis of this subject and the figures found in the text
see

SPECIAL TASK

FORCE

REPORT,

supra note 1, at 49-52, 127-28.

74. P. L. 480 authorizations are made in terms of dollars. Consequently, in times
of rising prices, the same level of monetary expenditures will result in a lower level of
quantities programmed.
75. In the report Foreign Food Assistance of the United States, supra note 1, at
VI-5, the Secretary of Agriculture recommends increasing food aid tonnages by 50%,
or, if possible, by 100% (a level of 12.6 million metric tons) by 1982. In fact, programming in 1977, 1978, and 1979 averaged somewhat above 6 million metric tons on an
annual basis. SPECIAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 52-53.
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The sluggishness in real growth of levels of food aid programming, as well as the overall reduced levels when compared
with the levels of the 1960s, is a reflection of: (1) generally
rising effective demand for U.S. agricultural exports; and (2)
domestic farm policy decisions to reduce the amount of foodstuffs grown by the United States. Simply stated, the volume
of food aid has declined dramatically as the opportunity costs
of providing such aid have increased."
Given the basic population trends and food production
levels outside the United States, it is unrealistic to assume that
the opportunity costs of providing food aid will decline in the
foreseeable future. The only other methods of relieving pressure
upon levels of food aid programming would be either: (1) to
allocate much larger sums of money for the purchase of P.L.
480 commodities; or (2) to relax farm production controls,
thereby increasing available supplies while decreasing the price
of commodities available for the P.L. 480 program.
Neither solution is acceptable at this time. Fiscal and inflationary pressures undoubtedly preclude substantial increases in P.L. 480 expenditures. Conversely, political pressures probably preclude any reduction in grain prices through
supply increases, especially when it is considered that grain
prices have already been at relatively low levels over the past
three years. Under these conditions, only marginal increases in
levels of P.L. 480 programming may be expected during the
next few years.
The ultimate question confronting food and agriculture
policymakers today is how can policies which reduce the availability and raise the price of basic foodstuffs in a hungry world
be morally justified." The United States has clearly embarked
upon a concerted policy of supply management. 8 The central
features of this program are:
1. Implementation of acreage limitations on U.S. production to avoid building "excess" stocks of grain; and
76. Hanrahan & Kennedy, International Considerationsin the Development of
Domestic Agricultural and Food Policy, in U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL
FOOD POLICY REVIEW 130, 135 (1977).

77. See Anderson, note 4 supra.
78. See Foreign Food Assistance of the United States, supra note 1, at VIII-1 to -
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2. Creation of farmer-held reserves and commercially
held stocks of about 30 million metric tons of grain.7" At the
same time, it is clear that the first consumption sector to suffer
in a supply reduction program is the food aid sector. Although
P.L. 480 shipments have always been small "relative to total
use they have varied directly with the level of 'excess supplies.'","
It is simplistic to view this issue as one of food production
versus poor and hungry people. The U.S. agricultural sector is
extremely complex, and any changes in the level ofP.L. 480
programming will have a significant effect upon U.S. agriculture." Furthermore, whether greater levels of food aid are accomplished through increased expenditures or through modifications of agricultural policies, any increase in food aid represents a real cost which society must bear. The proper question,
then, is not whether the United States can morally justify reduced food production in a hungry world, but rather whether
the United States is contributing its fair share towards reducing hunger and malnutrition in the world.
American agriculture is the most productive in the world,
but it can only maintain its productivity so long as producers
are adequately compensated. It is not possible to constantly
run the agricultural sector of our economy at 100% capacity
without causing severe dislocations in all sectors of our economy. Therefore, the long run interests of consumers, both rich
and poor alike, are best served by a healthy farm economy
operating at sustainable levels. Experience over the past
fifty years has shown that production controls are at times
necessary to maintain a healthy farm economy.
Of course, agricultural policy should take into account
food aid needs. Such needs are an important consideration.
Nevertheless, they are only one among a number of factors
which must be considered. No single factor can or should dominate agricultural policy decisions.
3. Emergency Food Aid Security
An important subsidiary question to the general issue of
79. See, 7 U.S.C.A. § 1445e (Supp. 1979).
80. SPECIAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 52.
81. Id. at 52-60.
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food aid policy is how best to avoid the 1973-1975 disaster when
unexpected shortfalls and commercial purchases drastically
reduced the amount of food available for food aid purposes.
The Carter administration's response was to propose the creation of an International Emergency Wheat Reserve (IEWR).
As proposed by the Administration, the reserve would
have consisted of six million tons of wheat. Stocks of wheat
from this reserve could only be used when short supply situations, such as existed in 1973-1975, prevent normal food aid
programming. The concept of such a reserve received substantial support in the fall of 1977; however, a Senate provision
establishing the reserve was deleted from the 1977 farm bill by
8
the conference committee. 1
Thereafter, a number of bills were introduced in both the
Senate and the House to establish an IEWR in one form or
another. The bills were considered by the Senate Agriculture
Committee, the House Agriculture Committee, and the House
International Relations Committee during the spring and summer of 1978.
The House Committees eventually reported substantially
identical bills, both very similar in substance and form to the
Administration proposal. The Senate Agriculture Committee,
however, reported a radically different bill creating an international emergency food fund. Conceptually, the fund was to
provide money to purchase extra commodities in times of short
supply. The basic philosophy of the bill's sponsors was that
3
there is no such thing as "short supply" if the price is right.8
The Senate bill was unacceptable to the Administration,
and neither the House nor the Senate took any further action
on this subject.
82. S. CONF. REP. No. 418, 95TH CONG., IST SEss. 183-84 (1977).
83. Farmers look very disfavorably upon any kind of government-held reserves
after the experience of the 1960s when government-held reserves were used to hold
down commodity prices. These suspicions, then, are visited upon the IEWR, which is
heavily laden with restrictions on the release of stocks-stocks too small to affect
market prices in any appreciable manner.
Another factor is that in 1977 grain prices were very low, and any device, such as
the IEWR, that would have taken grain off the market looked very attractive to farm
state representatives. However, by late 1978 grain prices had stabilized, and, accordingly, the IEWR looked less attractive.
For more information on this specific topic see Jones, World FoodFund: You Can't
Eat Money, Wash. Post, Aug. 31, 1978, at A15, col. 1.
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CONCLUSION

As seen from the above discussion, the U.S. food aid program has been in a constant state of evolution since its inception in 1954. The program continues to be beset by a myriad
of considerations, many contradictory and conflicting. It is the
interplay of these factors that generates the momentum by
which P.L. 480 continues to develop and evolve.
It is most encouraging to note that this evolution continues
in the direction of greater emphasis upon the humanitarian
and developmental aspects of P.L. 480. At the same time, the
overall level of P.L. 480 programming in comparison with previous years is somewhat discouraging. Therefore, the prognosis
for the program is rather unclear. The quality and quantity of
food aid are mutually necessary and complementary aspects of
the food aid program. Whether both objectives can be accomplished simultaneously remains to be seen.

Human Rights and Arms Transfer Policy*
CEDRIC
I.

W. TARR, JR.**

INTRODUCTION

This paper will attempt to assess the impact of human
rights considerations on arms transfer policy since 1973 when
Congress began to pressure the Executive branch to insert the
human rights factor into the decisionmaking process. Arms
transfer policy is defined to include the provision of military
equipment and training by means of grants and credits, plus
government regulation of commercial sales. Arms transfers
have become, since the Second World War, a principal ingredient of American foreign policy. A variety of purposes can be
identified: the containment of communism; the forestallment
of regional military imbalances in order to promote stability
and reduce the chances of conflict; the maintenance of favorable relations, hopefully to influence countries which request
arms; to establish/improve transit rights; to support/promote
specific regimes; to increase economic incentives such as reducing balance of payments deficts; and to maintain markets in
the face of competition from other suppliers. The effort to use
arms transfer policy as a means of improving the human rights
performance of foreign regimes has added a new purpose. No
attempt will be made to evaluate the effectiveness of arms
transfers in reaching these goals, nor to explore the larger question of whether or not human rights should be an important
ingredient of U.S. foreign policy. The emphasis will be on the
process by which human rights considerations have been built
into foreign policy decisions.
I.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WEAVERS IN CONGRESS
Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, before the
Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance in March 1977,
stated that "[t]he concern for human rights will be woven into
the fabric of our foreign policy."' This process was actually
* Adapted from a paper prepared for a presentation to the Midwest Regional
Conference of the International Studies Association, May 6, 1978.
** Professor of Political Science, Chairman, Political Science Department, Metropolitan State College (Denver).
1. Human Rights: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Assistance of the
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begun in 1973 as a result of congressional prodding of a reluctant Executive branch where Henry Kissinger continued to
preside over U.S. foreign policy. Kissinger made no secret of his
lack of interest in altering the fabric of his policy:
We have generally opposed attempts to deal with sensitive international human rights issues through legislation, not because of
the moral view expressed, which we share, but because legislation
is almost always too inflexible, too public, and too heavy
handed a means to accomplish what it seeks.
Through quiet diplomacy, this Administration has brought
about the release or parole of hundreds of prisoners throughout
the world and mitigated repressive conditions in numerous countries. But we have seldom publicized specific successes

The International Organizations and Movements Subcommittee, chaired by Rep. Donald Fraser, of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held a series of fifteen hearings beginning
in August 1973. 3 The purpose was to propose recommendations
for "raising the priority given to human rights in U.S. foreign
policy, and strengthening the capacity of international organizations to insure protection of human rights. 4 The final report
included twenty-nine specific recommendations,5 including the
one which urged the Department of State to "treat human
rights factors as a regular part of U.S. foreign policy decisionmaking," and to "prepare human rights impact statements for
all policies which have significant human rights implications. "I
Going beyond recommendation, Congress began to insert
human rights provisions into legislation. Section 32 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 19731 expressed the sense of the Congress
that "the President should deny any economic or military asSenate Comm. on Foreign Relations 62, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
2. Kissinger, Moral Promise and PracticalNeeds, 75 DEP'T STATE BULL. 597, 603
(1976).
3. InternationalProtection of Human Rights: The Work of International Organizations and the Role of U.S. ForeignPolicy, HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on International Organizationsand Movements of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings].
4. REPORT OF THE SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND MOVEMENTS OF

THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY: A
CALL FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP, 93D CONG., 2D SESS. (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT].

5. Id. at 3-8.
6. Id.
7. Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-189, § 32, 87 Stat. 714, 733
(1973).
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sistance to the government of any foreign country which practices the internment or imprisonment of that country's citizens
for political purposes.""
What was to become the major legislative guideline was
placed in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, section 502B.
Introduced by Representative Fraser, it stated that:
(a) It is the sense of Congress that, except in extraordinary
circumstances, the President shall substantially reduce or terminate security assistance to any government which engages in a
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged detention without
charges; or other flagrant denials of the right to life, liberty, and
the security of the person.
(b) Whenever proposing or furnishing security assistance to any
government falling within the provisions of paragraph (a), the
President shall advise the Congress of the extraordinary circumstance necessitating the assistance. 0

In paragraph (b) Congress first crossed the threshhold
from recommending to requiring by placing a reporting requirement on the Executive. The Department of State had responded to the growing congressional prodding by making a
number of small changes" in order to give the appearance of
cooperation without actually making the fundamental changes
in the substance and process of foreign policy implied by the
various resolutions and recommendations.
In response to section 32 regarding political prisoners,
American embassies were asked to report on the situation in
their countries and to make the foreign governments aware of
section 32 as a warning. Subsequently, the State Department
broadened the subject matter to include: torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, arbitrary curtailment of existing political
rights, unlawful killing and seriously unfair trials. 2
8. 1974 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 4, at 3-8.

9. Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 502B, 88 Stat. 1795, 1815
(1974).
10. Id.
11. Salzberg & Young, The ParliamentaryRole in Implementing International
Human Rights: A US. Example, 12 TEx. INT'L L. J. 251, 275 (1977).
12.

HOUSE COMM. ON INTERNA95TH CONG., 1sT SEss., HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMU.S. FOREIGN POLICY, 1945-1976, 47 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter

SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE

TIONAL RELATIONS,
MUNITY AND IN

cited as 1977

HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT].
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However, the response to the reporting requirement in section 502B was not considered satisfactory. Secretary of State
Kissinger, in November of 1975, declined to allow a countryby-country report to be released and substituted a report indicating that all countries violate human rights, and that it
would not be in the national interest to single out specific violators. 3 Congress responded by including in the International
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976,1 a
stronger version of section 502,15 which was vetoed by President
Ford on the ground that it permitted Congress to terminate,
restrict, or continue security assistance for any country found
in violation of human rights by means of a concurrent resolution, which is not subject to veto." Still another version of 502B
was subsequently adopted by both houses which was essentially the same as the one that had been vetoed, except that it
stipulated congressional termination by means of a joint resolution rather than a concurrent resolution, which satisfied the
Administration's requirements.
The revised section 502B states that it is the policy of the
United States to promote and encourage increased respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, and that, except under special circumstances, "no security assistance may
be provided to any country the government of which engages
in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights."' 7 Such violations are defined as:
torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged detention without charges and trial; and other
flagrant denials of the right to life, liberty, or the security of
person.
The Secretary of State may still attempt to provide
security assistance if he can convince Congress that "[e]xtraordinary circumstances exist which necessitate a continuation of security assistance ....
,
No examples of what
13. Id. at 57-58.
14. 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1976).
15. Id. § 2304(a)(2). For a thorough analysis of § 502, see Weissbrodt, Human
Rights Legislation and US. Foreign Policy, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 231, 241-87
(1977).
16. S. 2662, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). See, 122 CONG. Rac. S6715-16 (daily ed.
May 10, 1976).
17. 1977 HUMAN RIGHTS REPoRT, supra note 12, at 53.
18. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(c)(C)(i) (1976).
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might constitute extraordinary circumstances were provided.
The Secretary of State is required to furnish annually to Congress, along with the supporting materials, a full and complete
report on the human rights practices in each country,"9 which
is proposed as a security assistance recipient. In order to reduce
the possibility of a whitewash, section 502B requires that the
findings of appropriate international organizations be taken
into consideration in the preparation of the report. The extent
to which these organizations have been given access for their
investigations by the governments in question is also to be
considered.
Should the Senate or the House, or their relevant committees, at any time request a report on a specific country the
Secretary of State must respond within thirty days. 0 If the
report is not received in that time, all security assistance will
be terminated until a report is received. When a report is received, Congress may still terminate, restrict, or continue assistance by means of a joint resolution.
Finally, the revised version of section 502B sought to reinforce these provisions by requiring the establishment in the
Department of State of a Coordinator for Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs, to report directly to the Secretary of
State. This official would be appointed by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate. The Coordinator would
have responsibilities in the areas of refugees, prisoners of war,
and U.S. military personnel missing'in action, as well as
human rights. In addition to reviewing, analyzing, and gathering information, the Coordinator would have responsibility for
preparing the required reports. It was also directed that the
Secretary of State "shall carry out his responsibility under section 502B of the Act through the Coordinator for Human Rights
and Humanitarian Affairs."' 21 Congress was clearly trying to
legislate a substantive change in the decisionmaking process
and was aware that the creation of new institutions is, by itself,
no guarantee. The first Coordinator's office was staffed with
one Foreign Service Officer and one deputy, to compile reports.
19. Id. § 2304(b).
20. Id. § 2304(c)(1).
21. 1977 HuMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 12, at 55.
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Congress also used the more direct method of terminating
or reducing military aid to specific countries. Starting in 1974,
military assistance to Chile was eliminated and limits were
placed on the amount of economic assistance that could be
provided. 2 In the case of South Korea, where security considerations are more apparent than in Chile, military assistance was
limited until the U.S. President reported that significant progress had been made in the observance of human rights.23 The
President was also instructed to express forcefully to the government of South Korea the American concern over the erosion
of human rights. Thus, Congress demonstrated its willingness
to apply the human rights standard selectively, depending
upon individual circumstances. 2 In 1976 Congress prohibited
military assistance to Uruguay.
III. ARMS TRANSFERS AND THE NEW ADMINISTRATION
A campaign pledge of Jimmy Carter's was to return morality and idealism to American foreign policy. A Carter foreign
policy would make human rights a major factor in the formulation of policy. Carter also pledged to reduce American arms
transfers to other countries on the grounds that being the
world's major arms supplier set a bad example and was not
consistent with the goals of peace and arms control. Thus, with
the advent of a new administration, Congress gained an ally in
the cause of human rights. Within a year the position of the
newly designated Coordinator for Human Rights, Patricia
Derian, had been upgraded to that of Assistant Secretary of
State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, in charge
of a Bureau (HA), which has as one of its three main subdivisions, an Office of Human Rights. Arms transfer policy is handled in this office. Human Rights Officers have also been designated at each U.S. Embassy to engage in ongoing monitoring
and reporting of the local human rights situation. Additionally,
in other parts of the State Department, such as Policy Planning, the Legal Division, and International Organizations,
22. International Security Assistance and Arms Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-329, § 406, 90 Stat. 729, 758. See also, Salzberg, supra note 11, at 263-66.
23. Salzberg, supra note 11, at 266-69.
24. Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1977, Pub. L.
No. 94-441, § 505, 90 Stat. 1465, 1473 (1976); see also, 122 CONG. REc. S16406 (daily
ed. Sept. 22, 1976).

1979

ARMS TRANSFER POLICY

there are people with responsibilities in the human rights
areas. Human rights policy is also being included in the training programs of the Foreign Service and military services.
However, the fact that the new Administration was committed to placing greater emphasis on the human rights factor
did not prevent Congress from continuing to use its powers over
appropriations, and over Executive branch organization to influence both the process and the substance of foreign assistance
policies. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY 1978,
required a full report from the Secretary of State by January
31, 1978 on the steps that had been, and were being, taken to
"strengthen human rights and humanitarian considerations in
12 5
the conduct of United States foreign policy.
IV. THE POLICY PROCESS
There are two general categories of military assistance.
One is commercial sales from an American company to a foreign government, requiring a license from the U.S. Government. The other category is government-to-government transactions. These can be in the form of foreign military credits, or
sales (FMS), grant military assistance (MAP), security supporting assistance (SSA), and international military education
and training (IMET).
The time between the first request and the actual delivery
of the items may be as long as three years. The system is
tortuous and sluggish because of the complex clearance process
in the Executive branch and a congressional phase which can
involve as many as eight separate hearings. Formalization of
the human rights factor has simply inserted another hurdle,
another potential point of delay, into an already cumbersome
process.
A. Phase One-The Department of State
A request from a foreign government is first evaluated in
the regional bureau which involves the Department of Defense
on questions of military and technological implications. The
desk officer or country director then evaluates the political
considerations.
The Bureau's human rights officer may get involved at this
stage. Informally, the human rights factor has to be kept in
25. 124 CONG. REc. S1422-1426 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1978).
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mind by all concerned simply because an independent office of
advocacy, backed at the highest policy levels has joined the
circuit. It is also possible for a request to be turned down at this
stage for reasons other than human rights, e.g., if the requesting government has not made a convincing case of need, or if
Bureau policy forbids certain types of equipment. The Latin
American bureau, for example, will not approve requests for
export licenses for incendiary munitions, silencers, and other
items which appear to lack a legitimate function.26
Beyond this, President Carter, following up on his pledge
to reduce the American role as arms merchant, in a statement
on May 17, 1977, placed added restrictions on conventional
arms transfers through FMA and MAP. The restrictions apply
to all countries except those with which the U.S. has major
defense treaties (NATO, Japan, Australia, New Zealand). According to one analysis, however, this new policy has not yet
resulted in significant restraint in the use of arms transfers as
a tool of foreign policy.27
The Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (PM) looks at the
proposed arms transfer (in the case of major items) from the
standpoint of regional and global implications and also drafts
the regional Bureau's justification. Although PM's role is that
of neutral reviewer and drafter, the human rights advocates in
the State Department do not regard it as particularly sympathetic to their cause.
The arms request takes the form of an Action Memo which
circulates back through the regional bureau and to HA. Policy
Planning then looks at all of the arguments to evaluate the
justifications and possibly to challenge weak points. If disagreements are not worked out at the Bureau level, the issue can
be referred to the Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, and then possibly to the Secretary of State.
An interdepartmental group, the Arms Export Control
Board (AECB) was established by the new Administration to
have jurisdiction over all aspects of its arms transfer policy.
26. Interview with Col. Stuart Quigg, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (March
1978).
27. Shandler, Implications of President Carter's Conventional Arms Transfer
Policy, Cong. Research Serv. 77-223 F (Sept. 22, 1977), at 99.
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The Assistant Secretary for HA is a permanent member, as are
representatives from PM, DOD, NSC, OMB, Treasury, CIA,
and ACDA. The AECB has responsibility for overall policy and
procedures for arms transfers, but does not usually act as a
review and clearance committee to consider specific recommendations emerging from the arms transfer bureaucracy in
the State Department. This function is by statute the sole
responsibility of the State Department, which is not anxious to
bring other departments into the system.
By contrast, recommendations for economic assistance are
reviewed on a case by case basis by a new interdepartmental
committee chaired by the Deputy Secretary of State, Warren
Christopher. The Inter-Agency Committee on Human Rights
and Foreign Assistance includes representatives from HA and
others from the State Department, along with DOD, Commerce, Agriculture, Treasury, NSC, OPIC, AID, and U.S. participants from international financial institutions. There have
been complaints that the "Christopher Committee" is a major
bottleneck in the clearance process.
When the annual arms transfer package is finally approved, the request, with supporting material, is sent to Congress. Section 502B requires that this include a report on the
human rights conditions in every country recommended for
military assistance. This becomes part of the public record, a
practice Kissinger tried unsuccessfully to prevent.
The first full set of reports, prepared by the State Department under the Ford Administration, included eighty-two
countries and was transmitted to the Congress in April 1977.2
As a result, five Latin American countries renounced their requests for military aid: El Salvador, Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, and Uruguay.
The second set of reports was submitted in February 1978
and included 105 nations. The larger number results from an
amendment of section 116 of the International Development
and Food Assistance Act of 1977 which requires a human rights
report on all nations recommended for development assistance.
There were even more entries in the third set (115) because
28. U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

HUMAN

RIGHTs PRACriCES IN CouNTmEs RECEIVING

U.S. SEcURIT ASSISTANCE, 95TH CONG., iST SEss. (Comm. Print 1977).
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President Carter ordered that countries requesting police and
civil law enforcement aid also be included in the human rights
review process (Presidential Determination #30, February 17,
1978).
Each country report is divided into four sections:
1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Torture; Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;
Arbitrary Arrest or Imprisonment; Denial of Fair Public Trial;
Invasion of the Home.
2. Governmental Policies Relating to the Fulfillment of
Such Vital Needs as Food, Shelter, Health Care, and Education.
3. Respect for Civil and Political Liberties, Including
Freedom of Thought, Speech, Press, Religion, and Assembly;
Freedom of Movement Within the Country; Foreign Travel and
Emigration; Freedom to Participate in the Political Process.
4. Government Attitude and Record Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights.n
The State Department does not interpret any part of section 502B to require either a ranking of nations according to
their human rights record on a scale of good to bad, or the
establishment of some sort of blacklist of gross and consistent
violators, although anyone is free to use the reports for that
purpose. Pressure to do this has been resisted. Patricia Derian
was castigated for refusing to do so by Representative Clarence
Long of Maryland, Chairman of the House Appropriations
Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Related
Agencies.u Evidently, the Department has concluded that the
disadvantages of determining a formula of eligibility, which
would eliminate the freedom to make exceptions for individual
circumstances, far outweigh the disadvantages of the present
flexible system in which aid to each country is subject to multilateral bureaucratic negotiation and bargaining, with the result
29. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, CoUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES,

95TH CONG., 2D SESS. (Comm. Print 1978).
30. Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies, Appropriationsfor 1978: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations355, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Appropriations].
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that human rights sanctions are applied inconsistently. It is a
no-win situation, a dilemma for which there is no resolution in
sight. According to Assistant Secretary Derian: "I think that
the thing that would probably subvert our human rights initiatives more than anything is a grossly inconsistent pattern of
application.'
Yet there is general agreement in the Department (including HA), in Congress, and even among some nongovernmental promoters of human rights, that there will be
times when security considerations have to take precedence
over human rights. There may be differences of opinion over
specific security situations, but the principle is accepted. Iran,
Korea, and the Philippines are examples of countries which
continued to receive military aid in spite of serious human
rights violations.
A frequent complaint is that Latin America is a prime
example of the inconsistent application of our human rights
policy. Assuming that the human rights behavior of the Latin
American nations is no worse than those in other regions, this
region has received a disproportionate share of human rights
sanctions. But Latin America has always held a somewhat special status in American arms transfer policy, according to a
RAND study by David Ronfeldt and Caesar Sereseres.
No other region-whether Africa, the Middle East, South Asia,
or Southeast Asia-has been so subject to critical U.S. treatment
and legislation as a region. Historically, the presumed homogeneity of nations and comparatively low threats to U.S. interest in
Latin America have made it easy to generalize and skip exceptions and distinctions that have stood out elsewhere, such as Iran,
32
South Korea, and the Philippines.

The new emphasis on human rights has served only to
reinforce an existing tendency in the U.S./Latin American
arms transfer policy; it did not cause it. In spite of President
Carter's efforts to assign greater importance to Latin America
in U.S. foreign policy, security considerations are relatively
unimportant in Latin America. Thus, human rights factors can
weigh more heavily in foreign policy decisions, a luxury not
available with respect to U.S. policy toward many of the countries of black Africa, the Middle East, or Asia.
31. Id. at 253.

32. Ronfeldt & Sereseres, U.S. Arms Transfers, Diplomacy, and Security in Latin
America and Beyond (October 1977) (Rand Paper P-6005), at 2-3.
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B. Phase Two-Congress
In addition to the evaluations prepared in the Executive
branch, as of 1978, hearings of the House International Relations Committee had been held on the human rights situations
in approximately twenty countries, and separate reports had
been requested and provided by the Congressional Research
Service on fifteen countries. These hearings and reports tend
to rely most heavily on unofficial, nongovernmental sources of
information, such as studies and testimony from NGOs, private citizens, and church groups in the countries under consideration.
Arms transfer recommendations from the Executive are
subject to modification or elimination in the appropriations
process. In some cases aid has been prohibited to countries not
included in the Administration's package. Aid was prohibited
to Vietnam, Uganda, Cambodia, Cuba, Laos, Angola, Brazil,
and Argentina in the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs
Appropriations Act of 1978.3
The same Act prohibited various categories of military assistance to Uruguay, El Salvador, and Gutemala, and reduced
the amounts requested for the Philippines, all on human rights
grounds.Y Ethiopia was also dropped, as recommended by the
Administration, but less on human rights grounds than because of its growing relationship with the Soviet Union.
When Congress is in the mood to determine specific policy
details, bureaucratic battles lost in Phase One may be reversed
in Phase Two. This inevitably leads to informal alliances between like-minded participants in Congress and the bureaucracy. Although these relationships are not explored in the present study, they deserve further attention.
C. Phase Three-Implementation
It is still possible to alter decisions emerging from Phases
One and Two in the presumably routine stage when the Executive actually obligates money, issues licenses, schedules delivery, etc. The report to Congress from the Secretary of State
serves notice that human rights considerations will be brought
33. Pub. L. No. 95-148, §§ 107, 114, 503B, and 506, 91 Stat. 1230, 1234, 1235,
1239, and 1240 (1977).
34. Id. §§ 503A, 503B, 503C.

1979

ARMS TRANSFER POLICY

to bear again.3 Congress had expressed its displeasure over
human rights in Nicaragua by reducing the FY 1978 aid authorization, and the Executive decided not to sign an aid
agreement with Nicaragua pending improvement in its human
rights situation. 3 Later in the year, in response to a question
from the Fraser Subcommittee, the State Department pointed
out that even the signing of an agreement does not mean that
the money will be forthcoming. An agreement with Nicaragua
was signed for FY 1977, but no drawdown was requested by
Nicaragua. Under these circumstances, Nicaragua declined to
make a request for FY 1979 security assistance.
Human rights factors are applied to the implementation of
commercial sales licensing as well as security assistance. One
example is the M-16 sling swivel case. Nicaragua had previously purchased 5,000 M-16 rifles from Colt and discovered
that the sling swivels were corroded. In May of 1977, Colt requested a permit to replace them. When HA refused to agree
on human rights grounds, the ensuing deadlock brought the
issue to the level of the Secretary of State, where no decision
was made, and none is likely-a sort of pocket veto. 7
There may also be attempts to stop a transaction, which
has already been concluded, short of delivery. HA attempted
unsuccessfully to block the sale of $9 million worth of Beech
aircraft to Argentina. It would have meant cancelling a good
faith contract for which, presumably, the company would have
to be compensated. The prospect brought interventions from
the Kansas congressional delegation and ultimately from the
White House.Y
V. BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS
There is a good deal of unhappiness with a human rights
policy that is delineated and applied by people in the regional
bureaus, the overseas missions, and those parts of the DOD
involved in arms transfers. There are complaints that HA is
doctrinaire and is given to the use of delay tactics. It is felt by
many that the proper goals of U.S. diplomacy should be the
35. 123

CONG.

Rac. S1424 (daily ed. -Dec. 7, 1977).

36. 1978 Appropriations,supra note 30, at 4.

37. Interview with Ellis 0. Jones, III, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs (March 1978).
38. Id.
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cultivation of favorable relations and influences with foreign
governments, and that an improvement in the treatment of

their own citizens should be, at most, a secondary objective.
Then there are those who believe that it is important for the
United States to use its influence to promote human rights
abroad, but that the methods should be confined to "quiet
diplomacy" rather than public evaluations and the denial of
aid as a form of punishment.
There is resistance, however, and although it is not possible under normal circumstances to bypass HA entirely, there
will be attempts to control information in the hope that HA can
be kept out of the picture long enough to develop a broader
constituency and momentum. To prevent this, the staff people
in HA try to "bird dog" issues so as not to be dependent on the
normal channels of information. Of course, effectiveness is dependent on experience with the system. It takes time to tap the
informal information channels and sources of influence which
are present in any complex organization.
It is possible to bypass the system, however, if the White
House wants something in a hurry. According to Ellis Jones,
the original arms transfer policy officer, it took only two and a
half days to arrange arms transfer eligibility for Somalia, and
HA was confronted with a fait accompli. Even so, he estimated
that delivery can still take six months to a year. It is the opinion of another participant/observer that fewer such instances
have occurred during the Carter administration than during
the Kissinger tenure.3 9
VI.

CONGRESSIONAL

POLITICS

Although both the House and Senate have participated in
the human rights movement, it is the House which plays the
more prominent role, in large part because it is the first to
review Administration appropriations requests, giving it the
initiative and greater visibility. The Senate often plays a moderating role and provides the Executive with an opportunity to
reverse a setback in the House.
Not all members of Congress, or of the relevant committees, see eye to eye on the subject of human rights, and there
39. Interview with Priscilla Clapp, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (March
1978).
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are mixed motives among the supporters of sanctions against
countries. 0 The result has been the inadvertent alliance of
strange bedfellows: human rights crusaders who are anxious to
punish transgressors, along with anti-aid people who seek to
terminate giveaway programs and are delighted to be able to
obscure their real motives under the banner of human rights.
Arms transfer policy is somewhat less affected by this combination because much of it involves sales which do not require appropriations, and also because anti-aid factions are more likely
to train their sights on economic assistance, including American participation and support for international financial institutions. Aid has also been opposed for purely parochial reasons
which are disguised as human rights concerns, such as the
protection of home district economic interests from foreign
competition.
Members of Congress who are in neither camp are placed
in a difficult position. For example, Congressman Charles Wilson of Texas, a member of the Long Subcommittee, is generally
supportive of foreign aid, but he feels that the President has
provided a handy club to opponents of assistance in the State
Department and in Congress with which to belabor the Administration's own program. In the absence of ranking, or formula
of eligibility, almost any country is open to attack on human
rights grounds."
The installation of the 96th Congress in January 1979 may
have marked the end of the era in congressional human rights
activism that began in 1973. Not only was Congressman Fraser
defeated in his bid for a Senate seat, but there was a move to
abolish his International Organizations Subcommittee altogether. This was averted, but it is clear that the Chairman of
the International Relations Committee, Clement Zablocki,
does not intend to allow the subcommittee to play the same
activist role that it did under Fraser. The present Chairman,
Don Bonker of Washington, is a supporter of human rights but
does not have the comparable status and seniority of Fraser.
Other departures have thinned the ranks of human rights
advocates. In addition to Fraser, Joshua Eilberg of Pennsyl40. 1978 Appropriations, supra note 30, at 350.
41. Interview with Noel Holme, staff of Congressman Charles Wilson (March
1978).
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vania, Michael Harrington of Massachusetts, Helen S. Meyner
of New Jersey, Yvonne Burke, and Leo J. Ryan of California
are no longer on the scene. In the Senate, the death of Hubert
Humphrey and the defeat of Richard Clark of Iowa removed
two prominent human rights supporters. These and other
losses have eliminated the majority that previously supported,
for example, sanctions against Rhodesia.
The congressional attention span tends to be short and, in
any case, the more pressing issues of inflation, energy, and
arms control were bound to reduce legislative attention towards human rights. But the era of activism established a legacy of statutory provisions and organizational structures which
assures the human rights factor a role in the policymaking
process, despite the level of congressional or Executive interest.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Human rights considerations have become an important
new element in the arms transfer decisionmaking process since
1977. The change came about because of congressional pressure, organizational changes in the Department of State and,
most importantly, Presidential interest.
Congress led the human rights battle between 1973 and
1977 and made organizational changes to induce aid reductions
and terminations. The Ford administration complied only minimally with the congressional requirements, while its initiatives were designed to placate Congress and to deflect and
confine the issue to the ambit of international organizations.
American efforts to improve human rights were confined to
"quiet diplomacy," and changes were pursued bilaterally. Congress, however, wanted that and much more. If the Ford administration had remained in office after the election, a major
collision would probably have occurred over the issue of economic and military assistance policies.
At the beginning of the Carter administration, concern was
expressed by human rights advocates in and out of Congress
that bureaucratic resistance would undermine the new Administration's efforts to effect genuine change in policy. 2 The
42. For an excellent analysis of the background and political undercurrents of the
Carter human rights policy see Drew, A Reporter at Large: Human Rights, New
Yorker, July 18, 1977, at 36.
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doubters soon realized however, that a real change had taken
place. Although the Administration toned down its public rhetoric, the subject of human rights violations in other nations has
become a major consideration in the decisionmaking process.
Differences between the Carter administration and Congress arose over economic assistance and U.S. participation in
international financial institutions, rather than over the arms
transfer policy. Nonetheless, the implementation and application of an arms transfer policy based on human rights considerations is difficult. Inconsistent application is particularly acute
as it is generally recognized that exceptions must be made on
national security grounds, while exceptions to nonmilitary
forms of assistance are more difficult to justify. Evaluating and
comparing the human rights performance of governments is
difficult. There is inevitably disagreement over the basis of a
valid claim for exemption or the extent to which any given
country has changed its human rights performance. The evidence available is always conflicting, except for such pariahs
as Uganda, Cambodia, and North Korea. Nevertheless, there
is evidence, and for this reason much of the argument within
the bureaucracy tends to center on questions of performance
rather than security. It is easier for human rights advocates to
argue, for example, that the human rights situation in the Philippines has not improved, or has worsened, than to contend
that the Philippines is not sufficiently important to American
security interest in Asia to justify an aid grant in spite of
human rights violations.
The security factor tends to prevail, however, particularly
in countries with a major American military presence, such as
the Philippines, South Korea, and formerly, Iran. The Carter
administration requested $95.7 million in military assistance
for the Philippines in FY 1980, triple the amount requested for
FY 1979. The Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the
House Foreign Relations Committee voted to delete $7.9 million on human rights grounds, but the amount was restored by
a 14-11 vote in the full Committee. 3 At the same time, cuts in
aid to several Latin American countries were sustained, thus
continuing the tradition of allowing human rights considera43. Felton, House Panel Backs Military Aid Request for Philippines,37 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 542 (1979).
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tions to weigh more heavily in decisions regarding aid to that
region.
It may be possible to avoid the appearance and the reality
of "chaos," but inconsistency is endemic to any policy absent
a precise formula. This insures that foreign assistance policymaking will continue to be contentious, and the proper weight
to be given to human rights considerations in policy decisions
will remain a source of controversy.

U.S. Policy Toward Human Rights in Latin
America: A Comparative Analysis of Two
Administrations*
LARS SCHOULTZ**

The purpose of this paper is to analyze two related aspects
of comparative human rights behavior: the comparative level
of human rights violations among twenty-three Latin American nations; and the comparative level of financial support of
human rights violations in Latin America by the Administrations of Presidents Ford and Carter. The focus of the first comparison is on the advantages and shortcomings of a method
which attempts to rank governments on the basis of expert
evaluation of human rights performance. The latter comparison concentrates on the extent to which U.S. bilateral economic and military aid supports those Latin American governments which repress their citizens' fundamental human rights.'
* Adapted from a presentation made at a conference on human rights hosted by
the International Legal Studies Program, College of Law, and the Graduate School of
International Studies, University of Denver, and the Department of Political Science,
University of Colorado (Boulder), and held in Denver-Boulder in Spring 1978.
** Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
1. For a collection of cases studies, see, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: FISCAL YEAR 1978 (1977). A large
body of literature exists on the relationship between U.S. foreign assistance and various other types of behavior by recipient governments. See, e.g., Alpert & Bernstein,
InternationalBargainingand Political Coalitions: U.S. Foreign Aid and China's Admission to the U.N., 27 W. POL. Q. 314 (1974); D. BALDWIN, FOREIGN AID AND AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY: A DOCUMENTARY ANALYSIS (1966); L. BLACK, THE STRATEGY OF FOREIGN
AID (1968); J. Dunn, Military Aid and Military Elites: The Political Potential of
American Training and Technical Assistance Programs (1961) (Ph. D. dissertation,
Princeton U.); G. EDER, INFLATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: A CASE HISTORY
OF INFLATION AND STABILIZATION IN BOLIVIA (1968); H. FEIS, FOREIGN AID AND FOREIGN
POLICY (1966); Griffin & Enos, Foreign Assistance: Objectives and Consequences, 18
ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 313 (1970) (for a critique, see Over, An Example of
the Simultaneous-EquationProblem: A Note on 'ForeignAssistance: Objectives and
Consequences, '23 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 751 (1975); J. HOLCOM3E & A. BERG,
MAP FOR SECURITY: MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES (1957); H.
HOVEY, UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE: A STUDY OF POLICIES AND PRACTICES (1965);
Kaplan, The Distributionof Aid to Latin America: A Cross-NationalAggregate Data
and Time Series Analysis, 10 J. DEV. AREAS 37 (1975); Kaplan, US. Arms Transfers
to Latin America, 1945-1974: Rational Strategy, BureaucraticPolitics, and Executive
Parameters, 19 INT'L STUD. Q. 399 (1975); Kaplan, United States Aid and Regime
Maintenance in Jordan, 1957-1973, 23 PUB. POL'Y 189 (1975); Kato, A Model of U.S.
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In both cases, human rights are defined narrowly, encompassing only the physical integrity of the person. The human
right concerned, then, is that of freedom from torture and
other forms of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment,
including prolonged detention without trial.'
The issue of United States support for repressive governments through its foreign aid program has received an extraor3
dinary amount of attention from scholars and policy makers.
Foreign Aid Allocation: An Application of a Rational Decision-Making Scheme, in
APPROACHES TO MEASUREMENT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 198 (J. Mueller ed. 1969);
Lefever, The Military Assistance TrainingProgram, 424 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc.
Sci. 85 (1976); E. MASON, FOREIGN AID AND FOREIGN POLICY (1964); Miller,
Underdevelopmentand US. Foreign Policy, in STRUGGLE AGAINST HISTORY: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTION 136 (N. Houghton ed. 1968); Packenham,
PoliticalDevelopment Doctrines in the American ForeignAid Program, 18 WORLD POL.
194 (1966); F. Pancake, Military Assistance as an Element of U.S. Foreign Policy in
Latin America, 1950-1968 (1969) (Ph.D. dissertation, U. of Virginia); Sylvan,
Consequences of Sharp Military Assistance Increases for InternationalConflict and
Cooperation,20 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 609 (1976); R. WALTERS, AMERICAN AND SOVIET
AID: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1970); A. WESTWOOD, FOREIGN AID IN A FOREIGN POLICY

FRAMEWORK (1966); Wittkopf, The Concentration and Concordance of Foreign Aid
Allocations: A Transaction-FlowAnalysis, in LOCATIONAL APPROACHES TO POWER AND

CONFLICT (K. Cox & D. Reynolds eds. 1974); Wittkopf, Containment Versus Underdevelopment in the Distributionof United States Foreign Aid: An Introduction to the
Use of CrossnationalAggregate Data Analysis in the Study of Foreign Policy, in A
MULTI-METHOD INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL POLITCS 174 (W. Coplin & C. Kegley

eds. 1971); Wittkopf, ForeignAid and United Nations Votes: A Comparative Study,
67 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 868 (1973); E. WrrrKOPF, WESTERN BILATERAL AID ALLOCATIONS:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF RECIPIENT STATE ATTRIBUTES AND AID RECEIVED (1972); C.
WOLF, MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS (1965) (Rand Corp. pub. P-3240).
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ClassicalModel of Human Rights Development, in COMPARATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS 6 (R.
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Rights: Hearings before the Subcomm. on InternationalOrganizationsand Movements
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Training, Equipping the Latin American Military, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 16, 1967, at 13;
Gruening, Exporting Trouble, 195 THE NATION 194 (1962); Gutteridge, The Impact of
Foreign Aid upon the PoliticalRole of the Armed Forces in Developing Countries, in
THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 217, 225-26 (R. Cox ed. 1969); T. HAYTER,
AID AS IMPERIALISM 97-98, 138, 152 (1971); Hughes, The Myth of Military Coups and
Military Assistance, 47 MIL. REV. at 4, 7 (1967); REPRESSION IN LATIN AMERICA 154, 15760 (W. Jerman ed. 1975) (report on first session of second Russell Tribunal, Rome,
April 1974); Kaplan, United States Military Aid to Brazil and the Dominican Republic: Its Nature, Objectives and Impact, in Symposium on Arms Control, Military Aid
and Military Rule in Latin America (U. of Chicago, May 1972); Lernoux, Church
Cowed by Uruguayan Military (Jan. 18, 1977) (Alicia Patterson Foundation rep. no.
PL-7); J. MONTGOMERY, THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN AID: AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 252 (1962); 0berg, Arms Trade with the Third World as an Aspect of
Imperialism, 12 J. PEACE RESEARCH 213 (1975); Payer, Third World Debt Problems:
The New Wave of Defaults, MONTHLY REV., Sept. 1976, at 13; Powell, Military Assistance and Militarism in Latin America, 18 W. POL. Q. 382, 388 (1965); Rowe, Aid and
Coups d'Etat: Aspects of the Impact of American Military Assistance Programsin the
Less Developed Countries, 18 INT'L STUD. Q. 239 (1974); Schmitter, Foreign Military
Assistance, National Military Spending and Military Rule in Latin America, in
MILITARY RULE IN LATIN AMERICA 117 (P. Schmitter ed. 1973); Shestack & Cohen,
InternationalHuman Rights: A Role for the United States, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 673, 676
(1974); Styron, Uruguay: The Oriental Republic, 223 THE NATION 107, 111 (1976);
THAYER, THE WAR BUSINESS: THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ARMAMENTS 119-200 (1969);
U.S. CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, IF YOU WANT PEACE, DEFEND LIFE 18-20 (1976); Victor,
Military Aid and Comfort to Dictatorships,U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC., March 1969, at
43-47; Weaver, Arms Transfers to Latin America: A Note on the Contagion Effect, 11
J. PEACE RESEARCH 213 (1974); S. WEISSMAN, THE TRoJAN HORSE: A RADICAL LOOK AT
FOREIGN AID (1975); C. WOLF, THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF MILITARY PROGRAMS: SOME
INDICATIONS FROM LATIN AMERICA 38 (1963) (Rand Corp. memorandum RM-3676-ISA);
M. WOLPIN, MILITARY AID AND COUNTERREVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD (1972); and
Wriggins, Political Outcome of Foreign Assistance: Influence, Involvement or
Intervention? 22 J. INT'L AFF. 217 (1968).
Congressional hearings are packed with testimony on both sides of this issue. See,
e.g., ForeignAssistanceAuthorization: Examinationof US. ForeignAid Programsand
Policies: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Foreign Assistance of the Sen. Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 424-84 (1975). For prototypic responses of the
State Department, see Treatment of Political Prisoners in South Vietnam by the
Government of the Republic of South Vietnam: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Comm. on ForeignAffairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
58-62 (1973); PoliticalPrisonersin South Vietnam and the Philippines:Hearings before the Subcomm. on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 87-89 (1974); and International Protection of Human
Rights: Hearings before the Subcomm. on InternationalOrganizationsand Movements
of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 820-21 (1973) (letter
containing partial transcripts of State Department press briefings by C. Bartch).
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While it is impossible to deny that the U.S. Government has
helped to finance some of the most repressive regimes in Latin
America, no comparative data are available to support the assertion that the United States systematically directs its foreign
assistance to governments which violate their citizens' human
rights. Since 1972, Freedom House, a New York-based nongovernmental human rights organization, has conducted a semiannual "Comparative Survey of Freedom" which ranks each of
the world's nation states and most of their territories and dependencies on their respect for both political and civil rights.
The survey, unfortunately, is based almost exclusively upon
the western European and U.S. tradition of individual freedom. This, along with Freedom House's undisguised hostility
toward socialist economies, renders its rankings of human
rights performance somewhat inconsistent.' The only other
crossnational comparison of human rights behavior is James
Seymour's valuable contribution which ises as its measure of
human rights repression the number of political prisoners per
capita. 5 The major weakness in Seymour's analysis is that data
on political prisoners do not exist for a large number of states;
in the case of Latin America, Seymour could obtain reliable
data on only about half of the countries in the region.
DATA AND PROCEDURES

In order to measure the comparative level of human rights
violations in Latin America, a collective assessment was made
by surveying a group of individuals who have devoted their
lives to the international protection of human rights. When
research for this paper was initiated in early 1976, the universe
of experts on comparative human rights in the Western noncommunist world totaled approximately ninety-one persons.
They were defined as the persons who had published widely on
the subject or who occupied key positions in nongovernmental
and governmental human rights orgainizations. Rather than
sample this surprisingly small number of experts, questionnaires were sent to each of them. From among the eighty-seven
4. The director of the Freedom House survey is aware of and defends the emphasis
on the Western European tradition of freedom. See Gastil, The Comparative Survey
of Freedom-VI, FREEDOM AT ISSUE 5, 12 (Jan.-Feb. 1976).
5. Seymour, Human Rights as a Social Science Sub-Discipline, ANN. MEETING
INT'L STUD. A. 15-16 (March 1977).
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Third World nations which received U.S. foreign aid between
1962 (the fiscal year in which the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 began to operate) and 1976, respondents were asked to
rank only those nations with whose human rights record they
were familiar on a scale of ascending violations of from one to
four, using as a time frame the calendar year 1976.
After two letters to many potential respondents, a number
of telephone calls, and six months of waiting, the response rate
reached a respectable forty-two percent. As might have been
expected, given the specialized nature of the subject, the
thirty-eight respondents formed a fairly homogeneous group. In
terms of their primary occupations, twelve were employees of
nongovernmental human rights organizations (NGOs), eight
were professors of international law, seven were social scientists, six were practicing attorneys, three were members of national parliaments, and two were U.S. congressional staff members. All of the attorneys, social scientists, and professors of
international law were closely associated with at least one
NGO. Most of the respondents had some firsthand knowledge
of human rights protection in Latin America, generally gained
through participation in an investigation sponsored by nongovernmental organizations. Many had participated in several
investigations. As to their nationalities, thirty-two respondents
were from the United States and Canada, five were from various European nations, and one was from Latin America. This
disappointing distribution was the result of an extremely low
response rate by experts from outside the United States.
Nearly half of the potential respondents were not U.S. citizens.
In order to reduce some of the hazards of interregional
comparisons, the global assessment of the relationship between
U.S. aid and human rights violations was reduced in scope to
consider only the twenty-three aid-receiving nations of Latin
America.' The dependent variable, then, was the experts' mean
evaluation of the level of human rights violations by each Latin
American government in 1976. This variable had a range of
2.79 (1.00 to 3.79), a mean of 2.35, and a standard deviation of
6. Latin America is defined to include all nations whose aid disbursements are
wholly or partially controlled by the Department of State's Bureau of Inter-American
Affairs. Included, therefore, are Guyana, Jamaica, Surinam, and Trinidad and Tobago.

596

VOL.

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

8:591

.87. Table 1 presents this composite assessment of human

rights performance by Latin American governments.
Table 1. Level of Human Rights Violations
(Latin America, 1976)
Mean Expert
Rank Ordera
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
9
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
20
22
23

Country
Costa Rica
Trinidad and Tobago
Surinam
Jamaica
Venezuela
Colombia
Guyana
Mexico
Ecuador
Panama
Peru
Honduras
El Salvador
Dominican Republic
Bolivia
Nicaragua
Guatemala
Haiti
Brazil
Paraguay
Uruguay
Argentina
Chile

Assessment
(N = 38)

1.00
1.13
1.36
1.43
1.48
1.52
1.56
1.85
2.05
2.05
2.13
2.19
2.35
2.43
2.61
2.95
3.00
3.33
3.35
3.44
3.44
3.59
3.79

a In ascending level of human rights violations.

This technique of creating a comparative ranking of
human rights violations has the advantage of producing findings which are reasonably valid. In general terms, the countries
are more or less properly ranked. Certainly there will always be
arguments among Latin Americanists in ranking the region's
twenty-three nations along any dimension, but most scholars
will agree that the ranking in Table 1 presents a fairly accurate
comparison. The technique of expert evaluation is much more
valuable in identifying the extreme cases than in accurately
ranking those nations which tend to be grouped together in the
middle.
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The disadvantages of using the technique of expert evaluation to compare governments' human rights behavior are, however, considerable. One problem is the varying level of expertise among the respondents. A few were extremely knowledgeable about a single country, but their "vote on that country
carried no more weight in this survey than that of any other
respondent. Although the group of experts was chosen with
extreme care, given the complexity and diversity of the Latin
American region, it was not possible to select respondents with
equal levels of expertise for each nation. An additional problem
arising from this variance was the fluctuating number of countries ranked by each respondent. Some experts ranked all
twenty-three Latin American nations, while others commented
on just a few. This problem was resolved by selecting a totally
arbitrary cutoff: the thirty-eight respondents who ranked
twenty or more nations were included. All the other responses
were left uncoded in a file drawer, despite the fact that some
of them were by highly esteemed authorities.
A second disadvantage of the technique of expert assessment is methodological, and has its origin, perhaps, in a personality characteristic of lawyers. A brief pretest of the questionnaire demonstrated that the desired interval scale of
human rights behavior could not be used with attorneys, nearly
all of whom refused to rank governments by numbers alone.
Although social scientists and NGO personnel were content to
use only numbers, the lawyers demanded some descriptive
phrase beside each number. In providing this description, the
questionnaire provided the basis for creating an ordinal rather
than an interval scale. A rating of "four" is still worse than a
"three," but it is impossible to determine whether the experts
responded in such a way that the interval between three and
four can be considered equal to that between two and three.
Thus, it is inappropriate to compute the mean expert assessment presented in Table 1. As a result, it is incorrect to assume, for example, that the fifty-two points between Costa
Rica and Colombia are the equivalent of the fifty-two points
between the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua. They might
be, but there is no way to know for sure. The fact that a large
majority of the respondents resorted to half points suggests
that many experts did perceive the scale as interval, but this
is hardly a sufficient reason to disregard the potential limitations of the data.
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A third disadvantage is that the exercise tends to become
trivialized. The results are challenged by such questions as "Is
Argentina really worse than Uruguay?" or "Should Surinam be
considered a part of Latin America?" Once large amounts of
time have been invested in an exercise of this sort, there is a
natural tendency not only for the author to defend it vigorously
but also for others to attribute a greater degree of validity to
the data than an objective analysis would deem proper. This
is particularly true in cases which yield quantifiable results.
Because the data appear to be "hard," researchers tend to
squeeze them a bit too much, to use inappropriate statistical
techniques, to carry calculations too far to the right of the
decimal point.
Given an imperfect instrument, then, commentary revolves around an analysis of its flaws, and in this process one
somehow tends to forget that the goal of all this is to contribute
to a reduction in the level of torture in Latin America. If the
basic method of expert evaluation is to be used in the future,
perhaps what should be attempted is a gross ordinal classification similar in certain ways to the much maligned Freedom
House categories. Governments should be classified as, say,
extremely repressive, moderately repressive, or relatively nonrepressive. Rather than judging on the basis of all human
rights, however, experts could be asked to consider only the
fundamental right to the physical integrity of the person. This,
I believe, would effectively eliminate some of the most obvious
shortcomings of the technique which produced Table 1, and
would, therefore, permit us to turn to a more relevant topic:
how and to what extent our government is involved in encouraging or discouraging the violation of human rights in Latin
America.
THE FORD AND CARTER ADMINISTRATIONS

The principal subject of this paper is the comparative level
of support for human rights violations in Latin America by the
two most recent U.S. administrations. While there are a number of ways to express this support, perhaps it is most clearly
observed in the U.S. bilateral aid program. The comparisons
below are based upon FY1975 and proposed FY1979 aid from
the Agency for International Development (AID), the Food for
Peace (PL480) program, and from four different types of military aid. The FY1975 aid distributions reflect the priorities of
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the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger policy toward Latin America, while
those for FY1979 are the first relatively pure reflections of the
Carter administration's preferences.
Using the data on human rights from Table 1 and the
FY1975 aid disbursements, Figure 1 presents the relationship
between the level of human rights violations in Latin America
in 1976 and the receipt of U.S. aid during FY1975. This scatterplot describes quite vividly the limited extent to which human
rights considerations were included in the Ford administration's foreign assistance decisionmaking.
FIGURE I. Scatterplot of the Relationhip between US. Aid to
Ltin America in FY 1975and the Le'el of Hoan
Rights Viottion
by Recipient Gonernnt in
1976.
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It is clearly evident that U.S. aid at this time tended to flow
disproportionately to those Latin American governments which
tortured their citizens. The Pearson correlation for Figure 1 is
+.68. Even given a low N and an imperfect instrument to
measure human rights violations, a correlation of this magnitude is highly unusual in studies of other aspects of the U.S.
foreign aid program. Although it is incorrect to use these
findings to make causal analyses, if in 1975 one were interested
in making a safe bet on how the Ford-Kissinger administration
would distribute its foreign aid, perhaps the best available indicator would have been the level of recipients' violations of
human rights.
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The scatterplot is composed of two clusters of nations. One
group of seven countries was ranked relatively low in its level
of repressiveness and received relatively little, if any, economic
or military assistance from the United States. The other sixteen nations are all ranked higher in their repression of human
rights, and all received relatively large amounts of U.S. aid.
The only major exception among the twenty-three nations is
Colombia. While Figure 1 describes the relationship between
human rights and absolute levels of aid, the relationship holds
for relative (per capita) aid levels as well. Most of the twentythree nations do not change their position in the scatterplot
when population is considered, and those few that do change
are replaced by other nations with similar human rights records. Very populous Brazil, for example, drops precipitously
when per capita rather than absolute aid levels are considered,
but Nicaragua makes a commensurate rise and thereby cancels
the potential decline in the positive relationship between U.S.
aid and human rights violations.
The relationship between Latin American governments'
repression of human rights in 1976 and the Carter administration's proposed aid distributions for FY1979 is presented in
Figure 2. Between 1975 and 1979 some very substantial changes
occurred in the distribution of U.S. economic and military assistance.
FIGURE 2. Scatt-rplot of the Relatioohip betw n U.S. Aid to
Lotio Amterio in FY 1979and the Lenolof Huoan
Rights Violatir- by Recipient Gonernmeht in
1976.
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Most of the extremely repressive governments in Latin America now receive substantially less aid than in earlier years.
Indeed, two countries, Argentina and Uruguay, were completely omitted from the Carter administration's request to
Congress, although to some extent the aid "pipeline" is still
open to Argentina. Along with these two nations, Brazil, Chile,
and Nicaragua declined dramatically in the receipt of U.S. aid
between FY1975 and FY1979. It must be emphasized, however,
that much of the credit for these aid reductions should go to
Congress, especially in the cases of Chile, Nicaragua, and Uruguay. And in the case of Nicaragua, there was some evidence
that the Administration might yield to pressure from the potent Nicaraguan lobby and free a large amount of previously
blocked aid funds for the Somoza dictatorship.7
Two further points underline the differences between U.S.
aid policies under the Ford and Carter administrations. First,
several nations with high levels of respect for human
rights-Costa Rica, Guyana, and Jamaica-are now receiving
much more aid from the United States than they have in the
past. During the Kissinger era it was rumored that Guyana and
Jamaica were considered as targets for "destabilization" programs because of their governments' slight tilts to the left of
center. In 1979 they are scheduled to be among the region's
major aid recipients. Second, those Latin American nations
with very repressive governments which nonetheless remain
major aid recipients-Bolivia, Guatemala, and Haiti-are
among the neediest in the region, and U.S. aid programs in
these countries are designed to reach only the neediest social
sectors. 8 This is also true of the much reduced Food for Peace
program in Chile, where all commodities will now be channeled
not through the Pinochet government but rather through private voluntary organizations, such as Catholic Relief Services.
Congress approved of these "needy people" exceptions when it
inserted clauses in human rights sections of economic assistance legislation permitting the President to ignore a recipient
7. Wash. Post., May 16, 1978, at Al, col. 6; and id. at A18, col. 1.
8. An exception to this is an unexplained request for $6.5 million in foreign military sales credits for Bolivia.
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government's abuses of human rights so long as the provision
of U.S. aid will directly benefit needy people
Overall, even the most unrelenting critics of U.S. foreign
policy will have to admit that the performance of the Carter
administration in dissociating the U.S. bilateral aid program
from unusually repressive Latin American governments is impressive. 0 At the very least, the values displayed by the FY1979
aid request are far different from those of four years earlier. In
1975, human rights activists were attacking the entire direction
of the U.S. aid program, including such notorious cases as the
distribution of eighty-five percent of Latin America's Title I
PL480 funds to the Pinochet regime in Chile. In 1978, the same
groups were attacking the exceptional cases. In fact, the best
indication of how much change has occurred is the datum that
in 1978 human rights groups concentrated their energies upon
a miniscule $150,000 grant to Nicaragua for military training.
A

FURTHER COMPARISON

Comparatively speaking, there is much to praise about the
Carter administration's aid-related policy toward human
rights in Latin America. But bilateral aid to Latin America is
a restricted area of U.S. foreign policy, and it might be wise to
compare this area with other aspects of the Administration's
efforts to promote human rights. One of these areas should be
U.S. bilateral assistance to non-Latin American countries.
Here those who would reduce to a bare minimum all U.S. aid
to repressive regimes are less than euphoric with the current
Administration, for its FY1979 budget request suggests that a
number of repressive governments continue to be favorites of
our national security planners. South Korea is scheduled for
$336 million, Indonesia for $228 million, and the Philippines for
$143 million from the various U.S. bilateral aid programs in
FY1979. These three nations, with unusually repressive regimes, are programmed to receive more than twice the total aid
9. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(a) (1976).
10. The only unmentioned major change in Figure 2 is an increase in aid to the
increasingly repressive Mexican Government. It should be noted, however, that all
U.S. aid to Mexico is for the purpose of narcotics control. The program therefore should
not be considered foreign aid in the strict sense of the word, since the paraquat purchased with these funds eventually lodges in the lungs of U.S. citizens.

-
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to all of Latin America's twenty-three nations. The protestations of AID notwithstanding, it is ludicrous to suggest that the
governments of these three countries are going to use much of
this money to help their poverty stricken masses. The purpose
of our aid is variously said to be support for "friendly" governments (the Indonesia argument), national security (the Philippine bases argument), the sanctity of our word as expressed in
earlier Cold War commitments (the South Korea argument),
or some other argument which cannot mask the fact that under
the current Administration the U.S. aid program continues to
support some of the world's most egregious violators of human
rights. It is relatively easy for aid decisionmakers to be tough
with Latin America's repressive governments. The true test of
the Carter administration's human rights mettle is in areas
where competing values challenge that of the protection of
human rights. In these areas, human rights have been subordinated to a variety of traditional foreign policy concerns.
A second area to which U.S. bilateral aid to Latin America
can be compared is that of multilateral aid. With the strong
support of Congress, the Carter administration has worked to
incorporate human rights considerations into multilateral aid
policies. Nevertheless, its activities in this area cannot yet be
described as vigorous, except perhaps in the Inter-American
Development Bank. The Administration officials responsible
for U.S. participation in international financial institutions
(IFIs), Treasury Secretary W. Michael Blumenthal and Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs C. Fred
Bergsten, have actively opposed efforts by Congress to add
human rights sections to legislation authorizing U.S. participation in IFIs. 1 Their argument, like that of Henry Kissinger in
the case of human rights and bilateral aid, is that the Administration requires "flexibility" in the conduct of foreign relations.
In addition, loan requests from a number of very repressive
governments continue to receive "yes" votes from U.S. directors of multilateral banks. While a growing list of negative
11. See Blumenthal's statement in 124 CONG. REC. H1403, H1406 (daily ed. Feb.
23, 1978) (letter of Sec. Blumenthal) and Bergsten's testimony in Foreign Assistance
and Related Agencies Appropriationsfor 1978, Part1: Hearings before the Subcomm.
on Foreign Operations Appropriationsof the House Comm. on Appropriations,95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 139, 206, 513-14 (1977) (statement of Ass't Sec. Bergsten).
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votes is encouraging, the overworked staff of the State Department's Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs has
not yet been able to exert its influence over loans to a sufficiently wide range of nations."2 Specifically, the Bureau simply
does not have the human resources needed to counter claims
by other, more experienced bureaucratic entities that a given
loan to a repressive government will directly benefit needy people. The Bureau, therefore, tends to flag loans to certain governments for special attention by the Christopher Committee
and to sputter ineffectually at others. This, of course, may
change as the Bureau matures, but in the meantime human
rights considerations are less regularly incorporated in U.S.
multilateral aid policy than they are in bilateral aid to Latin
America.
In a third area, that of commercial transactions by U.S.based corporations, the Carter administration has failed to use
its full influence to promote human rights. In 1978 the Administration chose to support neither a general human rights
amendment to the Export-Import Bank authorization bill nor
a specific one which would restrict Eximbank participation in
financing the investments of multinational corporations in
South Africa. In addition, it has been alleged that the Commerce Department is carrying on an active program of encouraging the export of "gray area" armaments to repressive governments. One example involves the sale of military aircraft
components to Brazil for eventual resale to Chile. Turned down
by the Arms Export Control Board, it is alleged that the Department then contrived to have the weapon redefined so that
it could be removed from the Munitions List and exported
without the Board's approval. 3 Finally, it is the Congress and
not the Administration which has taken the lead in attempting
12. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, Mark Schneider,
stated in 1978 that during 1977 the United States opposed twenty loans by IFIs on
human rights grounds, and that at least a dozen loan requests were withdrawn when
the U.S. made clear its opposition to them. For a list of seventeen opposing votes, six
of which were against Argentina, see Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy:A Review
of the Administration's Record: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on InternationalOrganizations of the House Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2,
14 (1977).
13. Arnson & Klare, Pipeline to Pinochet: Law or No Law, the Arms Flow, 226
THE NATION 502 (1978).
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to curtail major corporate investments and loans by private
banks to repressive governments which have been declared ineligible for U.S. aid. When Rep. Henry Reuss (D-WI) of the
House Banking Committee asked six New York banks to explain why they were undermining U.S. foreign policy by continuing to loan unusually large sums of money to the Chilean
government, the Carter administration decided to ignore the
issue. 41
Initially, many members of the Carter administration
seemed not to have received the message that human rights are
to be promoted aggressively. However, an active alliance between nongovernmental human rights groups and human
rights activists within the Administration is perhaps responsible for conveying the message to persons such as the former
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Terence A. Todman, who was moved to the U.S. Embassy in Madrid. Overall, however, it would be a grave error to underestimate the number of U.S. foreign policy officials who are waiting quietly for the human rights issue to disappear. The plea
of these people, whether it concerns IFI loans or Food for Peace
allocations, is that they must be allowed to "de-politicize" the
U.S. aid program. Most of them are sufficiently sophisticated
to realize that the global distribution of resources will always
be political. Their aim is not to "de-politicize" aid but to "defuse" human rights considerations. It would be lamentable if
human rights activists, looking at encouraging data from the
U.S. bilateral aid program to Latin American, were lulled into
a complacency which permitted these officials to succeed in
their efforts.
14. Wash. Post., Apr. 12, 1978, at A9, col. 1; and id., Apr. 13, 1978, at A19, col. 1.
See also the study by I. Letelier & M. Moffitt, Human Rights, Economic Aid and
Private Banks: The Case of Chile (The Transnational Institute, April, 1978 (mimeo)).

An Immigration Policy of Helping Bring
People to the Resources
JAMES
I.

A.R.

NAFZIGER*

INTRODUCTION

The issue of undocumented aliens in the United States
eludes resolution because of several factors. These include distorted, ritualized commentary, an incomplete and incoherent
national policy framework, deficiencies in the federal immigration law and its implementation, and consequent public misperceptions which encourage more of the same. In response, the
federal government desperately needs to formulate a coherent,
informed immigration policy which rises above misplaced public fears to define the national interest more broadly in terms
of emerging political, economic, and demographic realities and
world order imperatives.' As a fulcrum of a new policy, the
United States should assist in the rational process of human
migration and the related redistribution of global resources. In
general, people should be allowed, indeed encouraged, to migrate internationally, as they do domestically, in search of a
better life.'
There is no dearth of legal techniques, actual and proposed, which address the issue of undocumented aliens. The
threat of undocumented aliens, however, has been grossly exaggerated.' The United States can, and should, revive its mori* Associate Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law; Visiting (Fulbright) Professor, National Autonomous University of Mexico, 1978.
1. "It is not a question whether or not to act upon the national interest, but
whether we perceive and define that national interest in terms broad enough to respond
to the actual determinants of political behavior." Shulman, On Learning to Live with
AuthoritarianRegimes, 55 FoR. AiF. 337 (1977). The newly established Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy will have an opportunity to formulate a new
policy which takes account of emerging national and world order interests. Act of Oct.
12, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-412, § 4, 92 Stat. 907.
2. See, e.g., the injunctions of the World Population Plan of Action, infra notes
85 and 86; President Lpez Portillo of Mexico has emphasized the trananational consideration that "[ilt is not a crime to look for work [by Mexican immigrants] and I
refuse to consider it as such," quoted in Eying Mexico's Oil Bonanza, NEWSWEEK, Feb.
19, 1979, at 31.
3. See W. Cornelius, Migration to the United States: Causes, Consequences and
U. S. Responses (Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Monograph Series of the Migration and Development Study Group) (1978).
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bund hospitality toward immigration and, in the process, legitimatize the status of undocumented aliens in the country.
Unnecessary immigration barriers serve neither national nor
global interests.
A fortress mentality is especially detrimental to the interests served by Mexican migration.4 Although the presence of
large numbers of undocumented Mexican aliens is not cost free
to this country, on balance they have more than paid their way;
they are more of a benefit than a burden.5
By official acknowledgement, the issue of undocumented
aliens remains at dead center in relations between Mexico
and the United States. The "special relationship" between the
4. Nafziger, A Policy Framework for Regulating the Flow of Undocumented Mexican Aliens into the United States, 56 OR. L. Rav. 63 (1977).
5. Id.
6. Mexican President L6pez Portillo, quoted in Excelsior (Mexico), Aug. 9, 1977,
at 1-A, col. 4; U. S. Ambassador (to Mexico) Patrick J. Lucey, quoted in Hatch, Illegal
Aliens' Biggest Issue: Lucey, Capital Times (Madison, Wisc.), Aug. 16, 1978, at 43,
col. 1; Fagen, The Realities of US.-Mexican Relations, 55 FOR. AFF. 685, 688 (1977);
Excelsior, May 6, 1978, at 6-A, col. 1. During 1978 the United States was increasingly
preoccupied with the issue: Fagen, The Carter Administration and Latin America:
Business As Usual? 57 FOR. A". 652, 656 (Special issue 1979).
The February 14-16, 1979 meetings in Mexico City between Presidents Carter and
L6pez Portillo seem to have featured three issues: trade, energy, and immigration,
although others were discussed. Nelson, Mexican PresidentDelivers Blunt Warning to
Carter, L.A. Times, Feb. 15, 1979, at 1, col. 2; Nelson, Carter Defends As "Fair"U.
S. Dealings with Mexico, L.A. Times, Feb. 16, 1979, at 1, col. 1; Greenwood and
Nelson, Carier Vows to Push for Mexican Gas Deal, L.A. Times, Feb. 17, 1979, at 1,
col. 5; The Oregonian, Feb. 17, 1979, at 1, col. 5.; Goodsell, Mexico: Goodwill-but
not Necessarily Oil for US., Christian Sci. Mon., Apr. 6, 1979, at 7, col. 1. Leonel
Castillo, Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, described the meeting as the most important development involving the two nations since Mexico nationalized American oil holdings in 1938. L. A. Times, Feb. 16, 1979, at 12, col. 1. Generally, however, appraisals of the meeting were less exuberant. See, e.g., Goodsell, Little
Enthusiasm for Carter in Mexico, Christian Sci. Mon., Feb. 16, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
Whatever the final appraisal of the meetings, they did establish a process of better
communication-a "joint consultant mechanism"-between the two countries on the
issues of immigration and undocumented aliens. Del Olmo, FirstStep Taken To Solve
Alien Issue, L.A. Times, Feb. 17, 1979, at 1, col. 16. In a joint communiqu6 following
the meetings, Mexico for the frst time agreed that it shares the migration problem
with the United States. The Oregonian, Feb. 17, 1979, at 1, col. 5. The issue of undocumented Mexican aliens will apparently be a central consideration of the newly established Presidential Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy. L.A.
Times, Feb. 17, 1979, at 12, col. 1. On the background of the Carter-Lpez Portillo
meeting, including summaries of divergent views on the issue of undocumented aliens,
see, e.g., Holt, Carterin Mexico: It Could Be a Turning Point, Christian Sci. Mon.,
Feb. 7, 1979, at 23, col. 2; Goodsell, Carter'sMexican Test: Coal Friend, New Riches,
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United States and Mexico,7 and the historical and geographical
circumstances of Mexican migration (which is estimated to
involve as much as one-quarter of the total Mexican work
force 8 ) should be instrumental in shaping a comprehensive,
coherent immigration policy and law. In focusing on the issue
of Mexican migration to the United States, it is recognized that
undocumented aliens from other countries are more apt to be
visa overstayers rather than, as is more typical of Mexicans,
undocumented entrants at the border. A comprehensive national policy should consider what, if anything, this formal
distinction among undocumented aliens implies.
Before examining the substantive issues, it will be useful
to take note of recent commentary and studies as an indication
of public and scholarly opinion. Throughout this article, special attention will be given to Mexican press commentary, in
an effort to maintain a broad perspective.' In surveying the
domestic media, to which lesser attention is given, it is depressing to find very few items which offer new insights and abjure
the familiar ritualized mythology. 0 One can find several responsible press commentaries and several useful studies." On
Christian Sci. Mon., Feb. 13, 1979, at 6, col. 1; and Goodsell, Carterin Mexico: Warm
Welcome, Cool Debate, Christian Sci. Mon., Feb. 15, 1979, at 3, col. 1.
7. The relationship supposedly emanates from the social and economic ties of the border region and from the basic situation of
'neighborliness' that geography has imposed upon the two nations. By
definition, goes the argument, neighbor nations enjoy a particularly intimate relationship exemplified by a plethora of favorable interactions,
including voluminous trade, mutual investment, reciprocal tourism and
cooperative efforts to resolve occasional problems.
Williams, Oil in Mexican-US. Relations:Analysis and BargainingScenario, 22 ORais
201 (1978).
8. For a summary of research leading to the estimate of Mexican workers in the
United States, see Excelsior, June 1,1978, at 1-A, col. 1. See generally J. SAMORA, Los
MOJADOS: THE WETBACK STORY (1971).
9. Of particular note is a column on these issues, usually appearing in the Monday
edition of the Mexico City daily Unomisuno, written by Jorge Bustamante of El
Colegio de Mexico, the director of a $1 million study involving interviews with some
800,000 Mexicans who have worked in the United States. L.A. Times, Feb. 17, 1979,
at 16, col. 1.
10. For a description of this mythology, see Nafziger, supra note 4, at 64.
11. For salient press commentary, see especially, Kirsch, California'sIllegal Aliens: They Give More Than They Take, NEW WEsT, May 23, 1977, at 26; Cook, How
Illegal Aliens Pay as They Go, NEW WEST, May 23, 1977, at 34; Critchfield, They Still
Come Home to Huecorio, Christian Sci. Mon., Aug. 31, 1977, at 14, col. 1 (a concise,
revealing account of migratory patterns involving one small town in the Mexican state
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the other hand, there is a mass of regurgitated mythology,
much of it expressed with apocalyptic vision,"2 which princiof Michoacan); Goodsell, Why Paco Diaz Wants To Head Up North, Christian Sci.
Mon., Apr. 4, 1979, at 14, col. 1; Preston, Why Mexico's Peasants Migrate North,
Christian Sci. Mon., Aug. 29, 1978, at 9, col. 3; Jacoby, How Should We Deal with
Illegal Aliens?, Manchester Guardian, July 31, 1977, at 17, col. 1; Maxwell, Illegal
Immigration: The Mexican Perspective, L.A. Times, July 15, 1979, Special Supp. at
30; Becklund, Get Out If You Can: Mexico's Catch 22, id. at 31; Green, Unalienable
Wrongs: Immigrants and the Law North of the Rio Grande, 7 Juus DOCTOR 37 (Nov.
1977); Wall St. J., June 18, 1976; Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1979; Wachter, Second Thoughts
About Illegal Immigrants, FORTUNE, May 22, 1978, at 80; and Riding, Silent Invasion:
Why Mexico is an American Problem, SAT. Ray., July 8, 1978, at 14. Illegal Aliens:
Invasion Out of Control, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Jan. 29, 1979, at 38; Velarde &
Castillo, How to Deal with Illegal Aliens, Christian Sci Mon., Mar. 14, 1979, at 22;
Van Slambrouck, New Study Rejects Old Views: Illegal Aliens Affect Small Part of
Economy, Christian Sci. Mon., Mar. 22, 1979, at 9, col. 4.
Among the scholarly studies, especially recommended is W. Cornelius, note 3
supra, which not only provides a thorough description and analysis, but an excellent
bibliography. Also recommended are Bustamante, Commodity Migrants, in Vm~ws
ACROSS THE BORDER, (S. Ross ed. 1978); Catz, Fourth Amendment Limitations on
Nonborder Searches for Illegal Aliens: The Immigration and NaturalizationService
Meets the Constitution, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 66 (1978); W. Cornelius, Illegal Migration
to the U.S.: Recent Research Findings, Policy Implications and Research Priorities (unpublished, 1977); J. Reichert and D. Massey, Patterns of Migration from a
Rural Mexican Town to the United States: A Comparison of Legal and Illegal
Migrants (March 1979) (unpublished study, Princeton University); W. Cornelius,
Mexican Migration to the U.S.: The View From Rural Sending Communities (MIT
1976); National Council on Employment Policy, Illegal Aliens: An Assessment of the
Issues (1978); RIos-Bustamante, IMMIGRATION AND PUBLIC PoucY: HUMAN RIGHTS FOR
UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS AND THEIR FAMILIES (1978); Stoddard, Illegal Mexican
Labor in the Borderlands: InstitutionalizedSupport of an Unlawful Practice, 19 PAC.
Soc. REV. 175 (1976). See also several unpublished papers presented or otherwise
distributed at the First International Symposium on the Problems of Migratory Workers from Mexico and the United States (University of Guadalajara, July 11-14, 1978):
J. Arroyo Alejandre & W. Winnie, La Migraci6n de los Trabajadores Rurales de Jalisco
Hacia los Estados Unidos; L. Estrada, G. Cardenas & L. Garcia y Griego, Measuring
the Volume and Social Impact of Undocumented Immigration: Confusion Leading to
Unfounded Exaggerations; C. Garcia, Maximization or Survival?: The case of "Illegal
Aliens" from Mexico; R. Rochin, Illegal Mexican Aliens in California Agriculture:
Some Theoretical Considerations; and J. Sommers, The Problem of the Undocumented Worker: A View from the United States.
For additional data, unfortunately marshalled in support of questionable conclusions, see D. NORTH & M. HousTotmN, THE CHARAcrmUsicS AND ROLE OF ILLEGAL ALIENS
IN THE U.S. LABOR MARKET: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY (1976); Salinas & Torres, The
Undocumented Mexican Alien: A Legal, Social, and Economic Analysis, 13 HOUSTON
L. REv. 863 (1976). The Centro de Inmigraci6n, Georgetown University Law Center,
Washington, D.C., has prepared a useful bibliography, Undocumented Immigrant
Resource Materials Available from Centro de Inmigraci6n.
. 12. See, e.g., Morris, Texas-Chihuahuo, 177 NEw REP., Oct. 22, 1977, at
12; TIME,
May 2, 1977, at 26; Strout, Illegal Aliens Present US. with Problem of Huge Size,
Christian Sci. Mon., May 16, 1977, at 16, col. 1; Strout, "Undocumented Workers"
Swell U.S. Population, Christian Sci. Mon., Nov. 2, 1978, at 7, col. 4; Strout, The
Undocumented Alien, Christian Sci. Mon., Mar. 18, 1977 at 39, col. 1; Strout, Labor
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pally serves to distort public opinion.
Written commentary is, however, only one factor in the
vicious circle of current public concern. The Federal Government has also been instrumental. 3 Finally, public opinion,
doubtlessly fed by these first two factors, has become more
hostile toward aliens. As an example of this trend, the United
States public now seems to favor the requirement that all persons carry an identification card presumably unavailable to
undocumented aliens, large-scale roundup of them, and a law
penalizing employers who hire them. Public opinion also disfavors "amnesty" for undocumented aliens already in this country." Although these responses address specific policy proposSecretary Looks Hard at Illegal Alien Problem, Christian Sci. Mon., Nov. 17, 1978, at
10, col. 1; Strout, Population Clock: The Impact of Immigrants, Christian Sci. Mon.,
Nov. 17, 1978, at 31, col. 1; Strout, US. Immigration Chief Criticized by Some as
"Soft" on Mexicans, Christian Sci. Mon., Nov. 27, 1978, at 7, col. 3; Lyons, Inside the
Volcano, HARPER's, June 1977, at 41 (although not addressed to the specific problem
of undocumented aliens, the Lyons article presents a rather sensationalistic series of
Mexican vignettes that make both indirect and direct reference to bracero migration
to the United States). Of particular notoriety in the recent literature is a report,
IMMIGRANTS AND IMMIGRANTS: PERSPECTIVES ON MEXICAN LABOR MIGRATION TO THE

UNITED STATES (A. Corwin ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as the Corwin Report). Al-

though its data (current as of 1975), legislative focus, and conclusions are by now
outdated, it warrants special mention because of the recent impact it was reported to
have had on initial positions taken by the Carter administration and because it only
recently received attention (front page) in Mexico (Excelsior, Mar. 23, 1978, at l-A,
col. 1; id. Mar. 24, 1978, at 1-A, col. 4; id. Mar. 25, 1978, at 1-A, col. 1; id. Mar. 26,
1978, at 1-A, col. 1; id. Mar. 27, 1978, at 1-A, col. 2; and id. Mar. 28, 1978, at 1-A, col.
5). Couched in the most frenetic language, the report reportedly frightened the Carter
administration with its forecast of a "Chicano Quebec" in the Southwest, Excelsior,
Mar. 7, 1978, at 1-A, col. 4. Typical of the report's polemic, it nowhere considers the
positive features of Mexican immigration nor the possible justifications of ChicanoMexican claims for greater political power. See also the "leaky sieve" characterization
of the U.S.-Mexican border in the Report of the House of Representatives Select
Committee on Population, reported in Christian Sci. Mon., Dec. 20, 1978, at 2, col. 1.
13. Both Federal immigration laws and their enforcement are instrumental. One
official responsible for regional enforcement of the Federal laws described them as "too
harsh, too cumbersome" and "among the most difficult to administer." He added that
the "law needs drastic revision." Remarks by Carl Houseman, Acting (Portland) District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service (Willamette University, Apr.
16, 1979). See also notes 27-31, and 58-59 and accompanying text, infra. In addition,
U.S. governmental spokesmen have asserted doubtful statistics and assumptions. See,
e.g., statements of John J. Gilligan, Agency for International Development, Excelsior,
May 3, 1978, at 3-A, col. 1; Griffin Bell, Attorney General, Excelsior, May 11, 1978, at
1-A, col. 6; and F. Ray Marshall, Secretary of Labor, Excelsior, May 12, 1978, at 1-A,
col. 3.
14. GALLUP PoLITIcAL INDEX, Feb. 1978, at 3-5.
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als and hence may be interpreted as ad hoc, it is important to
note more generally, by contrast to an earlier poll, 5 that a
plurality of respondents now favors a decrease in the present
level of immigration. Particularly in view of a disturbing current of nativism which may underlie some opinion,"6 a sharp
change in public attitudes is essential if the United States
wishes to maintain its integrity in the promotion of human
rights and otherwise to satisfy its responsibilities to the global
community." Convincing the U.S. public and the Congress
that opening the door to more immigrants is within the national interest 6 will be difficult. 9 The development of U.S.
leadership toward a global accommodation of the rational process of human migration is both more important and more
difficult to attain in view of the emerging sentiment against
alien labor throughout the world. Xenophobia directed against
aliens has increased in such western countries as Switzerland,20 France,2 ' West Germany,1 the United Kingdom, 23 Can15. GALup POLMCAL INDEX, Aug. 1965, at 15 (during the intervening 12 years,
respondents favoring a decrease in the immigration level increased from 33% to 42%,
those favoring a retention at the present level decreased from 39% to 37%, those
favoring an increased level decreased from 8% to 7%, and those voicing "no opinion"
decreased from 20% to 14%).
16. See, e.g., the Corwin Report, supra note 12; Fernandez Ponte, Nace el mros
espantosoRacismo en EU contra los Mexicanos y los Latinos, Excelsior, Feb. 20, 1978,
at 1, col. 6; and Cornelius, supra note 3, at 95.
17. See Excelsior, Aug. 9, 1977, at 6-A, col. 1. The U.S. has acknowledged that
the welfare of undocumented aliens is a human rights matter. See L.A. Times, Feb.
17, 1979, at 1, col. 6; id. Feb. 17, 1979, at 16, col. 3; The Oregonian, Feb. 17, 1979, at
1, col. 6; Unomaisuno, Aug. 14, 1979, at 1, col. 1; address by Herbert L. Hansell, Legal
Advisor, Dept. of State, 71 Paoc. AM. Soc. Lrr'LL. 207, 208 (1977); Excelsior, May 5,
1978, at 10-A, col. 1. But see note 36 infra.
18. See Cornelius, supra note 3, passim, On the national interest in a continuing
supply of Foreign labor, see the views of Jorge Bustamante of El Colegio de Mexico,
e.g., in Unomdsuno, Aug. 13, 1979, at 2, col. 1.
19. Id. at 95.
Under the circumstances, there is serious doubt that the U.S. will be able
to rise above scapegoating, political expedience, and racial prejudice to
pursue an immigration policy which will serve its own long-term national
interests as well as those of Mexico and other sending countries. Like
some West European nations, the U.S. may well have lost the capacity
to respond rationally, constructively, and humanely to large-scale migration from less developed countries. The implications of this are profoundly disturbing, but Mexico and other sending countries would be well
advised to ponder them.
20. See Gregory, The Migrants: Europe's Bitter Legions Head Home, Christian
Sci. Mon., Apr. 25, 1977, at 22, col. 3.
21. Id.; Excelsior, Feb. 15, 1978, at 3-A, col. 4.
22. Id.
23. Id.; Excelsior, Mar. 23, 1978, at 3-A, col. 1.
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ada,24 New Zealand,n and Brazil.2"
II.

CURRENT UNITED STATES LAW AND POLICY

The present immigration law 27 and its implementation

contribute substantially to the perceived problem of undocumented aliens. Sheer chaos reigns. For example, not only does
the law, carelessly amended in 1976, unwisely establish the
unrealistically low annual quota of 20,000 Mexican documented immigrants,2 8 but it is easily violated with impunity.
Provisions for alien labor certification2 have been improperly
administered by the Department of Labor, to the detriment of
both prospective immigrants and the nation's economy.30 In
flagrant violation of the law, the Federal Government has in
effect converted prospective immigrants into undocumented
aliens."
The rights of undocumented aliens remain uncertain and
their access to justice minimal.3 2 On the state level, De Canas
24. Noting a "fundamental ambivalence towards immigration which has characterized much of our history," a Canadian jurist observed that "we have reacted towards the immigrant with indifference, intolerance and fear, and even during periods
when we officially embraced a policy of large scale immigration as the answer to our
agricultural and manpower needs, we were frequently disinterested in the human
dimensions of the migration process." Hucker, Immigration, NationalJusticeand the
Bill of Rights, 13 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 649 (1975). Canada cancelled a bracero program
with Mexico in the face of fears of growing unemployment in that country. ElNacional
(Mexico), June 15, 1978, at 9, col. 3.
25. Carthew, New Zealand Puts Heat on Illegal-Alien Workers, Christian Sci.
Mon., Nov. 23, 1977, at 13, col. 1.
26. Unomisuno, June 12, 1978, at 14, col. 1.
27. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1970), see U.S.
Immigration Law and Policy: 1952-1979, Library of Congress, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979).
28. Pub. L. No. 94-571, 90 Stat. 2703 (1976). For a summary of the 1976 Amendments, see 56 CONG. DIG., Oct. 1977, at 230; Recent Developments, 18 HARv. INT'L L.
J. 457 (1977).
29. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1970) generally provides that an employer must hire
U.S. nationals exclusively unless none are "able, willing, qualified and available" to
fill an open position. See generally, Annot., 41 A.L.R. Fed. 608 (1979).
30. See Singhal, Labor Certification Under Revised Regulations, 51 S. CAL. L.
Rv. 823 (1978); Note, Alien Labor Certification,60 MmN. L. Rv. 1034 (1976).
31. A related problem is the discretion vested in consular officers abroad to decline visas. See Study, Consular Discretion in the Immigrant Visa-Issuing Process, 16
SAN DiEo L. Rav. 87 (1978); Note, Judicial Review of Visa Denials: Reexamining
Consular Nonreviewability, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rzy. 1137 (1977). Unnecessary visa denials
contribute to the stigmatization of aliens as "undocumented" and the lack of respect
for the immigration laws. They are violated with a substantial measure of impunity.
See, e.g., Wisc. ST. J. (Madison), Aug. 22, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
32. See, e.g., Green, supranote 11, at 40 et seq. Williams, Alien's Right to Unemployment Compensation Benefits, Annot., 87 A.L.R.3d 694 (1978); Van Slambrouck,
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v. Bica 33 permits legislation discouraging undocumented aliens. In ten states it is now illegal for employers knowingly to
hire undocumented aliens.3 All but two of these are on the East
Coast, and six are in the New England and California of Robert Frost ("Good fences make good neighbors"). Other states
are considering such legislation, 5 so that by the time of this
article's publication, more may be on the list.
In no small part because of an inadequate policy framework, Federal legislative initiatives have been diffuse and generally unproductive, if not harmful. Although the Carter administration, with encouragement from the United States
Embassy in Mexico and other quarters within the Department
of State, is reevaluating its position, it initially assumed the
rather extraordinary position that the mere presence of undocumented aliens violates the law and that, therefore they
should have no rights.3 Moreover, the Administration narrowly
construed the criteria under recent Supreme Court opinions to
the disadvantage of aliens and to the impairment of their rights
so as, for example, to authdrize arrests under the law on the
basis of Mexican appearance alone.37 At least one recent court
decision has. enjoined police entry of private dwellings when
there are no other reasonable grounds for suspicion. 38 This reTexas Schools and Mexican Aliens, Christian Sci. Mon., Feb. 16, 1979, at 4, col. 2. In
regard to civil action on behalf of and by undocumented aliens, see, e.g., Zavala v. Bell,
453 F. Supp. 55 (N.D. Cal. 1978); see Excelsior, Mar. 18, 1978, at 4-A, col. 1; Capital
Journal (Salem, Or.), Oct. 20, 1977, at 5A, col. 1. But see the recent decision of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, reversing a unique 45-year precedent, which establishes
that the "illegal" status of aliens can no longer bar access to the state's courts in civil
actions. Arteaga v. Literski, 83 Wis. 2d 128, 265 N.W.2d 148 (1978). The 1933 decision
which Arteaga overturned stood alone "for the proposition that an alien's status strips
him of standing to maintain a suit." Id. at 149.
33. 424 U.S. 351 (1976). For an excellent commentary on this decision, see Note,
12 TEx. INT'L L.J. 87 (1977).
34. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805 (West Supp. 1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51K
(West Supp. 1978); DEL. ANN. CODE tit. 19 § 705 (Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
448.09(1) (West Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4409 (1974); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 26 § 871 (West Supp. 1978); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 149, § 19C (West Supp.
1978); N.H. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 275-A: 4 & 275-A: 5 (Supp. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 444a (Supp. 1978); VA. CODE § 40.1-11.1 (Michie Supp. 1977).
35. See Report of the Centro de Inmigraci6n at 18 (Georgetown U. Law Center,
Oct. 23, 1978); Excelsior, Mar. 2, 1978, at 1-A, col. 5; and id. Feb. 10, 1978, at 1-A,
col. 5.
36. See Excelsior, Apr. 11, 1978, at 9-A, col. 1.
37. Excelsior, Feb. 25, 1978, at 1-A, col. 5.
38. Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 540 F.2d 1062, modified 548 F.2d 715 (7th
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flects the hard line taken against undocumented aliens by the
Carter administration, it is reported that 15,655 lawful residents were detained in the period from June to December 1977
alone, allegedly for "introducing, concealing, harboring, or
shielding" aliens. 3' The opportunities for abuse are obvious. 0
A legislative proposal known as the "Carter Plan"" provided "amnesty" in the form of permanent resident status for
undocumented workers who have resided since January 1970 in
the United States;42 nondeportable status for five years, without further rights, for all who have resided here since December
1976; civil injunctions and fines for employers who knowingly
hire undocumented aliens; substantial expansion of border
patrols and other police enforcement of the immigration laws;
an increased enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act and
the Federal Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act; a modest
increase in the annual quota for Mexican and Canadian immigrants; and foreign aid designed to lessen the "push" factor of
43
undocumented migration from economically depressed areas.
A proposal to require identification cards of all documented
residents, urged by the Secretary of Labor and adopted in a
draft proposal, was withdrawn, apparently in response to vigorous political opposition, although the public seems to favor
such
a card and the Secretary of Labor continues to propose
44
it.

Cir. 1977); see also Christian Sci. Mon., Nov. 17, 1977, at 6, col. 1. For an official
position taken by one state, see 38 Op. Atty. Gen. (Or.) 759 (1977) which states that,
within Oregon, not only do state and local law enforcement officers not have authority
to arrest individuals on the sole ground that they are suspected of being "illegal
aliens," but that presumably the Federal stopping and detention of such aliens involves a "higher standard" than that of appearance alone.
39. Excelsior, Feb. 28, 1978, at 10-A, col. 1. On the case of Mario Cantfi, see
United States v. Cantd, 557 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1977); Excelsior, Mar. 7, 1978, at 2-A,
col. 2.
40. See, e.g., Morehouse & Harsch, Many Running a Risk by Befriending Illegal
Aliens, Christian Sci. Mon., July 28, 1977, at 12, col. 1.
41. President's message to Congress (Aug. 4, 1977). On the background of the
Carter Plan, see 35 CONG. Q. 822 (1977); and NEwswEEK, July 4, 1977, at 16.
42. For arguments for and against the amnesty provisions of the Carter Plan, see
56 CONG. DIG., Oct. 1977, at 232. At id. is a quotation of the "amnesty" provisions of
the Carter Plan.
43. The emphasis to be placed on foreign economic assistance is uncertain in view
of President Carter's puzzling statement that the plan does not relate specifically to
economic assistance. Excelsior, May 16, 1978, at 14-A, col. 3.
44. Christian Sci. Mon., Mar. 17, 1977, at 9, col. 3; 35 CONG. Q. 823 (1977) (de-
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Adverse reaction to the Carter Plan has been strong,"1 and
the apparent result of its announcement ironically was a new
flood of undocumented aliens, encouraged by the amnesty provisions, in the Mexican border communities." The President
clearly "stumbled into an emotionally charged minefield,"47
perhaps because of exaggerated fears," bureaucratic confusion,4" a pragmatic commitment to whatever program is
"politically viable,"50 or simply the complexity of the perceived
problem.5 ' Moreover, the uncertainty of valid data bearing on
scription of the original proposal for an identification card). On public approval of such
a card, see GALLUP POLICAL INDEX, note 14 supra;on the Secretary of Labor's continuing support of the cards, see Christian Sci. Mon., Nov. 17, 1978, at 10, col. 1.
45. See, e.g., Fagen, The CarterAdministration and Latin America: Business As
Usual?, supra note 6, at 656. For comments on the proposed "amnesty" provisions, see,
56 CONG. DIo., note 42 supra. On the apparent opposition to the Carter Plan of the
AFL-CIO, see, statements of George Meany, quoted in Excelsior, May 10, 1978, at 16A, col. 1; Stevens, A Union View of Illegal Aliens HoldingJobs in the U.S., Christian
Sci. Mon., Sept. 5, 1978, at 7, col. 1. See also Houston Chron., Aug. 5, 1977, at 1-1,
col. 4; Kraft, Alien Program Would Make Things Worse Yet, Wash. Post syndicated
column, Aug. 18, 1977; Excelsior, Apr. 5, 1978, at 1-A, col. 5; Unomdsuno, Mar. 15,
1978, at 8, col. 1; Excelsior, May 5, 1978, at 4-A, col. 1. Detailed critiques of the Carter
proposals have been prepared by the Centro de Inmigraci6n, Georgetown Law Center,
Washington, D.C.
46. Houston Chron., Aug. 5, 1977 at 1-4, col. 2; WiS. ST. J. (Madison), Aug. 8,
1977, at 1, col. 4; Eugene (Or.) Register-Guard, Aug. 25, 1977, at 15-A, col. 1; and
Excelsior, Aug. 8, 1977, at 1-A, col. 3.
47. The Sunday Oregonian, Sept. 11, 1977, at G1, col. 2.
48. See L. Estrada et al., supra note 11, at 14.
49. E.g., according to the author's count, at various times there have been no
fewer than 16 official, often contradictory, spokesmen for the plan.
50. Excelsior, Mar. 7, 1978, at 1-A, col. 4 (quoting Anne Gutierrez, then of the
White House staff).
51. Despite the repeated concern over illegal aliens, few policies have
been brought to bear on the attendant problems associated with the mass
influx from Mexico. One difficulty lies in the inability to devise policies
which do not provoke adverse responses from Mexico and domestic interest groups such as Chicanos and growers. Another difficulty is that
"illegal" immigration cuts across a number of disparate areas of expertise
and interests, ranging from the intricacies of immigration law, civil
rights, law enforcement, and labor economics to the questions of foreign
policy and the balance of payments. Further, the changing character of
agriculture, the high levels of unemployment and a general national perception of an economy of increasing scarcity conspire to change not only
the facts of illegal immigration, but also our perceptions of those changing problems.
Rochin, supra note 11, at 1. In another view of United States' relations with Latin
America, the Carter administration "has failed, or is unwilling, to understand that the
old forms of political and economic organizations are unable to deliver minimally
acceptable conditions of life to millions of persons south of the border." Fagen, The
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the issue has led to a chronic reliance by immigration policymakers on questionable data and short-term responses. In its
most recent efforts, the Federal Government seems to have
acted responsibly in seeking a solution to what was metastasizing into a major public issue, but in doing so, it impatiently
settled upon a grab bag of techniques without first going
through the arduous task of constructing a comprehensive policy framework. Political efficacy rather than rigorous policy
analysis seems to have governed the selection of items for the
grab bag.
This country does not need further penal or civil sanctions
against aliens. Nor does it need further fortification of the border-the so-called "tortilla curtain" established by the Carter
administration. 5 There is already one border trooper for every
one-half mile of the border, and the Carter administration announced plans to more than double this concentration.13 Nor
does the United States need further dragnets of Mexicanappearing suspects;5 4 a revival of the bracero program or a reliance upon ad hoc permits in times of agricultural emergency; 55
CarterAdministration and Latin America: Business As Usual?, supra note 6, at 669.
"One point most people who have studied the problem agree on is that an economic
rather than an enforcement solution is required." Smith, Immigration Key Issue:
Carter Faces Mexico Trip, The Sunday Oregonian, Feb. 11, 1979, at A20, col. 2.
52. On the "tortilla" curtain, see Excelsior, May 5, 1978, at 1-A, col. 5; Christian
Sci. Mon., Nov. 7, 1978, at 28, col. 2; Bode, BarreraMds Infranqueable ParaIlegales,
Excelsior, Mar. 18, 1979, at I-A, col. 2. Blancornelas, Brincan Ilegales ta Cerca
Impenetrable, Excelsior, Aug. 16, 1979, at 1, col. 1. On its international significance,
see Montemayer, Border Fence May Be Tied to Carter Trip, L.A. Times, Dec. 14, 1978
(Part II), at 1, col. 1.
53. Excelsior, Feb. 24, 1978, at 1-A, col. 3; id. Feb. 16, 1978, at 2-A, col. 2. In
regard to the Carter administration's program of building up electronic surveillance
and patrols along the border, see Excelsior, Aug. 9, 1977, at 10-A, col. 3; id. Jan. 25,
1978, at 3-A, col. 1; Unom~suno, Mar. 15, 1978, at 9, col. 1; Medina y de Avalos, 1,500
Illegales por dia Detecta Ia "Border Patrol"en la Fronterade Baja California, Excelsior, July 24, 1978, at 4-A, col. 4. On the futility of such measures, see Stevens,
Patrolling the Mexican "Sieve," Christian Sci. Mon., Feb. 20, 1979, at 2, col. 1; and
Smith, note 51 supra.
54. See, e.g., Nabbing 29 "Illegals" in One Illinois Town, 83 U.S. NEWS & WORL
REP., July 4, 1977, at 33 (note the date of the event). On the use of special agents
appointed by the Department of Labor to investigate employers suspected of hiring
undocumented aliens, see Excelsior, May 12, 1978, at 10-A, col. 4. The Carter administration has shunned massive deportation of undocumented aliens and has denied that
its amnesty proposals imply deportation for those not granted amnesty. Unomdsuno,
June 7, 1978, at 1, col. 1; id., at 10, col. 5. See also Bustamante, Las Deportaciones
Masivas desde E. U., Unombsuno, June 12, 1978, at 5, col. 2.
55. See McGhee, Apple Picker Blues, NEW REP., Oct. 29, 1977, at 15 (Federal
authorization of temporary work permits to apple pickers); Excelsior, Jan. 26, 1978,
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an intensified inspection mechanism in Mexico; 56 nor any other
such legislative agents of exploitation and harrassment. "At
best, all such proposals treat symptoms or peripheral aspects
of the real problem, and many carry with them serious potential for infringements of civil liberties." 7
Besides the probable inefficacy of such jerrybuilt measures, the Federal Government should remember the sobering
lesson that each time it has for good reasons tinkered with the
immigration laws, it seems to have created problems. Two examples are instructive. In 1965, Attorney General Katzenbach
concluded that there was "not much pressure 5' 5 from Western
Hemispheric immigration and, with complete lack of foresight, successfully promoted legislation which imposed an
entry quota on inter-American immigration for the first time
in history. In 1976 the next reforms, which improved the system
in a number of respects, nevertheless adopted irresponsibly low
annual immigration quotas of 20,000 even for Mexico and other
major Western Hemispheric sources of immigration. Prior to
1965 there had been no per country quotas for Western Hemispheric immigration, only a single, overall ceiling; between
1965 and the 1976 reforms, the newly established quotas in
effect permitted somewhat higher immigration from Mexico
and other primary sources of immigration than from countries
in the Eastern Hemisphere, for which the 20,000 ceiling already
had been established. The 1976 reforms attempted to bring the
flexible system governing immigration from within the Western Hemisphere into conformity with the more precisely regulated, uniform country-quota system for Eastern Hemispheric
applications. In a number of respects the geographical uniformity of the law improved the prospects for Western Hemispheric
applicants and achieved a greater overall fairness in the law,
but the 20,000 per country limitation was an unfortunate result. The dynamics of immigration pressures and needs were
thereby sacrificed to an unnecessarily artificial symmetry in
at 1-A, col. 4 (proposal by Robert Bergland, Secretary of Agriculture, apparently
speaking without authority, for new bracero program).
56. Excelsior, Feb. 16, 1978, at 1-A, col. 4.
57. Fagen, The CarterAdministration and Latin America: Business As Usual?,
supra note 6, at 689. For a report on a spine-chilling proposal for cradle-to-grave
registration, see Excelsior, Feb. 20, 1978, at 10-A, col. 5.
58. See Wall St. J., June 18, 1976.

1979

BRINGING PEOPLE TO RESOURCES

the law. A 1978 reform establishes a worldwide annual ceiling
of 290,000 alien admissions."
III. NEW FEDERAL POLICY WITH EMPHASIS ON THE
ACCOMMODATION OF DIVERGENT GLOBAL INTERESTS

United States policy on undocumented aliens should involve five measures:60 the continued improvement of data and
of a mechanism for data collection and dissemination; legitimation of the status of acceptable numbers of undocumented
aliens; discouragement of labor exploitation and protection of
indigenous labor; accommodation of divergent global interests;
and improvement of law enforcement and discouragement of
excessive migration."' The accommodation of divergent global
circumstances deserves particular emphasis.
A. UnilateralAccommodation by the United States

The United States should reassume its historic hospitality
to prospective immigrants.62 Human migration is a natural,
more or less biological pattern of manifest destiny; 3 it is a
"familiar and healthy phenomenon." ' 4 The myopic vision of
current U.S. immigration law and policy urgently needs correction; an accommodation of the manifest destiny of human migration is within both the national interest and the framework
of global population policy and the new international economic
order. More generally, the United States should commit itself
to a more hospitable immigration policy to facilitate
59. Act of Oct. 12, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-412 § 201, 92 Stat. 907. For a summary
of this and other recent legislation see Message From the Commissioner of INS, AINL
Immigration Newsletter, Dec. 1978/Jan. 1979, at 1.
60. See Nafziger, supra note 4, at 100 et seq.
61. On the problem of acquiring data, see, e.g., Williams, Alien Survey: What
Caused Breakdown?, L.A. Times, Feb. 13, 1979, at 1, col. 1. On the renewed commitment of the U.S. to discourage labor exploitation and to protect indigenous (even
undocumented) labor, see L.A. Times, Feb. 17, 1979, at 1, col. 5. But see on recent
evidence of exploitation of undocumented aliens, Excelsior, Jan. 24, 1978, at 1-A, col.
3, 4; id. Mar. 25, 1978, at 1-A, col. 1; id. Mar. 25, 1978, at 6-A, col. 1; id. Apr. 8, 1978,
at 1-A, col. 1; id. Apr. 9, 1978, at 3-A, col. 4; Christian Sci. Mon., Sept. 5, 1978, at 7,
col. 1; id. Feb. 8, 1979, at 5, col. 1; Mejias, Los Intocables Explotacron, Excelsior, Aug.
10, 1979, at 1, col. 6. A U.N. General Assembly Resolution (G. A. Res. 3449, 30 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 90, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1976), appeals to members to respect
human rights of all workers, including undocumented ones.
62. See 56 CONG. DIG., Oct. 1977, at 226-229.
63. See Vdsquez Amaral, Espacio Vital y Destino Manifesto, Excelsior, June 25,
1978, Diorama de la Cultura, at 3; Bustos, Immigration-TheHuman Journey and the
Human Hunt, 7 LA Luz, Feb. 1978, at 11. See also, Portes, Why Illegal Migration? in
Human Rights and World Order (A. Said ed. 1978).
64. Wall St. J., June 18, 1978.
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substantially greater redistribution of the world's economic resources. One of the easiest, economically sensible, and effective
ways to satisfy a commitment to international development is
to rely less on transferring material and financial resources
abroad and more on redistributing people on their initiative.
Programs of economic development abroad would be greatly
strengthened by putting greater reliance on transferring people
to the resources. Foreign assistance could remain or could be
further developed as an important element in national policy."e
The impact of migration on economic development is impressive. Statistics show, for example, that money transfers by
Third World aliens to their countries of origin do not present
serious balance-of-payments problems for the host countries,
but are of such enormous importance to the countries of origin
as to equal net economic assistance from multilateral agencies
and members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), comprised of Western, industrialized countries and Japan.66
A broader, world order perspective which seeks to accommodate natural patterns of migration readily brings into question the validity of national immigration barriers. It is not
inconceivable that comprehensive immigration barriers, a
rather recent phenomenon in United States history, may be
eliminated in time. Short of that, the Congress should amend
65. An official of the United States Agency for International Development, noting
that this country does "pitifully little" in promoting economic development in Latin
America, emphasized that "we need to stop thinking of meeting the problem [of
undocumented aliens] by stopping or regularizing [their] flow into this country."
Remarks by Abelardo L. Valdez, Annual Meeting, American Society of International
Law, in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 26, 1979).
A combined program of highly targeted investment and relaxation of immigration
barriers has been proposed, as follows:
Optimally, a well targeted program of rural and small-town investments
in Mexico should be combined with steps by the U.S. to increase the
number of opportunities to migrate legally to the U.S., for varying lengths
of time: raising the legal immigration quota, administering the existing
H-2 temporary worker visa in a less restrictive way, or better, instituting
a new type of temporary worker program not modeled on either the H-2
system or the former "bracero" program. Such measures would create
alternatives to illegal migration, for those who must continue to go to the
United States.
Cornelius, supra note 3, at 95.
66. Excelsior, Aug. 11, 1977, at 14-A, col. 5.
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the Immigration and Nationality Act 7 to allow substantially
greater annual immigration, particularly from the Western
Hemisphere. Total and per country levels can be determined
on the basis of demographic and economic projections which
would take full account of the true capacity of the United
States to absorb immigrants rather than xenophobia which
currently dominates United States immigration law and policy. The Federal Government should also relax its restrictive
interpretation of the H-2 "temporary worker" visa standard.6 8
B. Source-Country and BilateralAccommodation
The political feasibility and operational success of a new
emphasis on bringing people to the resources will depend
greatly on the efforts and cooperation of immigrant-source
countries, particularly Mexico."' Despite recently discovered
Mexican oil, the United States will probably maintain its overwhelming comparative advantage in economic resources. Although a short-term bracero agreement is no longer a cornerstone of negotiations between the United States and Mexico,
as it was as recently as 1974,70 there is ample opportunity for
bilateral accommodation of a range of interests which influence
the flow of undocumented aliens into the United States. A
linkage of divergent interests is essential, fully consonant with
the mutual recognition that the problem of undocumented aliens is fundamentally a matter of the "push" factor of economic conditions in Mexico and ultimately must be solved
there.7 Mexico's share of the problem seems to have two com67. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1970).
68. Id. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(2), in conjunction with § 1182(a)(14), provides that visas
may be given temporarily to aliens "if unemployed persons capable of performing such
labor cannot be found in the United States."
69. See Williams, supra note 7, at 215. For a summary of differences between U.S.
and Mexican academic viewpoints, see Bustamante, Indocumentados: Problema
Imparable, Unomdsuno, July 3, 1978, at 5, col. 1.
70. See El Universal, Aug. 30, 1974, at 1-A, col. 4.
71. See Cornelius, supra note 2, at 36; address to the U.S. Congress by President
L6pez Portillo, Wash. Post, Feb. 18, 1977, at A-9, col. 1; remarks by Leonel Castillo,
Immigration and Naturalization Service, quoted in Excelsior, Nov. 22, 1977, at 5-A,
col. 1; Excelsior, Mar. 18, 1977, at 20-A, col. 1; id. Apr. 7, 1978, at 1-A, col. 5; Christian
Sci. Mon., July 8, 1977, at 31, col. 4 (remarks of Charles W. Yost, formerly U.S.
Ambassador to the United Nations); Fagen, The Carter Administration and Latin
America: Business As Usual?, supra note 6, at 689, (note the author's skeptical observation on the same page that "what is perhaps most important [from the perspective
of the Mexican elite] is that the migration annually draws off hundreds of thousands
of persons who would otherwise swell the ranks of the unemployed." On governmental
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plementary facets: a structural one of chronic socio-economic
debility and a geographical one of adjacency to the United
States. With respect (or not) to the U.S.-Mexican border,
"[t]here is no frontier in the world quite like it. It is as if
Algeria were to border directly upon the South of France, or
West Germany upon Zaire."7 2 That may be an exaggeration,
but the truth remains that the U.S.-Mexican frontier is a rare
instance of pronounced economic and world power contrasts
demarcated by a single national boundary.
What can be done? As the Mexican Government acknowledges, that country desperately needs "very large scale and
carefully designed programs of rural development and job creation."" First and foremost, the "bad foot" of the Mexican economy, its agrarian economy, must be treated." Supplementary
efforts toward population control will be helpful,7 5 although the
Mexican economy may suffer no more from excessive manpower than from economic and social disorganization." The
prospects of success in this developmental effort are uncertain:
given the logic of Mexican politics, it may be that Mexicans
acknowledgement of the need for bilateral cooperation, see Excelsior, May 5, 1978, at
23-A, col. 1. Cf. Mejias, Los Intocables: Soluciones, Excelsior, Aug. 13, 1979, at 1, col.
6.
72. Lyons, note 12 supra.
73. Fagen, The Carter Administration and Latin America: Business As Usual?
supra note 6, at 689.
74. Laviada, Injusta Miseria en el Campo, Excelsior, Aug. 8, 1977, at 7-A, col. 3;
and El Informador (Guadalajara, Mexico), July 13, 1978, at 4-A, col. 1.
75. See Excelsior, Apr. 7, 1978, at 1-A, col. 3. On the Mexican Government's
commitment to lower that country's annual birth rate from its current 3.2% to 2.5%
or 2.6%, note the following:
One important difference between the mid-1970s and the mid-1950s is in
the attitude toward population among Mexico's leaders . . . . Now the
advantages of a lower birth rate are widely perceived. In 1974 a constitutional provision was adopted asserting that 'Every person has the right
to decide in a free, responsible, and informed manner the number and
spacing of his or her children.' There is now a National Council of Population in the Ministry of the Interior, and governmental as well as private
programs for the promotion of family planning.
Finally, it appears that the birth rate has begun to go down.
Coale, Population Growth and Economic Development: The Case of Mexico 56 FoR.
AFT. 415 (1978). See also L.A. Times, Dec. 14, 1978, at 1-2, col. 1.
76. See Aguilar, Plan CarterPara Braceros, Excelsior, Apr. 7, 1978, at 7-A, col.
1. "The Mexican Experience is a very useful counter to the over-simplified attribution
to excess fertility of every impediment to social and economic development." Coale,
supra note 75, at 423. "We find that the Mexican experience in the last 20 years in
short [does not support] the simplistic view that population growth is the principal
source of all difficulties in any low-income country." Id. at 425.
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will continue to be the "cannon fodder rather than the beneficiaries of Mexican development."" In the long term, Mexico's
anticipated oil boom and further energy sales to the United
States may help,7" not only in real economic terms but also in
terms of correcting an imbalance of international trade which
abates economic progress.
What role can the United States play? First, by special
concessions to Mexican producers and exporters, it can encourage a healthier trade balance with Mexico. Although Mexico's
trade deficit with the United States may at times be overemphasized by the Mexican Government as a primary factor contributing to the northward migration," it is nevertheless a factor.8 0 In undertaking major negotiations, such as those involv-

ing the sale of petroleum and natural gas, both countries
should take a realistic account of the linkage between economic
and energy issues and the migration of undocumented aliens,
and both countries should negotiate accordingly. 8 1 Second,
without weakening its new commitment to bring people to the
resources, the United States should continue to offer further
economic assistance, particularly to develop small-scale, laborintensive industry in those target areas which provide the largest number of undocumented aliens. Whenever it is feasible,
such assistance should be channeled through multilateral lend77. Fagen, The CarterAdministration and Latin America: Business As Usual?,
supra note 6, at 700.
78. See, e.g., Grayson, The Oil Boom: Mexico's Opportunity, FOR.POL'Y (No. 29),
Winter 1977-78, at 65; Williams, note 7 supra; Riding, supra note 11, at 17; Goodsell,
Mexico: The Next Oil Power, Christian Sci. Mon., Nov. 16, 1978, at 1, col. 3; Eying
Mexico's Oil Bonanza, note 2 supra; Capetillo, ResponsabilidadMexicana, El Occidental (Guadalajara), Dec. 6, 1978, at 2A, col. 4. Mexico's Oil Power, 26 ArLAs, Aug.
1979, at 31. But see, Cornelius, supra note 3, at 43-45; Van Slambrouck, Mexican Oil
Won't Stem Emigrant Flow, Some Say, Christian Sci. Mon., Feb. 9,1979, at 6, col. 1;
and Goodsell, Mexico-Oil: A Tiger by the Tail, Christian Sci. Mon., Apr. 3, 1979, at
12.
79. See, e.g., statements of President Lopez Portillo, quoted in Christian Sci.
Mon., Sept. 14, 1977, at 7, col. 4; and Tiempo (Mexico) Feb. 21, 1977, at 9, col. 1.
80. See Williams, supra note 7, at 213; El Sol de Mexico, Aug. 7, 1977, at 4-A,
col. 3. On congressional support for special trade concessions to Mexico, see Excelsior,
May 4, 1978, at 1-A, col. 2.
81. Linkage of trade, energy, and immigration issues was accomplished during the
Feb. 14-16, 1979 meetings between Presidents Carter and L6pez Portillo, note 6 supra.
But see, Grayson, Mexico's Oil-No Reason To Tolerate Illegal Aliens, Christian Sci.
Mon., Jan. 3, 1979, at 22, col. 1 for the dissenting viewpoint. See Cornelius, supra note
3, at 94; see text accompanying note 65, supra. See also, Goodsell, Oil Wealth and a
Myriad of Problems, Christian Sci. Mon., Apr. 2, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
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ing agencies, to avoid rejection by the Mexican Government for
longstanding, understandable reasons of national pride and
fear of dependencia12 For its part, Mexico may need to submit
to certain economic requirements imposed by those agencies.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Bilateral and multilateral developmental efforts focus
almost exclusively on extending resources abroad. 3 If, however,
charity begins at home, not only are the United States and
other people-importing countries justified in taking care of
even their undocumented own, but they would promote the
global welfare by doing so. Rather than relying almost entirely
on the distribution of foreign assistance abroad, developmental
efforts should help bring people to the resources. This will involve some shift in the emphasis of immigration law, including
its enforcement; cooperation with and by immigrant-source
countries; and close coordination with programs of foreign assistance.
Although the international legal duty to do so is scant, 4
the United States and other developed countries have at least
a moral obligation to assume greater responsibility in encouraging the rational process of migration for individual betterment. In regard to Mexican migration, the United States has
more than a moral obligation. Despite its firm normative basis,
there is little evidence that the World Population Plan of Action, 5 to which both the United States and Mexico are parties,
82. On Mexico's rejection of a recent offer of economic assistance by the United
States, see Excelsior, Apr. 7, 1978, at 1-A, col. 5. See also Williams, supra note 7, at
214. On the U.S. Government's willingness to channel assistance through international
development agencies, see Excelsior, May 11, 1978, at 1, col. 5; and id. Feb. 18, 1978,
at l-A, col. 3.
83. See, e.g., the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, a nonbinding
but important global instrument of the "new international economic order," which,
as a United Nations General Assembly Resolution, was adopted by a vote of 120 in
favor, and 6 against, with 10 abstentions. Article 17 defines the duties of international
economic cooperation in terms of a duty of states to provide "favourable external
conditions" and to extend "active assistance" to developing countries. U.N. Doc.
A/RES/3281 (XXIX) (1975).
84. See Nafziger, supra note 4, at 83, et seq. For an interesting discussion of
universal obligations, erga omnes, derived from the Barcelona Traction Case, I.C.J.
REP. 1970, pt. 3, at 32, see GOODWIN-GILL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE MOVEMENT OP
PERSONS BETwEEN STATES 23 (1978).

85. U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 60/WG/L.55/Add. 3 (1974), reprinted in 71 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 440 (1974). Although the World Population Plan of Action is not legally binding
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has been, as it should have been, in the forefront of policy
planning. The implications of international migratory labor
8
legislation also warrant serious attention. 1
Even aside from broad humanitarian considerations
within the framework of world order, the United States national interest would be served by new policy and laws which
encourage immigration, rather than stifle it. The issue of
undocumented aliens can be resolved in large measure if the
United States and other people-importing countries commit
in the classical sense of an international agreement, it has much the same juridical
weight as, for example, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe. These "Helsinki Accords," upon which the United States Government has
put such great emphasis, particularly in its program of advancing human rights, also
establishes at least a moral obligation, in a number of its provisions, for the United
States and other signatories to accord greater hospitality to immigration. For example:
"The participating States will deal in a positive and humanitarian spirit with applications of persons who wish to be reunited with members of their family. . . . They will
deal with applications in this field as expeditiously as possible." Even though the
Helsinki Accords apply primarily within a European context, it little behooves the
United States, for example, to complain about Soviet emigration policy if it itself fails
to assume a greater global commitment to the same provisions. The World Population
Plan of Action recommends, inter alia, that governments facilitate migration, protect
the rights and welfare of migrants, help prevent discrimination and prejudice against
them, help reunite families, and provide proper and adequate welfare services for them
in conformity with relevant conventions of the International Labor Organization.
Where immigration has proved to be of a long term nature, countries are invited to
extend national civil rights to immigrants. The document further urges countries affected by significant numbers of migrant workers to conduct bilateral or multilateral
consultations with a view to harmonizing policies which affect these movements, and
to conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements. The more developed countries are
encouraged to cooperate through bilateral or regional organizations in creating favorable employment opportunities at the national level in countries concerned with the
outflow of migrant workers.
86. E.g., a recent resolution of the United Nations General Assembly:
1. Calls upon all States, taking into account the provisions of the relevant
instruments adopted by the International Labour Organisation and of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, to take measures to prevent and put an end to all discrimination against migrant workers and to ensure the implementation of such
measures;

. .

. 3. Also invites the Governments of host countries to adopt

the necessary measures to prevent any activity that might be prejudicial
to the interests of migrant workers; 4. Again invites the Governments of
host countries to give consideration to adopting definitive measures to
promote in their territories a normal family life for migrant workers by
reuniting families.
The resolution, which was adopted by a vote of 124-0-14, makes no mention of nationality or distinctions based upon national immigration practice. Measures to improve
and ensure the human rights and dignity of migrant workers, G.A. Res. 163, 33 U.N.

GAOR 587, U.N. Doc. A/33/509 (1978).
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themselves to more realistic, equitable levels of immigration.
Three considerations are especially important: Significantly
larger numbers of immigrants would contribute to the national
well-being, undocumented aliens are in part the unnecessary
creation of current policy and laws and their implementation,
and helping to bring people to the resources would unquestionably resolve some of the nettlesome perplexity of economic
development undertaken in the national interest. A constructive response to the issue of undocumented aliens will require
a more generous and yet more realistic definition of the national interest, and the accommodation, unilaterally and bilaterally, of this interest to those of immigrant-source countries
and global order.

Recent Trends in the Expanding Universe of
Nongovernmental Organizations Dedicated to
the Protection of Human Rights*
LAURIE S. WISEBERG**
HARRY M.

I.

SCOBLE***

INTRODUCTION

The struggle for human rights-for economic and social
justice, for cultural expression, and for personal freedom-has
indisputably been a persistent theme throughout history, although it has not always been so labeled. Therefore, what is
distinguishing in the 1970s is not the manifastation of a new
phenomenon but, rather, that the factors Brzezinski points to
(the impact of World Wars I and II, the spread of education and
literacy, and the establishment of new nations) have made it
possible for the aspirations of individuals and peoples to be
expressed and heard at the global level. While it may be true
that man's political consciousness has been dulled by a sense
of the inevitability of suffering, the struggle for human dignity
is not unique to the 1970s. Rather, the technological revolution,
and the shrinkage and interdependence of the globe which accompanied the spread of communications, industrialization,
and "modernization" has meant that those fighting oppression
can now internationalize their local struggle. Their appeals, in
international forums or to international public opinion, are
made all the more meaningful by the realization that, all too
frequently, those regimes which violate their human rights are
bolstered or supported by foreign interests. As a consequence,
liberation from oppression is no longer conceivable solely in
local terms. While the attainment of human rights is a struggle
by indigenous forces against indigenous oppressors, success is
often dependent upon the configuration of international forces.
* Adapted from a presentation made at a conference on human rights, hosted by
the International Legal Studies Program, College of Law, and the Graduate School of
International Studies, University of Denver, and the Department of Political Science,
University of Colorado (Boulder), and held at Denver-Boulder in Spring 1978.
** Codirector, Human Rights Internet, Washington, D. C.; Assistant Professor of
Political Science, University of Illinois, Chicago Circle.
*** Codirector, Human Rights Internet, Washington, D. C.; Professor of Political
Science, University of Illinois, Chicago Circle.
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If Brzezinski, in proclaiming human rights as "the genuine, historical inevitability of our times,"' meant to imply that
the last quarter of the 20th century offers hope for the realization of more humane national societies and a more humane
international order, he is perhaps unduly optimistic. While
there are reasons for taking satisfaction in signs of progress in
the human rights struggle, there are also reasons for sombre
reflection concerning the growing strength of the forces of repression. Indeed, from an historical perspective, Jerome J.
Shestack is probably more accurate in characterizing the
human rights struggle as the struggle of Sisyphus: it is a continuing struggle of small advances in the face of an omnipre2
sent threat.
The purpose of this paper is to examine one aspect of the
human rights struggle: that of the role played by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the protection of human
rights. In particular, we wish to assess recent developments
that have, in part, been stimulated and magnified by President
Carter's human rights policy. Additionally, we wish to assess
the policy impact or effectiveness of the frenzy of activity that
has been evident during the past two years.
A caveat is necessary at the outset, and that is that NGOs
have been active in the field of human rights long before President Carter helped make international human rights a prominent item of the global political agenda. Moreover, concern
with international human rights is not in any way exclusively
American. While many NGOs active in the arena are Westernbased groups, the roots of these organizations are as much in
Europe as the United States. And, while human rights NGOs
are still few in number and relatively weak in Third World
nations, the paucity of Third World NGOs should in no sense
be taken to imply a lesser commitment to human rights protection in the developing world than in the industrialized world.
II. THE EXPANSION OF THE UNIVERSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS NGOs
In early 1979 a Human Rights Directory was published in
1. Speech by Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, White House Commemoration of the 30th
Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 6, 1978), reprinted
in 78 DEP'T STATE BULL. 3 (Jan. 1979).

2. Shestack, Sisyphus Endures: The InternationalHuman Rights NGO, 24 N.Y.
L. ScH. L. REv. 89 (1978).
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the United States which, while by no means comprehensive,
provides information on over 200 U.S.-based organizations
which work to some significant extent on the promotion and/or
protection of international civil and political rights.3 A similar
directory has just been published in Britain,4 focusing largely
on U.K.-based organizations; and it, too, treats over 200 NGOs
engaged in international human rights work. Such comprehensive surveys have not been made for other countries. It is,
nonetheless, clear that there is a very large and growing number of voluntary organizations in the West concerned with
human rights.' Groups have also emerged in Eastern Europe
and the Third World in recent years. While a core of the groups
that comprise the NGO human rights universe has been active
in the human rights arena for many years-e.g., the International Committee of the Red Cross (Geneva-based) was created
in 1863; the Ligue franqaise pour la d6fense des droits de
l'homme et du citoyen (Paris) in 1902; the International
League for Human Rights (New York) in 1942; the International Commission of Jurists (Geneva) in 1951; and the AntiSlavery Society (London) in 1909 7-there has been a veritable
mushrooming of organizations that have only recently become
active in the politics of human rights protection.
In the United States context, it is important to remember
3. HUMAN RIGHTS DIRECTORY: 1979, a joint project of the Human Rights Internet
and Members of Congress for Peace Through Law Education Fund (1979).
4. THE HUMAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK (comp. M. Garling 1979).
5. The Human Rights Internet, is, however, currently planning to undertake a
World Directory project, to document NGOs working on the protection of civil and
political rights, and rights concerning the integrity of persons, worldwide.
6. Considerable information on the activities of human rights NGOs is regularly
published in the HuMAN RIGHTS INTERNET NEWSLE-rER, coedited by the authors of this
article [hereinafter cited as HRI NEWSLETTER].

7. For an analysis of some of these organizations, see Scoble & Wiseberg, Human
Rights and Amnesty International,413 ANNALS 11 (1974); Scoble &Wiseberg, Amnesty
International:Evaluating the Effectiveness of a Human Rights Actor, INTELLCT 79
(Sept.-Oct. 1976); Scoble & Wiseberg, Human Rights NGO's: Notes Toward Comparative Analysis, 9 HuMAN RIGHTS J. 611 (1976); Scoble & Wiseberg, The International
League for Human Rights: The Strategy of a Human Rights NGO, 7 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 289; Scoble & Wiseberg, Monitoring Human Rights Violations: The Role of
Human Rights NGO's, in HuMAN RIGTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (Rubin and Spiro

eds.); Weissbrodt, The Role of InternationalNon-Governmental Organizations in the
Implementation of Human Rights, 12 TEx. INT'L L. J. 293 (1977); D. FOasrrSTE, HuMANITARIAN POLITICS: THE INTERNATIONAL COMMIrEE OF THE RED CROSS (1977); and Shes-

tack, note 2 supra.
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that ever since the historic "Duiles Doctrine" of 1953 (which
ended the Bricker Amendment battle)," American organizations which were defined specifically as international human
rights concerns tended to focus their attention on the United
Nations arena in New York and not on the congressional arena
in Washington. Of course, there were groups concerned with
influencing U.S. policy in what we would today define as a
prohuman rights direction, but these groups rarely defined
their goals in these terms. The heightened interest in the U.S.
in human rights is, thus, only partly a consequence of Carter's
foreign policy and of congressional and public concern (in the
wake of the demoralization of Vietnam, Chile, and Watergate)
that the U.S. abandon the amorality/immorality of
Realpolitik. It is a definitional question to some extent: groups
long active in human rights are for the first time so defining
their objectives.
Indeed these groups were as much the stimulus as the
result of the new U.S. focus on human rights. A prime example
is the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy, which
grew out of the merger of the ad hoc Coalition for a New Foreign Policy and the Coalition on Natioral Priorities and Military Policy. This new Coalition set up its first task force, the
Human Rights Working Group (HRWG), in order to lobby for
the passage of the Harkin amendment on the economic aid
authorization bill (signed into law in the fall of 1975) and the
Fraser-Solarz amendment on the Security Assistance and
Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (adopted in committee in
1975). These were the first major legislative victories of the
current human rights thrust in the United States. Earlier still,
Clergy and Laity Concerned (CALC), which was created in
response to the Vietnam war, had set up a Human Rights
office in Washington and numerous groups had provided the
impetus and support for the benchmark hearings of Donald
Fraser's Subcommittee on International Organizations (the
first comprehensive human rights hearings ever held by the
U.S. Congress).'
8. Weissbrodt, United States Ratification of the Human Rights Covenants, 63
MINN. L. REv. 35 (1978); and T. BUERGENTHAL & J. TORNEY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN

(1976).
9. Scoble & Wiseberg. The Human Rights Lobby in the United States (paper

RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION
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In some ways the explosive interest in international
human rights is the direct result of Carter's policy and congressional monitoring. Not only have new groups emerged, coalescing around human rights as a prime concern: e.g., WATCH,
the U.S. Citizen's Helsinki Monitoring Committee (created in
1978); Freedom of Faith (1978); International Human Rights
Law Group (1978); but many long established organizations,
which had rarely manifested an interest in human rights issues,
have begun to give serious attention to the violation of human
rights. Notable has been the involvement of professional associations, committed to ending indifference to the fate of colleagues tortured and imprisoned in other countries. Equally
significant has been the deepening involvement of churches,
although this has had far less to do with the Carter administration's policies than with forces at work within the global structures of the churches. With the media increasingly willing to
spotlight gross violations of the integrity and security of persons, there has been a snow-ball effect of drawing others into
the movement. 0
In Western Europe, NGOs with an explicit human rights
concern have existed for many years, but the international
spotlighting of the issue has created a new fervor there as well.
Thus, in 1976 in Britain, a Human Rights Network was created
embracing now over fifty organizations in a loosely structured
cooperative enterprise. The Network grew out of cooperative
efforts around the celebration of the 20th anniversary of the
Universal Declaration in 1968, and was catalyzed largely by the
initiatives of the Secretary of the Human Rights Committee of
the United Nations Association of Britain (UNA-UK)." However, Britain is not immune to the actions of the United States.
There are direct linkages between groups in the United States
and Britain which have been strengthened by recent developpresented to the American Political Science Association annual meeting, New York
City, Aug./Sept. 1978).
10. The enormously increased interest in international human rights issues has
been evidenced in academia, as well as the political world, with numerous conferences
being organized during the past two years, a very marked increase in the number of
articles appearing in academic journals, the equal increase in the number of monographs being published, and the development of new courses in international human
rights, especially in law schools.
11. 3 HRI NEWSLE=rza 3 (Sept. 1977).
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ments. One interesting illustration is the U.S.-U.K. Colloquium on the Role of Human Rights in Foreign Policy held at
the Palace of Westminster in November 1978, jointly sponsored
by American and British Sections of the International Commission of Jurists and the Parliamentary Group for Human
12
Rights.
The past few years have also seen the revitalization of the
International Federation for the Rights of Man (the European
counterpart and parent of the New York-based International
League for Human Rights). Although the Federation was created in 1922, it was largely lethargic in the post-World War II
period, until resuscitated in 1977.11 Similarly, the Dutch legal
community has recently been reawakened to a concern for international human rights by the revitalization of the Dutch
Section of the International Commission of Jurists, under the
direction of dynamic, young law professors at the Universities
of Leyden and Utrecht." In Rome, the Lelio Basso Foundation
'for the Rights and Liberations of Peoples was established in
1975.15 In West Germany, the Bertrand Russell Tribunal III,
focusing on violations of human rights in that country-particularly on the practice of "Berufsverbote"-has generally raised the consciousness concerning international human
rights standards. 6 In Oslo, Norway, the Institute of Peace Research, in collaboration with UNESCO, held a conference on
"Peace and Human Rights = Human Rights and Peace," in
December 1978;' 7 in Greece the Institute of Public International Law and Relations held a colloquium on "The Peace
Movement and Humanitarian Law;"'" and in Paris a public
meeting on "Human Rights After Helsinki and Belgrade" attracted more than 2,000 participants. Moreover, throughout
Western Europe, Helsinki monitoring groups, or support
groups for Helsinki monitors imprisoned in Eastern Europe,
have arisen. The Help and Action Coordination Committee in
12. 4 id. at 46 (Nov./Dec. 1978).
13. Interviews with members of the Belgian and French Ligues (affiliates of the
Federation), summer 1977, Brussels and Paris.
14. 3 HRI NEWSLETrER 19 (Sept. 1977).
15. Id. at 18.
16. 4 id. at 23 (Nov./Dec. 1978).
17. Id. at 27 (Sept./Oct. 1978).
18. Id. at 50 (Nov./Dec. 1978).
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France regularly reports on the work of these groups;"9 and in
January 1979, a meeting was held of the Vorbereitungskomittee
Ffir die Europaische Helsinki Groups in Switzerland, in an
attempt to coordinate the activities of Helsinki monitors."t
Much of this involvement of West Europeans in issues of
international human rights has been stimulated and maintained by activities of the Council of Europe and its European
human rights system, by the traditional human rights concerns
of such countries as Sweden, by the caucusing of human rights
NGOs based in Geneva and oriented to the U.N. system, and
by the Helsinki and Belgrade meetings with their focus on
"Basket Three." European-based groups have certainly played
their part in placing human rights on the global political
agenda: it was they, and not the Americans, who maneuvered
"Basket Three" into the Final Act of Helsinki.' Yet, the new
climate created by U.S. concern has probably helped, even if
many European-based groups have been critical of the thrust
of the Administration's policy.
In Eastern Europe, the emergence of private nongovernmental human rights organizations-a Moscow-based Amnesty International Group, a Moscow Committee for Human
Rights, the Charter 77 Movement in Czechoslovakia, the Polish
Workers' Defense Committee-is an entirely new phenomenon
in the evolution of East European Communist development. 2
This is not to imply that protest within Eastern Europe is new,
that demands for greater religious freedom, the right to
emigrate, the right to free expression, or the right to national/cultural self-determination are only of recent origin. In
fact, the samizdat tradition (the underground Russian press)
has a hundred-year old history,2 3 and resistance to Stalinist
19. The Help and Action Committee began publishing a newsletter in October
1977, and since that time it has systematically followed the activities both of East
European dissidents and also of West European groups which support the dissidents.
The Committee is based in Hericy, France.
20. 4 HRI NEWSLETTER 37 (Feb./Mar. 1979).
21. H. Molineu, Human Rights and Dtente: The Case of CSCE (paper presented
at the International Studies Association annual meeting, St. Louis, Mar. 1977).
22. It is new particularly in the sense that these groups have consciously sought
direct or indirect affiliation with Western-based NGOs and have openly organized as
private associations.
23. L. Alexeyeva, The Tenth Anniversary of a Chronicle of Current Events, A
CHRONICLE OF HuMAN RIGHTS IN THE USSR 57 (Jan.-Mar. 1978).
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totalitarianism has been a manifest theme of the post-Stalin
period. However, the Helsinki Final Act provided substantial
encouragement to East European dissidents in their demand to
establish "Soviet legality," and new linkages with human
rights activists in the West have given the struggle new characteristics. Instructive in this context is the fact that, as early as
June 1971, the International League for Human Rights decided
to accept the Moscow Human Rights Committee (founded in
November 1970 by three Russian scientists) as an affiliate organization." Shortly thereafter, a Moscow-based Amnesty International group was created. Since neither the Soviet Constitution nor the constitutions of other East European states prohibit the establishment of private/voluntary associations, the
Communist regimes, under the glare of international scrutiny,
have resorted to subterfuge and harassment to destroy these
organizations. Nonetheless, they persist, despite political
trials, the incarceration of dissidents in mental hospitals, and
25
other tactics of repression.

In the Third World the situation has certain unique characteristics that require clarification. In examining the struggle
for the promotion and protection of human rights in the Third
World, one must avoid the danger of the institutional trap (or
the trap of cultural myopia): the assumption that because
there are few structures which replicate the Western type or
corporate nongovernmental organization, there are no structures or processes for expressing human rights concerns. This
caveat is necessary because there are still relatively few NGOs
in the Third World with an explicit human rights platform.
Where such groups exist, they are more like the dissident organizations of East Europe than the Western-based NGOs.
This is to say that they focus heavily on the protection and
expansion of human rights in their own country, rather than on
events outside their borders.
The reasons for this are easy to understand. Most Third
24. Scoble & Wiseberg, The InternationalLeague for Human Rights: The Strategy of a Human Rights NGO, supra note 7, at 307.
25. The extensiveness of the samizdat literature is merely one indication of the
persistence of these groups. For documentation on persecution of the dissidents, see
S. BLOCK & P. REDDAWAY, PSYCHIATRIC TERROR: How SovIEr PSYCHIATRY IS USED To
SuPPREss DISSENT (1977).
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World countries are newly independent and the tasks of nationbuilding and development consume the energies of those struggling to actualize a more humane world. The entire anticolonial
struggle and the concommitant struggle for racial justice have
been the major contribution of the Third World to the promotion of human rights in the 20th century. And those struggles
were carried on by nongovernmental (in fact, anti-government)
organizations, not dissimilar to Western organizations: by
labor movements, cultural associations, political parties, or liberation movements. However, since most colonial areas (with
the notable exception of Southern Africa) have now attained at
least formal independence, the continuing drive towards real
independence, racial equality, and economic justice is now in
the hands of governmental rather than nongovernmental
groups. This is particularly the case with respect to concern for
human rights at the global level (e.g., solidarity with the liberation struggles in Southern Africa). Moreover, the limited resources of the Third World, both in the sense of persons with
sufficient time to devote to an interest in international human
rights, and in the sense of money and organizational skills
available for manifesting that interest, militate against the
elaboration of organizations devoted to the protection of
human rights.
Despite this we have in the past few years seen the development of organizations in the Third World with a focus on
human rights, expressing concern for greater observance of
human rights in their own and other nations. Amnesty International, although still weak in the Third World, does have active
sections in such countries as India, Egypt, and Costa Rica. In
Thailand, the Coordinating Group for Religion in Society was
founded in 1976 to collect and disseminate information about
Thai political prisoners, identify misuses of governmental
power, and sensitize the population to human rights concerns."
In South Korea, Korean civilian employees of the U.S. military
formed a nationwide organization, the Korean Struggle Organization, to fight for the rights of the more than 14,000 base
workers who are employed by the U.S. military outside its
26. 4 HRI NEWSLm-ER 20 (Sept./Oct. 1978); and id. at 12 (Jan. 1979).
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formal contracts. "2 In Paraguay, the Commission for the Defense of Human Rights, which has existed since 1967, held a
major international human rights conference in Asunci6n in
December 1978.28 Indeed, throughout South America, and particularly in the Southern Cone, human rights groups have organized to counter the increasing coordination of the repressive
regimes of that region. Recent conferences held by the Vicariate of Solidarity in Chile, by the Sao Paulo Archdiocesan Pastoral Commission for Human Rights and the Marginalized in
Brazil, and by the Caribbean Human Rights and Legal Aid
Co. in Surinam, also attest to global linkages and concerns
between organizations in different nations. 9 Finally, one can
make mention of parallel manifestations in Africa: the adoption of the "Freetown Declaration of 1979 on Human Rights in
Africa" of the African Bar Association; 30 the formation of the
National Council for Public Liberty in Tunisia, 3' and the
human rights conferences held in 1978 in Rwanda and in
32
Dakar.

III.

RECENT TRENDS IN THE

NGO HuMAN

RIGHTS COMMUNrrY

In addition to the proliferation and increasing diversity of
human rights organizations throughout the world, a number of
specific trends are discernable in the expanding NGO universe.
The first is the manifest shift from a primary concern with the
promotion of international human rights standards to the
protectionof the rights embodied in international instruments.
A second trend, briefly touched on above, concerns the increasing involvement of scientific and professional organizations in
the human rights arena. As an amplification of that, a third
trend is the more active role that the legal profession has begun
to play in seeking enforcement of human rights internationally.
Fourth is the deepening commitment of churches to the struggle. A fifth trend is the growing concern for the plight of indigenous peoples, refugees, migrant workers, and other vulnerable groups. The sixth, seventh and eighth emerge from all of
the above: increasing attempts at cooperation; experimenta27. American Friends Service Committee, Korea Report, No. 3 (July 1978).
28. 4 HRI NEWst1 ER 32 (Jan. 1979).
29. These conferences are reported in 4 HRI NEwsLtrrER (Sept. 1978-Jan. 1979).
30. 4 HRI NEWSLEER 28 (Sept./Oct. 1978).
31. 3 id. at 17 (Oct./Nov. 1977).
32. Id. at 30 (Aug. 1978), with respect to the Rwanda meeting. The International
Commission of Jurists' Dakar meeting has not yet released its report.
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tion in strategy and tactics; and strengthening linkages between action-oriented and research-oriented groups.
The remainder of this article will discuss these trends and
consider their impact upon the struggle for human dignity
throughout the world community.
A. The Shift from Promotion to Protection
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was proclaimed in 1948 and the first two decades following the Declaration can largely be described as the years of promotion. During this period, much of the energies of NGOs were devoted to
achieving the codification of the rights proclaimed in the
United Nations Covenants on Human Rights and the myriad
of other international human rights instruments drafted during
these years. While that process of codification is by no means
complete-there is still no convention on religious intolerance,
and third generation or "solidarity" rights remain to be written
into law-there does now exist a very large corpus of treaty law
33
on international human rights.
Then, from the late 1960s on, NGOs which had directed
the major thrust of their efforts toward promotion began to
focus on the gap between promise and reality. While it is true
that there have been some organizations, notably the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) with respect to prisoners of war, and labor unions with respect to workers' rights,
that have been engaged in the protection of human rights for
many years, such organizations were the exception rather than
the rule in the post-World War II period. 3 With the U.N.
Human Rights Commission prepared to consider acting for the
protection of those victimized by gross and persistent patterns
of human rights violations, 35 the possibilities for NGOs of enhancing that protection expanded.
33. For a rapid survey of this corpus of law, see Bilder, The Status of International

Human Rights Law: An Overview, in INTERNATIONAL

LAW AND PRACTICE 1 (J. Tuttle

ed.

1978).
34. Forsythe & Wiseberg, A Research Agenda on Human Rights Protection, forthcoming in UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS.
35. For a discussion of the new U.N. procedures initiated in 1969 and subsequently enhanced in 1970 as ECOSOC Resolution 1503, see Cassese, Two United
Nations Proceduresfor the Implementationof Human Rights-The Role that Lawyers
Can Play Therein, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 33, at 39.
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Amnesty International (AI) typifies this new type of organization. Created in 1961 as a temporary campaign to appeal for
the amnesty of Portuguese students imprisoned for peaceful
protest, Al transformed itself into a permanent campaign to
secure the release of all political prisoners as evidence mounted
on the extensiveness of political imprisonment and prolonged
detention without charge or trial. Subsequently, AI also incorporated campaigns against torture and capital punishment
into its mandate. While AI has been active in human rights
promotion, particularly in the drafting of a Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Torture or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (adopted by the
General Assembly in December 1975), the development of
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, and
the elaboration of professional codes of ethics,3" the primary
thrust from the outset has been, and remains, affording
protection to the real and potential victims of torture and unlawful punishment. Other organizations have also developed in
the past decade in a direct effort to afford protection to persons
threatened by repression: the Vicariate of Solidarity in Chile,
TAPOL (the campaign for the release of Indonesian political
prisoners), the International Defense and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, and L'Action des chrdtiens pour l'abolition de la
torture" are prominent examples. Older organizations, such as
the International League for Human Rights, the International
Commission of Jurists, and the International Association of
Democratic Lawyers, have begun more aggressively to pursue
the politics of protection.
B.
The Involvement of Scientific and Professional
Associations
It is precisely with respect to protection that scientific and
professional associations have, in recent years, begun to make
a commitment to the defense of international human rights.
Thus, in 1977 the American Association for the Advancement
of Science established a Clearinghouse on Persecuted Foreign
Scientists under its Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility with 33 of its 200 affiliates joining the Clearing36. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ANNUAL REPORT 1977, at 20 (1978).

37. A description of all these organizations and their activities can be found in
issues of the HRI NEWSLETTER.
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house.3 8 At the sixth World Congress of Psychiatry in Honolulu
in August 1977, the World Psychiatry Association (WPA) condemned the abuse of psychiatry for political purposes and3
agreed to establish a committee to review abuse of psychiatry. '
In 1976 the National Academy of Sciences created a Committee on Human Rights to focus on the plight of individual scientists, engineers, and medical personnel suffering severe repression. In 1978 the Overseas Press Club set up a Human Rights
Subcommittee of the Freedom of the Press Committee, in response to the fact that a growing number of journalists around
the world were being detained or tortured. Many other professional associations have become similiarly engaged. 4'
Historically, professional and scientific organizations have
tended to avoid "sensitive" issues for fear of "politicizing" the
organization, and have exhibited an inherent tendency to support the status quo. Thus, Schmidhauser and Berg, tracing the
development of the American Bar Association, have noted the
"understandable ambivalence" of its leadership with respect to
matters of public policy: "When a subject did not meet their
approval, recommendations were dismissed on the grounds
that the problem was 'political.' Where the recommendations
were considered ideologically sound, consideration was urged
as essential to professional responsibility."" However, the
American Bar Association has not been unique in shunning
politically "sensitive" issues. This has been documented time
and again with regard to national organizations in the United
States, and these same tendencies are further emphasized at
the international level, where almost all professional and scientific organizations are necessarily based on the confederate
form of government with nationality as the constituent unit. As
an illustration, area associations, like the Asian Studies Association or the African Studies Association, have resisted taking
38.
39.
selected
Sept. 3,
40.

2 HRI NEWSLETTER 12 (May 1977), and subsequent issues.
WPA Condemns Psychiatric Abuses at 90-88, a collection of press clippings
from the coverage of the VI World Congress of Psychiatry (Hawaii, Aug. 291977).
For material on the formation and activities of these groups, see the HRI

NEWSLETTER.

41. Schmidhauser & Berg, The American Bar Association and the Human Rights
Conventions: The Political Significance of Private ProfessionalAssociations, 38 Soc.
RESEARCH

362, 375 (1971).
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policy positions on "politically sensitive" issues such as the
Vietnam war or U.S. policy toward the liberation struggle in
Southern Africa to the point that part of the membership split
away to set up their own organization (the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars), and another part of the membership
created a separate organization to acquire the freedom of action deemed essential (the Association of Concerned African

Scholars) .42
Similarly one can point to the intense resistance which
confronted human rights activists attempting to encourage the
World Congress of Psychiatrists to condemn the usage of psychiatric hospitals as prisons for political dissidents in the Soviet Union." In Mexico City, at the fifth Congress of the WPA,
association officials ruled out of order an attempt to introduce
a resolution condemning psychiatric abuse for political purposes. However, the weight of the evidence accumulated in the
six years between that fifth Congress in Mexico in 1971 and the
sixth in Honolulu in 1977, and the more sophisticated pressure
brought to bear by human rights activists, finally achieved that
condemnation and the establishment of a Committee to Review Psychiatric Abuse.
By contrast, the American Medical Association has failed
to respond, despite the efforts of human rights activists to activate members;" and, of the thirty-three AAAS organizations
which have become members of the Clearinghouse of Foreign
Persecuted Scientists, only three or four have been active in the
human rights arena.
C. "Liberalizing" Trends in the Legal Community
While it may be hazardous to generalize across cultures,
the legal communities-lawyers, judges, and other legal practitioners-in most countries have tended to fit (if not set) the
pattern of professional passivity with respect to issues of inter42. The Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars broke away in response to the
refusal of the Asian Studies Association to take a stand on the Vietnam war. The
formation of the Association of Concerned African Scholars is more recent but is
equally reflective of discomfort with a posture of academic aloofness that tends to
support the status quo.
43. Shaw & Block, Another Dark Age of Psychiatry, LANcET, Feb. 24, 1973, at 418419.
44. We have had discussions with many NGO leaders in the U.S. who have tried,
unsuccessfully, to move the Association to a position of concern.
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national human rights. There is a paradox which emerges from
an examination of the role of lawyers and their organizations
to the human rights movement, and that is that lawyers and
judges are frequently best positioned in society to observe the
violations of human rights, particularly civil and political
rights. Their skills are vital both to the protection and the
promotion process. Indeed, the courage of individual lawyers in
the defense of human rights: Joel Carlson in South Africa,"
Srdja Popovic in Yugoslavia," lawyers in Greece under the rule
of the Colonels,"7 among others, has been remarkable. We also
have numerous examples of the integrity and resoluteness of
the judiciary in attempting to maintain its independence and
the rule of law in countries that have fallen into dictatorial
rule: the Indian judiciary during the 1975-1977 emergency is a
recent example. 8 This notwithstanding, it has been exceedingly difficult to mobilize large sectors of the legal community,
especially in the United States and Western Europe, for the
human rights struggle.
Undoubtedly, the best known and the most widely respected group in the Western hemisphere today is the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ). Founded in 1952 in the
context of the Cold War to follow up abuses of justice in the
Warsaw Pact countries, the ICJ, especially during the last decade, has become truly international in concern and nonpartisan in its fight to uphold the rule of law worldwide.' 9 There
has been a marked shift in the position of the ICJ over the past
decade away from blanket condemnations of Communist regimes and toward an active concern about how the rule of law
can be strengthened in all political systems, including oneparty states in the Third World. The three conferences that the
ICJ held in the last few years in Tanzania, the Caribbean, and
Senegal, were all efforts pointing in this new direction. 50 Addi45. See, e.g., J. CARLSON, No NEUTRAL GROUND (1973).
46. International League for Human Rights, ANNUAL REvEw 1976-1977 at 8 (1977).
47. Abram, et. al., Report of an International Commission of Inquiry Into the
Detention of ConstantineAlavanos. . . (et al), 54 IDOC-NoRTH AMERICA 21-29 (Summer 1973).
48. Soli J. Sorabjee, comments made at a Conference on Human Rights, Foreign
Policy and the Media (Princeton, N.J., Nov. 3-5, 1978).
49. Scoble & Wiseberg, Human Rights NGO's, supra note 7, at 624-26.
50. The reports of the first two conferences have been published; the third is
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tionally, the ICJ in 1978 formed a Centre for the independence
of Judges and Lawyers in response to the fact that, "in an
increasing number of countries, and on an increasing scale,
serious inroads have been made into the independence of both
judges and of practicing advocates-particularly those who
have been engaged in the defense of persons accused of political
offenses." 51 The objectives of the Centre are to collect and distribute information on legal guarantees for the independence of
the legal profession, document particular cases of harassment,
repression or victimization, and distribute this information to
judges, lawyers, and their organizations throughout the world,
so that appropriate action can be taken to protect colleagues.
In a similar vein, lawyers in the United States have become directly involved in the human rights struggle at the
ground level. While it is still a small minority of the legal
profession in the U.S. that has become active-particularly
since the American Bar Association has given its approval to
the ratification of the Genocide Convention and the Racial
Discrimination Convention" and most recently (1979) to the
U.N. Human Rights Covenants-we have seen a marked willingness of lawyers to directly apply their talents to the protection of human rights. Thus, the Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights, begun in 1976 as a joint project of the
International League for Human Rights and the Council of
New York Law Associates, has built up an impressive record
in reporting on human rights abuses in Argentina; documenting the human rights situation in Uganda and evaluating the
potential effects of trade sanctions and other viable methods of
enforcement; preparing a report on U.S. failure to fulfill its
commitment to the U.N. in the administration of Micronesia;
examining the practices of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service in dealing with Haitian refugees; taking on cases of
Soviet dmigrds, imprisoned trade unionists, political asylum
cases, family reunification cases, etc.; and holding training sesforthcoming. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN A ONE-PARTY
STATE (1978); and INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
DEVELOPMENT (1977).
51. 1 BULLETIN OF THE CENTRE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS 1

(Sept. 1978).
52. 4 HRI NEWSLETTER 17 (Sept./Oct. 1978); and id. at 13 (Feb./Mar. 1979).
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sions for young lawyers interested in practicing in the area. 3 In
1978 two new legally oriented U.S. groups began similar work:
the International Human Rights Law Group of the Procedural
Aspects of International Law Institute and the Alien Law Project of the Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
Under the Law.54 Both worked closely with the Lawyers' Committee for International Human Rights on the Haitian refugee
study, which was a joint project of all three groups;5 5 and both
have been holding training sessions for lawyers and paralegals.
The former has been particularly active in studying the question of the implications of the reservations that the Justice and
State Departments have attached to the human rights conventions, sent to the Senate for ratification; the latter has been
working with political asylum, refugee, and illegal alien cases,
both at the level of providing legal assistance and at the level
of scrutinizing American law to see that it accords with international standards.
A somewhat older effort in the area of protection is the
Southern Africa Project of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights Under the Law, which was established in 1967 to provide legal representation in political and quasi-political trials
in South Africa.5" Recently, however, there has been greater
cooperation between organizations concerned specifically with
Southern Africa and lawyers' committees, reflective perhaps of
the changed mood in the U.S. and the increasing willingness
of lawyers to become involved in such issues as documenting
the violations of international sanctions by multinational corporations. This trend has even become apparent in the law
schools where law professors and students have evidenced an
interest in more than the "grand and global schemes" of international law and have become interested in the concerns of
53. Id. at 24 (Nov./Dec. 1978); and id. at 19 (Jan. 1979).
54. For descriptions of these organizations, see HuMAN RIGtTS DIRECTORY 1979.
55. The Haitians in Miami: Current Immigration Practices in the United States,
a joint report of the Lawyers' Committee for International Human Rights, the International Human Rights Law Group, and the Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law, Alien Rights Law Project (Dec. 1978).
56. HUMAN RIGHTs DIRECTORY 1979. For a discussion of other NGOs active in the
struggle for the liberation of Southern Africa, see G. Shepherd, Jr., ANTi-APARrHEm:
TRANSNATIONAL CONFLICT AND WESTERN POLICY IN THE LIBERATION OF SouTH AFRICA

(1977).
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practicing lawyers at the enforcement level. For example, several years ago Northwestern University Law students established the World Advocate Center, and in 1978 Harvard University's International Law Society initiated a research project
of providing voluntary legal research to organizations concerned with the international protection of international
rights.57 As with the informal program that Professor Frank
Newman had organized at Boalt Hall, University of California
Law School at Berkeley several years earlier, taking law students to lobby and observe the United Nations Human Rights
Subcommission meetings in Geneva,"8 the hope is that such
programs will provide both practical legal training to students
interested in international human rights law and support to
NGOs working in the field. The Ford Foundation internship
program, initiated in 1976 to provide law students or graduate
students with the opportunity of working for a year with a
human rights NGO, 5' has also stimulated and been stimulated
by these concerns.
Finally, in reviewing developments within the United
States in the law field, one might note evidence of the liberalization of the legal profession in the establishment in several
cities of international human rights committees of city bar associations. 0 While this in no way suggests that the average
American lawyer has suddenly become an impassioned human
rights advocate, it does represent some movement in the direction of consciousness-raising among the U.S. legal community.
So, too, does the fact that the American Bar Association has
agreed to support a program for curriculum development in
international human rights law in American law schools.6 ' All
these are rather hopeful signs.
57. 3 HRI NEWSLETR 6 (Oct./Nov. 1978); and 4 id. at 7 (Nov./Dec. 1978).
58. This was an informal program conducted by Professor Newman whose students became known in Geneva as "Newman's mafia."
59. The Ford Foundation-funded human rights internship program run by the
University of Minnesota, under the directorship of law professor David Weissbrodt, has
precisely this as its objective.
60. The Bar of Chicago and the Bar of New York have committees on international human rights, and several other city bar associations are in the process of
forming similar committees.
61. Morton Sklar, Proposal for a Human Rights Law Studies Center, (developed
under the auspices of the International Law Section of the American Bar Association
and endorsed by the Governing Council of the ABA's International Law Section) (June
1, 1978).
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THE DEEPENING COMMITMENT OF CHURCHES TO THE HUMAN

RIGHTS STRUGGLE

Both at the global and national level, the 1970's have provided evidence of a deepening commitment of churches to the
human rights struggle. The Roman Catholic Church's revitalization is associated with Vatican I and Vatican II which led to
the creation of the Pontifical Commission of Justice and Peace,
and national Justice and Peace Commissions in many countries. While the Vatican body has largely concentrated on
study and reflection, many national Justice and Peace Offices
have become deeply involved in the politics of enforcement,
such as with the Rhodesian Front regime and analyzing the
of rounding up rural Africans into
Rhodesian regime's practice
"protected villages." 2 (As a consequence, nuns working with
the Commission were arrested, the publication banned, and
members of the church harassed). Catholic bishops in South
Africa have also been outspoken against the apartheid regime
and against the police state that has been imposed to enforce
apartheid laws.63 In the Southern Cone of Latin America, as the
military have come to power in these societies and consolidated
highly repressive regimes, churches have become important
domestic actors in the struggle to counter the power of the
State." The work of the Vicariate of Solidarity in Chile is now
well known: in the aftermath of the coup against Salvador
Allende, the Church responded to the persecuted who turned
to it for help. 5 Elsewhere in South America, in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, and El Salvador, courageous bishops have spoken
out in defense of the rights of peasants, labor leaders, and
others who have opposed repression. 6 Similarly, in Asia, as
with the Bishops in Mindanao in the Philippines, individual
62. Rhodesia: The Propaganda War, A Study of The Catholic Commission for
Justice and Peace in Rhodesia (1977).
63. See Shepard, supra note 56.
64. 21 J. INTERAM. STUi. & WoRLD Air. No. 1 (Feb. 1979), devoted to The Church
and Politics in Latin America. See, especially, Smith, S.J., Churches and Human
Rights in Latin America: Recent Trends in the Subcontinent, id. at 89.
65. The Vicariate of Solidarity was awarded a human rights prize for its work by
the United Nations, Dec. 10, 1978.
66. See generally, the reports of such groups as the Washington Office on Latin
America, the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (Washington, D.C. and New York),
IDOC-International (Rome), and LADOC (Washington, D.C.).
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churchmen have spoken out, even where church structures
remain relatively conservative. 7
Paralleling the progressive thrusts in the Catholic Church
have been similar efforts in Protestant churches, as evidenced
particularly in the World Council of Churches, based in Geneva, to which many individual churches belong. Under the
impact of the radicalization of Protestant missionaries working
in repressive societies, the decolonization of Third World
church structures, and the growing consciousness of the inequalities in the international economic order, the WCC has
moved human rights to a priority item on its global agenda. In
October 1974, the WCC held a major consultation on Human
Rights and Christian Responsibility in St. Polten, Austria."' In
1975 the World Council created a Human Rights Resources
Office on Latin America in response to pleas from Chilean
churches. Since the Fifth Assembly of the WCC in Nairobi in
1975, the World Council has dedicated itself to the search for
"a just, participatory, and sustainable society.''"
Concurrently, but also under the impact of the domestic
civil rights movement and the "war on poverty" in the United
States, the National Council of Churches of Christ in the
U.S.A. has taken similar steps, most recently the creation of a
70
Human Rights Office in its Division of Overseas Ministries.
We have also witnessed the support of both Catholic and Protestant churches for such projects as the Washington Office on
Latin America and the Washington Office on Africa, lobbying
for just societies in those areas of the world and, especially, for
an end of U.S. support to repressive regimes; the Inter-Faith
Corporate Responsibility Project, which monitors church investments with multinational corporations to see that church
money does not support exploitative corporate ventures, or
lend support to governments which violate the human rights of
their people; and the work of the Human Rights Working
67. See, e.g., Claver, A Pastoral Letter-The Philippines, 3 HRI NEWLETTER 32
(Apr./May 1978).
68. World Council of Churches, Commission of Churches on International Affairs,
Human Rights and Christian Responsibility, at 21, Report of the Consultation (St.
Polten, Austria 1974).
69. Interview with Rev. Charles Harper, Human Rights Resources Office, World
Council of Churches (Geneva, Switzerland summer 1977).
70. HUMAN RIGHTs DREcroR¥ 1979, note 3 supra.
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Group of the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy.
The past few years have also seen a heightened involvement of Jewish congregations with respect, to the plight of
Soviet Jewry, of Jews in Arab countries, and also with more
generalized concerns. 7 Thus, the American Jewish Committee
took a strong stand on the Cambodian massacres, the plight of
Indo-Chinese refugees, and in support of the United Nations
Convention Against Racial Discrimination.12 Jewish and Christian organizations have worked closely together on such issues
as religious freedom, as evidenced by the recent formation of a
new U.S.-based organization, ecumenical in structure, Freedom of Faith. 3
None of this is to suggest that churches everywhere are
liberalizing institutions in the forefront of the human rights
struggle, or even that the progressive thrust in church structures has been a dominant one. Yet, there are hopeful signs, as
with the strong support that AI-U.S.A. has been able to generate with its Church Urgent Action Network, or overseas, with
the continued perseverance of such groups as the Coordinating
Group for Religion and Society in Thailand, or the Japan
Emergency Christian Conference on Korea.
E. Heightened Concern for the Plight of Indigenous Peoples,
Refugees, Migrant Workers and Other Vulnerable Groups
When one considers the large numbers of persons persecuted throughout the world, it is difficult to make comparative
judgements or, at least, definitive ones about the "most persecuted." Nonetheless, in recent years, some consensus has
begun to form concerning the total vulnerability of fourth world
people-indigenous peoples frequently faced with total destruction, in extreme cases at the level of physical extermination or, in somewhat less extreme situations, at the level of
cultural genocide. A few organizations-Cultural Survival
(U.S.A.), Survival International (U.K.), and the International
Working Group for Indigenous Affairs (Denmark)-have
71. The American Jewish Committee, for example, has always played an active
role in the United Nations forum and has had an active international human rights
program.
72. 4 HRI NEWSLErrER 18 (Jan. 1979); and 3 id. at 14 (Apr./May 1978).
73. 4 HRI NEWSLETrER 23 (Nov./Dec. 1978).
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emerged in response to the plight of fourth world peoples."
Comprised largely of anthropologists, these organizations have
tended to operate with small budgets, limited staff, and modest resources. Nonetheless, they have received the support
from, and stimulated interest among, other organizations such
as the Minority Rights Group (U.K.), the International League
for Human Rights (U.S.A.), or the Anti-Slavery Society
(U.K.). Increasingly, the genocide of the Ache Indians in Paraguay,75 the threat to the Bolivian Indians posed by white settler
migration from Rhodesia, 6 and the massacre of Indian peasants at Panzos, in Guatamala, 7 are documented and publicized. Of particular significance in bringing the dire circumstances of indigenous people to world attention was the September 1977 Conference of the International Indian Treaty
Council in Geneva, at which delegates representing more than
sixty nations and peoples from fifteen countries in the Americas gave testimony about genocide, discrimination and ethnocide used to destroy native peoples in order to exploit their land
and resources. 8
As a consequence, there has been some serious consideration within the human rights community during the past year
to the possibility of establishing a United Nations Commissioner for Indigenous Populations. This has taken on particular
political salience as the hope of getting adequate support for a
United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights was effectively squelched in 1978 (when United Nations member states
decided once again not to consider the establishment of such
an office). A Commissioner for Indigenous Peoples might, however, be better able to mobilize the necessary majority support
and be a first step toward the creation of a more generalized
7
U.N. office for human rights protection.
74. On Cultural Survival and Survival International, see HUMAN RIGHTs DIREcTORY 1979, note 3 supra. On the International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs,
see 4 HRI NEWSLETTER 24 (Sept./Oct. 1978).
75. See GENOCIDE IN PARAGUAY (R. Arens ed. 1976).
76. N. LEwIs, EAsTERN BoLwuI: THE WHrTE PROMISED LAND (1978).
77. Guatemala 1978: The Massacre at Panzos (IWGIA Doc., Copenhagen 1978).
78. P. BILLINGS, PARADOX AND PROMI SE IN HUMAN RIGHTS 3-4, 88-90 (1979).
79. The proposal for the creation of an Office of a Commissioner for Indigenous
Peoples was discussed by Theo C. van Boven, Director of the United Nations Division
of Human Rights, at a seminar he gave in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 1978).
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The past few years have also seen human rights NGOs pay
increasing attention to other highly vulnerable groups in society, particularly refugees and migrant workers. Moreover,
organizations have become concerned not only with the crisis
situation of providing assistance and protection to such groups
in emergency situations, but also with analyzing the underlying causes that give rise to them.
F. IncreasingAttempts at Cooperation
Several other trends emerge from, and have interacted
with, those noted above. A notable one is the increasing attempt at cooperation between diverse human rights organizations despite their continued functional, regional, or issue specialization. A number of these efforts have already been noted:
the emergence of the British Human Rights Network, pulling
together almost all British organizations engaged in systematic
international human rights work; the formation of the Human
Rights Working Group of the Coalition for a New Foreign and
Military Policy in the United States, which seeks to coordinate
lobbying efforts of some eighty organizations; and the efforts to
coordinate Helsinki monitoring groups in preparation for Madrid. One must again mention the NGO committees that work
together in New York and Geneva to coordinate policy and
exchange views with respect to United Nations lobbying; cooperation between Latin American human rights organizations,
some of which are currently trying to create the Federation of
Permanent Human Rights Assemblies of Latin America; and
very recent efforts of the International League for Human
Rights in New York to work more closely with the International
Federation of Human Rights in Paris, with a conference scheduled in the spring of 1979 which brought together the West
European affiliates of each to explore the potentialities for
common action.
In this context, however, it is also necessary to point out
the probable limits to effective cooperation-limits imposed by
the diverse interests, ideologies, and strategies that different
sections of the human rights community bring to bear on the
human rights issue. There are now so many specific groups,
each with their own particular interests and ideological
perspective, that have taken human rights to be their own
issue, that it is difficult to conceive of a permanent form of
cooperation even in the United States, let alone internation-
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ally. For one thing, there are so many area-specific groups (e.g.,
TAPOL, which campaigns for Indonesian political prisoners;
the Chile Committee for Human Rights; the Friends of the
Filipino People, etc.) that are so absorbed in their own specialization that they are prepared to divert their meagre organization resources only when the most compelling arguments are
made. Generally, calls for cooperation are interpreted as a request that they diminish the significance of precisely those
issues they have made uniquely their own. Secondly, given the
diverse backgrounds and experiences of the leadership of
human rights NGOs-some of whom have been schooled in the
U.N. arena, some in the domestic civil rights struggle, some in
diplomacy, some in the confrontation politics of the antiwar
movement-there are bound to be disagreements over strategy
and tactics, even where they can agree on the salience of an
issue. Thirdly, there are few issues for which ideological differences seem wholly irrelevant and where genuine cooperation is
possible across the spectrum of American human rights groups.
One of these, we think, is the U.S. ratification of the human
rights treaties currently pending before the Senate, which
might have been the catalyst to an extensive ad hoc coalition.
It remains to be seen, as the Covenants move onto the Senate
agenda, whether a sustained cooperative effort can take place.
Internationally, cooperation is rendered even more difficult by the ideological factor, but also by simple isolation and
lack of communication. Where cooperation occurs, it seems to
be of three types. The first is broad generalized support that
one human rights movement provides another, as with the
moral and material assistance Western antiapartheid movements provide to the liberation movements in Southern Africa,
or the same broad range of support from Western groups to the
Vicariate of Solidarity in Chile. The second is the tactical cooperation between human rights NGOs at United Nations forums, or before intergovernmental bodies such as the InterAmerican or European Human Rights Commissions. This often
involves formal caucusing as well as informal corridor efforts to
set priorities and mobilize support for particular items on the
agendas of international bodies. A third form of cooperation
arises out of specific attempts by national or international
human rights NGOs to afford protection to groups or individuals in other countries by sending representatives to meetings
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organized by the vulnerable persons or groups as evidence of
international concern and commitment; affiliating with such
groups where such affiliation is desired and deemed possible by
the vulnerable organization; sending observers to political
trials when human rights leaders are persecuted for their
human rights activities; and rejecting the counsel of quiet diplomacy in the belief that publicity is the best protection that
the international human rights community can provide to
threatened colleagues. However, despite this writer's hopes,
the prospects for greater coordination on a global scale are not
good.
G. Experimentation in Strategy and Tactics
As the human rights community moves away from the area
of promotion to that of protection, individuals have recognized
the need for developing new strategies and tactics, including
new ways to mobilize organizational resources. They have recognized that the legislative victories which produced the corpus
of international human rights law were primarily symbolic victories, or an early stage in a continuing political process, the
ultimate object of which is to change behavior of national and
international elites. It is now necessary to focus upon implementation, and in so doing, to devote attention to the creation
of new institutional structures with trained staff and adequate
budgets and mandates for enforcement. Thus, the human
rights community has supported a number of organizational
initiatives: e.g., changes in U.N. procedure making it possible
for action to be taken on the thousands of individual complaints annually received; efforts to extend the number and
duration of the meetings of the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights and its Subcommission; strengthening the InterAmerican Human Rights Commission through an expansion of
budget and personnel; and the thus far unsuccessful efforts to
create a United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
and an appraisal of the proposal for a Commissioner for Indigenous Peoples as a politically more feasible first step. Most
recently, they have begun to debate the desirability of creating
an international information clearinghouse and data center
which would both gather and disseminate information of
human rights violations and progress world wide. With respect
to the clearinghouse proposal, there is serious debate over such
questions as to whether it should be limited to fact gathering

652

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL.

8:627

or permitted also to engage in evaluation; whether it is to be
controlled by governments or by a nonpartisan nongovernmental organization; whether it is to be a single center or an informal network; and how it should be financed. Nevertheless, the
debate signals the recognition of the need for such an institution.
At the same time human rights organizations have begun
to recognize that bodies such as the U.N., the O.A.S., and the
Council of Europe are not the only forums in which human
rights issues should be confronted, but that international financial institutions-in particular, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the regional development
banks-must be made aware of human rights issues. Additionally, NGOs have begun to perceive multinational corporations
and commercial banks as relevant targets of their activities.
Meanwhile, the effort of elaborating national governmental
structures-such as the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs of the Department of State-to focus more attention on human rights considerations in the making of foreign
and military policy continues.
Concurrently, there have been concerted efforts to experiment with the domestic application of international human
rights standards. For example, there have been recent cooperative efforts in the United States and West Europe to expose the
indifference of domestic bureaucracies in enforcing the general
trade embargo against Rhodesia and the specific arms embargo
against South Africa. Another form of experimentation, which
has actually been inspired by the innovations of Russian dissidents and the Charter '77 Group in Czechoslovakia, is the recent creation of the Helsinki Watch Committee for the United
States, which has stimulated hearings on U.S. compliance with
the 1975 Final Act.80 Recently, the prospects of attaining U.S.
ratification of human rights covenants has reopened the question of the "non-self-executing" nature of such instruments,
with groups pressuring the State Department to include this
provision among the reservations transmitted to the Senate.8 '
80. The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe held these public
hearings April 3-5, 1979.
81. This was a major theme discussed at a Conference of the International Human
Rights Law Group (Washington, D.C., Jan. 18, 1979).
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As organizations have experimented with strategies and
tactics of implementation, it has become clear that they need
to expand constitutuency support, whether they are directed
toward the national or the international arenas. As a consequence, we have seen the conscious efforts exerted by these
NGOs at mobilizing professional associations, the legal community, and churches; and we have also observed attempts to
draw in other groups which have not normally been concerned
with human rights issues. One such campaign was initiated by
Liberty to Captives, a Christian pacifist group based in Philadelphia, to sensitize the Boy Scouts of America to the human
rights implications of participating in the 1979 World Jamboree which was to take place in Iran.8 2 Another effort, thus
far less successful, has been to mobilize American labor unions
in defense of Chilean workers by means of a boycott of Chilean
shipping and export products to the U.S." A final example may
be found in the recent creation of TransAfrica, concerned with
problems both in Africa and the Caribbean region, which is
aimed at activating and sustaining the concern of American
Blacks for the human rights of Blacks in these areas."
H. Strengthening Linkage Between Activism and Research
The last trend we discern is that of strengthening linkages
between action oriented and researchoriented groups. There is
nothing new about either of two apparently contradictory phenomena: On the one hand, a large gap between the work of
activists and academics who are generally isolated from each
other and often speak very different languages; and, on the
other hand, a clear recognition by some activists and academics of the mutual interdependence of their tasks. Both phenomena have been manifest in the human rights field. To the extent
that research on human rights was, until recently, the preserve
of political philosophers and international legal scholars, their
work was neither read nor understood by those on the front
lines of the human rights struggle. At the same time, human
rights activists were very aware of the fact that much of their
impact, and their credibility, rested on the quality of their
information about the state of human rights world wide. Their
82. 4 HRI NEWSLErER 14 (Jan. 1979).

83. Id. at 12 (Nov./Dec. 1978).
84. HUMAN RIGHTS DIRECTORY 1979.
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action on behalf of the victims of persecution depended upon
a research capacity. Thus, in some cases, groups, such as Amnesty International, developed their own research staff and
capability. In other instances, action oriented groups began
collaborative enterprises with like-minded research centers or
scholars. The Human Rights Working Group of the Coalition
for a New Foreign and Military Policy works closely with the
Center for International Policy in preparing the theoretical and
empirical basis for its lobbying. Also, Freedom House works
closely with Raymond Gastil of the Battelle Seattle Research
Center, who prepares its annual survey of the "State of Freedom" worldwide. We find similar linkages between West European action groups and academic communities, as with the
support provided to the Scandinavian human rights movement
by the Peace Research Institute in Oslo. In the Third World,
and particularly with respect to either church-based groups or
socialist groups, there is an even more pronounced tendency
towards analysis and action originating with the churches'
stress on reflection and the Marxist stress on action. Moreover,
as it is frequently students and university teachers who are in
the forefront of political opposition in Third World countries,
and to the extent that they have been responsive to labor or
peasant movements, the separation between academia and the
activist world has been less pronounced than in industrialized
societies.
IV.

EVALUATING EFFECTIVENESS: WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?

Thus far, we have been largely descriptive in our discussion of trends. But description is only a prelude to analysis.
What does it all mean? When one examines the proliferation
of human rights NGOs, the increasing involvement of professional associations, legal groups and churches, the heightened
concern for the plight of indigenous peoples, refugees and migrant workers, increasing attempts at cooperation between
groups, experimentation with strategy and tactics, and
strengthening linkages between academics and activists, has
all of this really had its manifestly intended effect? Has it
really lessened human rights violations and increased human
dignity?
There is no single satisfactory and, certainly, no scientific
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answer to this question. As we have argued elsewhere,85 impact
cannot be measured with precision in any multicausal situation. There is little evidence to support the claim of Zbigniew
Brzezinski that, in the last year,
there has been progress in a number of countries. It is difficult
to measure it but as a rough approximate estimate, I would say
in at least 40 countries around the world in which two and a half
billion people live, there, has been tangible progress-in some
cases more, in some cases less, in some cases certainly not
enough, but progress nonetheless.8s

Even if one could validate these quantitative claims, there is
no way to single out the contribution to progress of any one of
the logically independent variables: nongovernmental actors,
Carter's policy, the United Nations system, etc. Nonetheless,
the human rights movement is, and psychologically must be,
sustained by the faith that intended effects are being produced.
Even if it is impossible to measure progress and pinpoint causation, the facts that adopted prisoners are released, waves of
torture seem to abate, press censorship is relaxed, and dictatorships are overthrown sustain the private commitment of those
who make up the activists and leaders in the human rights
organizations. Beyond that, in the dialogue engaged in by
thinking persons, the human rights activists persuade themselves that without these groups and activities the human
rights situation would be far worse indeed. And there is a logic
to this argument. To the extent that the behavior of elites is
systematically scrutinized and censured, that elites are consequently forced to grant at least verbal deference to international human rights standards, and that domestic repression
can no longer be hidden but tends to be internationalized, support and encouragement is provided to those acting as if international standards exist. In this context, it is worth noting
Louis Henkin's appraisal of international enforcement mechanisms, "that the early assumption that states might be prepared to scrutinize other states and be scrutinized by them,"
as reflected in the early human rights conventions, has proven
fallacious.8 7 That is, "to date, more states have submitted to
85. Scoble & Wiseberg, Amnesty International:Evaluating the Effectiveness of a
Human Rights Actor, note 7 supra.

86. Brzezinski, note 1 supra.
87. L.
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109 (1978).
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private complaints than to interstate scrutiny. Obviously,
then, some states that are willing to have their citizens' complaints scrutinized are still reluctant to be accused by other
governments and have human rights trouble their diplomatic
relations." 8
At the same time, an honest appraisal of impact must take
note of the modesty of the advances that have been made.
Taking just one illustration, despite the enormous recent expansion in the resources, membership, and influence of Amnesty International, that organization is forced to conclude in
its 1978 Annual Report that:
there is little room for satisfaction. Torture in its cruelest forms
continues to be a systematic practice in many countries. Furthermore, in some parts of the world, new, more sophisticated methods of torture are being developed for the interrogation of political suspects or for deterring opposition to the regime. And torture
is also being used by anti-government and opposition groups."9

Furthermore, it is not inconceivable that the growth and effectiveness of human rights organizations perversely stimulates
increased repression, at least in the short run, by heightening
the demands for political participation, economic justice, and
freedom of expression. There is currently evidence to suggest
that when elites feel insecure and threatened, they respond
with brutality.
Meanwhile, the human rights organizations, which are frequently crisis oriented, have focused on violations and have not
yet attempted to analyze underlying causes of repression.
Therefore, they find themselves in the unenviable position of
mopping up the worst consequences of violations without moving toward an understanding of structural causes and, thus, to
institutional transformations which might significantly reduce
these excesses. We do not mean by this that we expect there
to be any single cause of human rights violations in general. We
do mean that without attention to causal factors, the danger
is that the "progress" registered will be superficial and temporary. Nor is it evident that any of the human rights NGOs,
particularly those in Western Europe and North America, are
willing to recognize the costs of genuine human rights policies
88. Id.
89. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. ANNUAL REPORT 1978. at 16 (1979).
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and to undertake the political education campaigns necessary
to actualize them. By this we mean that few Americans or other
Westerners have faced the material cost that would have to
accompany progress in economic development in those countries in which almost all rights are being systematically denied
for the benefit of indigenous elites and affluent Westerners.
They have neither understood nor recognized the implications
of the 1977 General Assembly resolution that "the realization
of the new international economic order is an essential element
for the effective promotion of human rights and fundamental
freedoms and should be accorded priority." 0
And if this has not been recognized by Western-based
NGOs, the costs of a genuine human rights policy has certainly
not been faced by Western governments. This failure to confront hard and costly choices is reflected in Patricia Derian's
recent comment that: "Human rights is an area where our
ideals and our self-interest strongly coincide."'" She argues:
"Our well-being and security are enhanced when there is
greater respect for human rights in the world. Our policy is
important to the health and integrity of this society within the
United States. Support for or indifference to oppression in
other countries weakens the foundation of our democracy at
home.""2 True, yet, in every case where national defense or
economic interests have been perceived to be important, U.S.
human rights initiatives have disappeared.
A last pessimistic but necessary consideration of the
American scene is the fact that the human rights movement
could readily prove to be a passing mood. The Carter administration itself has obviously drawn back from commitment to
this initiative. Meanwhile, there is the more important saturation effect that seems a byproduct of the mass media in its
coverage of political issues and public interests. Race, poverty,
90. G. A. Res. 32/130, para.1 (f). In this regard, see van Boven, Human Rights and
Development Cooperation, 3 NJCM BULL. 3-6 (Bulletin of the Dutch Association
for the International Commission of Jurists No. 11 (Nov. 1978)); and A. EIDE, HUMAN
PROTECTION (Oslo, Norway 1977).
91. Patricia Derian, speech at the White House Commemoration of the 30th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 6, 1978) reprinted in 78
DEP'T STATE BULL. 6 (Jan. 1979).
92. Id.
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the urban crisis all peaked and died in this fashion. There is
nothing inherent in the human rights situation to distinguish
it from these equally pressing domestic problems. Nor is it at
all clear that the Congressional initiatives of the last four years
will be sustained in the new 96th Congress.
From a more global perspective, despite the encouragement one might draw from the trends described, it remains the
case that the motivation and capacity to engage in repression
have probably increased as well and for hundreds of millions
of human beings the future is even more precarious. It is a
documented fact that the gap between rich and poor, both
within societies and between societies, has increased and not
diminished during the past decades. 3 As a consequence, the
motivation to retain power and privilege is enhanced at the
same time that the technology for repression has become more
sophisticated and regional cooperation among dictatorial regimes has been demonstrated. For the human rights movement, therefore, the challenges remain at least as demanding
as ever and there are no immediate prospects for sudden or
dramatic victories.
93. See, e.g., EIDE, note 90, supra.
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